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ARTICLES

International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages: Another International
Community Step Against Terrorism
ROBERT ROSENSTOCK*

I. IMrODUCTION
The United Nations took another significant step in its campaign
against international terrorism when it adopted the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.1 On December 17, 1979, the
United Nations culminated a four-year effort when it adopted the Convention without objection and opened it for signature. As of October 20,
1980, twenty-nine states had signed the Convention and one had ratified. s
There is every reason to expect the number of signatures to grow steadily
and ratifications to follow in due course.
The basic thrust of the Hostages Convention is that those who take
hostages will be subject to prosecution or extradition if they are apprehended within the jurisdiction of a state party to the Convention. Safe
haven is to be denied by the application of the principle aut dedere aut
judicare, which obligates states to prosecute or extradite an alleged offender.8 States party to the Convention will also be obligated to cooperate
in the prevention of acts of hostage taking by internal preventative mea* A.B., 1957, Cornell University; LL.B., 1961, Columbia University. The writer is an
Adviser for Legal Affairs at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and was, along with
Alan Kreczko and John MacDonald, a member of the United States team that worked on
the Convention. The views expressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily
reflect or differ from the official position of the United States Government.
1. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
1457 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hostages Convention]. The text of the Convention is appended to this article.
2. States that have signed the Convention as of this writing are Bolivia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Federal Republic of Germany, Gabon,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, United
Kingdom, United States, and Zaire. Of the 29 states that have signed, only the Philippines
has ratified thus far.
3. For a study of effective measures to insure the trial of persons accused of terrorist
acts, see Costell, International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare.10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483 (1975).
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sures and by exchanging information and coordinating measures to prevent such acts.

The Hostages Convention is patterned on the approach embodied in
the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft,4 the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 6 and the Convention on the
Protection and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.' The impressive numbers of states
party to the Hague Convention (49), the Montreal Convention (48), and
the more recent Protection of Diplomats Convention (50), gives reason for

optimism that the Hostages Convention will also become rapidly and
widely ratified.
While the Hostages Convention closely follows the earlier models
which Mr. Wood correctly identifies as containing "the most widely ac-

ceptable solutions to the problems they deal with,"7 there are several
noteworthy departures and innovations in the Hostages Convention
which will be examined in the discussion below.

That these conventions have played a significant role in crystallizing
international opinion against the acts covered can be seen from a variety
of sources. Perhaps the most timely, if poignant, example is the debate in

the United Nations Security Council concerning the holding of American
diplomats as hostages in Iran. A number of states specifically cited the
Protection of Diplomats Convention and the then still Draft Hostages
Convention as major elements in their conclusion as to the illegality and
total unacceptability of the holding of the Americans in Tehran.8
4. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at the Hague,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
5. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Convention]. See also White, The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 6 Rzv. INT'L COMM'N JURIsTs 38, 44 (1971).
6. Convention on the Protection and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature, Dec. 14, 1973, G.A.
Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030 [hereinafter cited as Protection of Diplomats Convention]. See also Wood, The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic
Agents, 23 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 791 (1974). Mr. Wood's article is an excellent analysis of the
earlier convention. The references to it throughout this paper are based not only on its
relevance but also on the writer's agreement with Mr. Wood's analysis. The Protection of
Diplomats Convention was the model most closely followed in the elaboration of the Hostages Convention essentially because: (a) it was adopted by the same body, i.e., the United
Nations General Assembly, and a number of the negotiators were the same; and (b) it was
the most recent model and in many ways covered the most analogous conduct.
7. Wood, supra note 6, at 792.
8. See, e.g., the statements of Liberia, 34 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2175 at 51
(1979); Egypt, 34 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2176 at 16 (1979); Australia, id. at 22; the
Netherlands, id. at 31; Yugoslavia, id. at 52; Singapore, 34 U.N. SCOR, S/P.V. 2182 at 27
(1979); Nigeria, 34 U.N. SCOR, S/P.V. 2183 at 39 (1979). No one took a contrary view and
the illegality of the holding of the hostage was asserted by numerous speakers and contra-
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The holding of the American hostages in Iran is one event that illustrates the divergence between law and practice, at least during present
times. Why do those acts proscribed under the Protection of Diplomats
and Hostages Conventions continue to occur? Although there has been a
marked decrease in acts of violence against international civil aviation in
recent years, the same cannot be said for attacks on diplomats or the
taking of hostages. These conventions establish modes of international
cooperation to deal with the particular problems involved. They assume a
reasonable degree of local order and are designed to facilitate prosecution
and punishment rather than to function directly as part of a state's criminal law. Domestic laws concerning disorderly conduct or disturbing the
peace do not of themselves prevent riots and are in many cases virtually
irrelevant once a riot has reached a certain proportion since such laws
likewise presuppose a basically stable political order. International conventions are agreements among states and presuppose not only some
measure of international order among states, but also the capacity of individual states party to maintain basic order and authority within their
own territory.
The situation in Iran when the United States Embassy was seized
was outside the framework of conditions requisite to the operation of international law as no responsible civil authority existed in the country at
that time.' This is not to suggest that international law does not speak to
the current situation in Iran or that the Hostages Convention's reaffirmation that "the taking of hostages is an offense of grave concern to the
international community" 0 is not relevant. It might, however, explain
why the sophisticated tools that enable states to cooperate in dealing with
problems may be ineffective in situations involving the complete breakdown of law and order-the more so when the breakdown involves the
effective collapse of the basic unit of the current international order-the
nation-state.
Despite the seriousness of these breakdowns, the significance of the
entire international community banding together to elaborate means of
cooperation to deal with aspects of the scourge of terrorism is of immense
importance. That the international community has been prepared to undertake such commitments in a growing number of areas and over a time
span from 1970 to 1979 is a more valid reflection of the views of states
than the exceptional situations that have occurred, spectacular and horrifying as these situations are. The actions by the United Nations do not
merely reflect the views of governments, they contribute to precipitating
and reaffirming the conclusions of governments as to the unacceptability
of the acts in question and to their readiness to cooperate internationally
to deal with them.
dicted by none.
9. At the time of this writing, the hostages were still being held in Iran.
10. Hostages Convention, supra note 1, preamble, para. 3. See also U.S. Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 Dec. 1979, [1979] I.C.J. 7.
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It remains important, of course, for states in all cases to avoid rewarding the perpetrators of such acts as history teaches that nothing
breeds imitation and sequels like success. Efforts to press host govern-

ments to accord the release of hostages in cases in which the host government is the target of the coercion are as counterproductive as they are
undignified and unworthy of those who purport to be engaged in public
service. When governmental representatives urge that priority be given to
the well-being of diplomatic personnel over all other considerations, including the need to deny the hostage takers any benefit from their illegal
activities, they do a profound disservice to world order. The courageous
conduct of United States Ambassador Diego Ascencio in the Colombian
crisis and the firm position of the United States Government in that case
were exemplary as the kind of dignified and farsighted response demanded by the unfortunate circumstances in such situations.
The discussion below begins with the background and history of the
Hostages Convention and then proceeds with a treatment, in seriatum, of
the preamble and articles.11
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
After the successful elaboration of the Protection of Diplomats Convention,1' it was recognized by a number of governments that international action against aspects of international terrorism was possible if discrete target areas could be identified for such action." The success of the
international community with the physically discrete entity of aircraft
and civil aviation and the legally discrete class of internationally protected persons including diplomatic agents formed the basis for this view.
The problem was to find another area capable of identification as a specific and demarcated area which would not be so broad in its sweep as to
suffer the fate of League of Nations and United Nations efforts to deal
with all forms of terrorism in one fell swoop." Some thought was given at
the outset to the question of letter bombs since they were a physically
discrete method and the international mails are an easily identifiable
area. Happily, the discontinuation of letter bombs drained this area of
sufficient international concern to make it the next appropriate step in
the campaign against terrorism.
11. The nature of the discussion of the articles requires that the reader give special
attention to the text of the Convention, which is reprinted in the Appendix.
12. Note 6 supra.
13. See Nanda, ProgressReport on the United Nations' Attempt to Draft an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 6 Oxio N.U.L. REv. 89, 89 (1979).
14. For examples of unsuccessful efforts along these lines, see Reports of the Ad Hoc
Committee on International Terrorism, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 37), U.N. Doc. A/34/37
(1979); 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 37), U.N. Doc. A/32/37 (1977); 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp
(No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973) (hereinafter cited as 1973 International Terrorism Report]; and Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, 19
LRAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., PART I 21. The 1973 International Terrorism Report, at 28, contains the text of the U.S. proposal for a relatively general convention dealing with terrorism.
The U.S. effort did not fare well for a variety of reasons, including the breadth of its scope.
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After a measure of casting about, the Federal Republic of Germany,
presumably stimulated by the Munich atrocity of 1972 and subsequent
kidnappings of German businessmen within and outside the Federal Republic of Germany, fixed on the idea of action against the taking of hostages. Some other advocates of action against aspects of terrorism wondered whether hostage-taking was sufficiently separable from any other
acts of terrorism, lacking as it did the ease of physical or legal identification of aircraft and internationally protected persons. The Federal Republic of Germany wisely, as it turned out, refused to be dissuaded by
such counsels of caution and, on September 28, 1976, submitted a request
to include on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly the
topic of drafting an international convention against the taking of hostages. 15 The explanatory memorandum attached to this request addressed
the heinous nature of the act of hostage-taking and the incompatibility of
such an act with the dignity and fundamental rights of human beings to
life, liberty, and security enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,17 and proposed that the General Assembly draft a convention
against hostage-taking. ' O
The item was inscribed that year by the General Assembly on its
agenda without undue difficulty. The path from inscription to final adoption slightly more than three years later was, however, bumpy and often
tortuous. Most of the details of this path are best explained in terms of
the negotiating history of each particular article and are thus contained
below. Briefly put, the basic problems stemmed from the nervousness of
some at any action which might adversely affect the struggle for what
they view as self-determination, the distaste of others at the prospect of
seeing the Federal Republic of Germany have a success, combined with
an opportunistic inclination to support some of the more extreme Arab
and African positions, and various particularistic, if understandable,
problems of some Latin American and Arab states.
During the initial discussion of the item in the Legal Committee in
1976, some suggested that the effort should be directed at the taking of

15. 31 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 123) 1, U.N. Doc. A/31/242 (1976). It is
worth noting that both the Protection of Diplomats Convention, note 6 supra, and the Hostages Convention, note 1 supra, in no small way owe their existence to the determination of
certain gifted individuals. It is highly doubtful that there would be a Protection of Diplomats Convention had Ambassador Richard D. Kearney not raised the issue in the International Law Commission and pressed it through that body in record time, and hard to imagine a Hostages Convention without the energy, intellect, and determination of Dr. Karl
Fleischauer. That individuals can still play so critical and positive a role in today's complex
and bureaucratic world is itself an encouraging sign and an example as well.
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
18. 31 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 123) 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/31/242 (1976).
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innocent hostages, thus suggesting there were some persons who in some

sense deserved to be taken hostage. This notion met with widespread opposition and was not pressed.'
Once the item was inscribed on the agenda and the strength of support afforded some basis for hope of success in drafting a convention, attention turned to the question of how the international community could
best organize itself to prepare a draft convention. Many urged that the

brilliant and expeditious work of the International Law Commission
(ILC) on the Protection of Diplomats draft"0 argued for submitting the
question to the ILC. The Federal Republic of Germany wisely urged that
the matter be sent instead to an Ad Hoc Committee of governmental representatives that would act as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly.
One may presume that key decision-makers on the Federal Republic of
Germany's team such as Dr. Fleischauer and Dr. Bracklo concluded that
the technical legal problems had already been solved by the ILC when it
elaborated the Protection of Diplomats draft and that what was needed
was a body of governmental representatives whose work product would
speak to the political commitment to take community action. The ILC

finished the work on Protection of Diplomats in one session and the Ad
Hoc Committee required three sessions--a comparison which does not
commend the use of an ad hoc committee as a general approach. The

relative ease with which the final product of the Ad Hoc Committee
moved through the General Assembly, however, and the absence of any
objection to its final adoption, appear to speak eloquently for the political

wisdom of the ad hoc committee approach in this particular case. 1

19. Libya proposed inserting the word "innocent" before the word hostage. U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/31/L.11. Subsequently, "the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic indicated
that he would not press his amendments... to a vote." Report of the Sixth Committee, 31
U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 123) 3, U.N. Doc. A/31/430 (1976).
20. Report of the International Law Commission, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 88-90,
U.N. Doc. A/8710 (1972). See also Kearney, The Twenty-Fourth Session of the International Law Commission, 67 AM. J. INT' L. 84 (1973); Przetocznik, Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against InternationallyProtectedPersons, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 65 (1973);
Wood, supra note 6, at 792-93.
21. It may be noted that the method by which the 34th session of the General Assembly in 1979 examined the draft proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee was also exceptional.
Instead of the tried and true method of an article by article examination followed by referral to a small drafting committee of fixed number and then adoption by the Legal Committee article by article, the Legal Committee held a brief general debate on the main issues
followed by reference of the entire draft to a more or less open-ended group of state representatives which in no very clearly defined manner assumed the characteristics of, at various
times, a contact or negotiating group, a drafting group, and a mix of the two. This group
met from time to time throughout the 34th General Assembly. Neither the Legal Committee
nor the Plenary of the Assembly changed the wording of any of the articles that came out of
this group. See the Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on the Drafting of an
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
34/SR. 53 (1979). The fact that this group remained relatively small was fortunate, as was
the cooperative spirit of many of the delegations. The fact that its chairman, Klaus
Zehentner of the Federal Republic of Germany, was able to press as hard as he did for rapid
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III. THE TEXT
A.

The Preamble
The preamble of the Convention contains substantially anodyne language of the kind one might reasonably expect to find setting the context
for a convention seeking to deal with the problem of hostage-taking. The
first two paragraphs of the preamble recognize the relevance of the Convention to the central United Nations purpose of maintaining international peace and security and the sanctity of life, liberty, and security of
person."
The third preambular paragraph-dealing with the United Nations
Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples-is of
interest both for what it says and what it does not say. There are four
reasons why language on equal rights and self-determination was included in the preamble. The first and most important reason is that some
governments, such as South Africa, cloak their most repressive laws under
the title of antiterrorism and it is reasonable to ensure that actions of the
international community are drafted in such a manner as not to permit
them to be used, or more accurately, abused, as an instrument of repression rather than a tool for protecting such basic rights as life, liberty, and
security of person. The second reason language of this nature appears is
that many countries of the Third World regard self-determination as a
principle which must be reiterated on every occasion irrespective of its
relevance.
In light of what is still the recent past for many and the poignancy of
current problems in areas of the Third World, there seems little justification for Western lawyers to refuse on grounds of relevance to make gestures toward this perceived need, rational or not, when the desire can be
satisfied with language that is not only an accurate reflection of the language of the Charter but also a restatement of Jeffersonian and Wilsonian
views and today, happily, a fundamental element of policy for all states in
the Western World.
A third reason for including language of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is the perception that the legitimacy of the use of
force in the cause of self-determination is strengthened by the inclusion
of this language and would be weakened by its absence. The logic of this
view is not apparent in light of the vast number of existing United Nations recommendations on the issue.
progress, stopping just short of alienating delegates by exerting too much pressure, also contributed significantly to the success of the operation. Again, it would not necessarily be useful to conclude that the method chosen, successful as it was, should replace the more traditional pattern. A possible new approach has been opened up and it, along with the
traditional approach, must be considered in the future in light of the particular situation

then obtaining.
22. The language in the first two preambular paragraphs reflects that which advances
the rationale for the elaboration of a convention as contained in the request for an additional agenda item submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, note 15 supra.
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The final and least convincing reason for including this language is
the curious but surprisingly widely held view that elements of the operative portions of a text should be foreshadowed in the preamble and, since
article 12 speaks of self-determination, it is argued there must be something in the preamble. Again, there seems little point in debating the theoretical merits of this questionable view beyond noting its doubtful character when there is agreement on the substance and text of the
preambular language in question.
The important issue with regard to this paragraph is that it in no
way suggests that pursuit of equal rights and self-determination can justify acts of terrorism such as hostage-taking anywhere any time. In addition to the language of the paragraph being clear on its face in this regard, the immediately following preambular paragraph recognizes that
"the taking of hostages is an offense of grave concern to the international
community" and states unequivocally that "any person committing an act
of hostage-taking shall be either prosecuted or extradited." Construed in
light of the fourth preambular paragraph, therefore, the third preambular
paragraph neither suggests nor was intended to suggest a possible justification for acts of terrorism or hostage-taking.
Since it is clear from the text alone that neither the pursuit of equal
rights nor of self-determination provides an exception to the prohibition
against hostage-taking, there is no justification for an examination of the
legislative history or resort to teleological analysis. 8 In fact, the various
proposals over the years that contained a suggestion of an exception were
rejected because they contained such a suggestion, as is clear from the
records of debate. Therefore, the legislative history, were it relevant,
would not surprisingly support the plain meaning of the language.
The final preambular paragraph restates the reasons initially given
for undertaking the effort and recognizes that the elaboration of a convention dealing with the taking of hostages is part of the larger effort to
elaborate ways and means of dealing with the scourge of terrorism.
B. The Articles
Article 1
The initial problem that needed to be addressed when the exercise
was launched was that of identifying the concept of hostage-taking as a
discrete act. In substance the problem was solved by the initial German
proposal which, simply stated, made the holding of A to obtain concessions from B the core of the definition."4 That basic approach was never

23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, done May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 679 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Vienna Convention].
24. Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.188/L.3, in Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 106-10, U.N. Doc.
A/32/39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as West German Draft; the Ad Hoc Committee Report
hereinafter cited as 1977 Ad Hoc Committee Report]. The West German Draft contains the
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seriously questioned and, although there were various drafting refinements, the final text of the article followed the initial approach. As in the
case of the Protection of Diplomats Convention, threats, attempts to
commit the act, and participation as an accomplice are made offenses
within the meaning of the Convention.
It was proposed at an early stage of the work by the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya that the scope of article 1 be expanded to include "the seizure
or detention, not only of a person or persons, but also masses under colonial, racist or foreign domination. ....,'5 This proposal was strongly opposed by some delegations on various grounds, including the view that it
raised questions extraneous to the task at hand and was unsuitable for
inclusion in a convention of the type contemplated. The proposal was not
energetically pressed and did not figure in the final negotiations.
A more troublesome problem was created by various proposals the
net effect of which would have been to exculpate hostage-takers who acted in the cause of self-determination.2 6 As the delegation of Syria put it:
"[A]cts perpetrated by criminals under ordinary law could not be placed
on equal footing with the struggle of the national liberation movements
which, by their very nature and objectives, were entirely different."2 7
The typical response to this line of argument ran along the following
lines: The issue is not whether force may be used in certain cases but
whether, even if the use of force is permissible, the taking of hostages is
an acceptable means of force. Some means of the use of force, it was
urged, are so heinous that they may not be countenanced in any circumstances. In this connection, it was noted, even states exercising their right
to self-defense are barred from engaging in certain acts including poison
gas, exploding bullets, physical attacks on diplomats, and the taking of
hostages. It was urged that making cause or motive relevant to the permissibility of a particular action would revive the idea of just and unjust
26
wars and set international law back to the nineteenth century.

concept of seizing or detaining a person "in order to compel a third person." See Comment,
The United Nations Effort to Draft a Convention on the Taking of Hostages, 27 AM. U.L.
REv. 433 (1978), which provides a thorough analysis of the West German Draft.
25. Working paper submitted by the Libyan Arab Jamhiriya, U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/L.9,
in 1977 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 24, at 112.
26. Proposals of this nature were submitted in writing by Libya, U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/
L.4, id. at 110, and Lesotho and Tanzania, later joined by Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Libya,
and Nigeria. U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/L.5, id. at 111.
27. U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/SR.8, id. at 36. Similar interventions were made by other Arab
and African representatives and some measure of support for the view was expressed by the
U.S.S.R. Id. at 32.
28. Arguments along these general lines were made inter alia by Canada, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.188/SR.11, id. at 51; by the United States, id. at 55; by France, U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/
SR.27, in Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 63, U.N. Doc. A/33/39
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Ad Hoc Committee Report]; and by Italy, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.188/SR.28, id. at 68.
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The representative of Mexico noted that the taking of hostages by
liberation movements had in effect been prohibited by Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions on Human Rights in Armed Conflict.2' He suggested
that perhaps one could exclude from the coverage of the convention acts

already covered by the rules of law applicable to armed conflict3 0
Although it was decided not to include a notion along these lines in
article 1 of the Convention, a sophisticated variation on this helpful
suggestion which avoided the risk of any loopholes was incorporated in

article 12 of the Convention and is discussed below in that context.
Article 2
Under this article, states party are required to make the offenses set
forth in article 1 punishable under domestic law. Article 2 follows the

established pattern of the Hague, Montreal, and Protection of Diplomats
Conventions."' It was contained in the initial draft of the Federal Repub-

lic of Germany

2

and was at no time controversial in the negotiations.3

Article 3
Article 3 places an affirmative duty on states party in the territory of

which the hostage is held to take measures to ease the situation of the
hostage. In particular, such measures are to be aimed toward gaining the
release of the hostage and to facilitate, when relevant, his departure
thereafter. States party also undertake to return any object that comes

into their possession which the offender has obtained as a result of the
taking of hostages.

This article appeared in substantially the same form in the initial
29. The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims are:
(a) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950);
(b) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950);
(c) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950);
(d) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
[Hereinafter cited as 1949 Geneva Conventions.] Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
are contained in Final Act, June 10, 1977, in 32 U.N. GAOR, I Annexes (Item 115 of the
provisional agenda), U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), reprintedin 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978).
See Nanda, supra note 13, at 92-93, for a concise discussion of the prohibition against hostage-taking under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.
30. 32 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/SR.11 (1977).
31. Notes 4-6 supra.
32. West German Draft, art. 4, supra note 24, at 107.
33. For a discussion of this clause in the Protection of Diplomats Convention, see
Wood, supra note 6, at 805-06.
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German draft and, except as discussed below, remains unchanged. No express language to this effect appears in the Hague, Montreal, and Protection of Diplomats Conventions. The obligations of the Tokyo Convention
on Offenses Committed on Board Aircraft " and existing international law
concerning diplomatic agents may be presumed to have caused the drafters of the previous conventions to regard an express provision along these
lines as unnecessary. The express inclusion of this language in the Hostages Convention was noncontroversial and a useful, if not strictly essential, explicit addition.
The only change of any note in what is now paragraph 2 of the article
was from "return

. .

. to the person entitled to possession" to the current

text, which provides that return should be made to the hostage or the
third party, as defined in article 1, or to the authorities of the third party.
The reason for this change was to avoid arguments about title which
could complicate the return to the status quo ante. 8
Article 4
Under this article, states party undertake to prevent their territories
from being used for preparations for the commission of offenses proscribed under the Convention by "taking all practicable measures ...
including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, or engage in the perpetration.

.

." of hostage-taking. Under paragraph (b), an

additional provision relating to the prevention effort, states party agree to
exchange information and coordinate the taking of administrative and
other measures.
This article substantially follows the pattern of the earlier conventions. The phrase "measures to prohibit

. . .

illegal activities of persons,

groups and organizations . .,,ss is the tautological result of the desire of
some states to ban activity not to their liking and the impossibility or at
least unwillingness for Western and some other states to limit freedom of
expression and assembly. No one raised any substantive problem with
prohibiting illegal activity since the denomination as illegal establishes
the prohibited nature of the activity and the text cannot be read as even
suggesting the utility of making licit acts illicit.
Article 5
Article 5 lists the offenses over which each state party is obligated to
establish jurisdiction. States are to take measures to establish jurisdiction
over hostage-taking (1) in their territory and on board their registered
ships and aircraft; (2) by a national or, if the state considers it appropri34. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force Dec.
4, 1969).
35. The change was suggested for precisely these reasons by Canada. U.N. Doc. A/
AC.188/SR.14, in 1977 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 24, at 74.
36. Hostages Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
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ate, by stateless persons who have their residence in that state; (3) when
the state is the object of the compulsion attempt; and (4) when the hostage is a national of the state, if that state considers it appropriate. States
party also agree to take measures to establish jurisdiction over hostagetaking where the alleged offender is present in its territory and that state
does not extradite him to any other state having jurisdiction over the
offense.
This article also substantially follows the basic pattern of the earlier
conventions. One change is the addition of stateless persons, but establishing jurisdiction over offenses committed by such persons is made optional by the phrase "if that State considers it appropriate. 37T The inclusion of stateless persons seems reasonable in light of the role such persons
from certain areas may play.
Another change from the Protection of Diplomats Convention is to
make the application of the passive personality principle, subparagraph
1(d), optional by the addition of the same phrase as used with regard to
stateless persons. It was thought by a number of delegations, including
the United States and the United Kingdom, that although the problems
unique to the protection of diplomats justified departure from opposition
to the passive personality principle in the case of the Protection of Diplomats Convention, a comparable rationale did not exist with regard to nationals generally. Civil law states, however, insisted on retaining the ability under their law of applying the principle, and subparagraph 1(d) was
the resultant compromise.
Article 6"
Although this article follows the basic pattern of the earlier conventions, it goes beyond them in several interesting ways. Paragraph 4 provides that the communications rights conferred under paragraph 3 be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the state in whose
territory the alleged offender is present, subject to the proviso that those
laws and regulations enable full effect to be given the purposes for which
the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are intended. Although not express
in earlier conventions, the principle embodied in paragraph 4 is a statement of existing law codified in the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations."'
The fifth paragraph is a useful addition from a number of points of
view. It provides that the provisions relating to communications rights of
paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be without prejudice to the right of any state
party having a claim to jurisdiction under the Convention to invite the
International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit

37. Id. art. 5(1)(b).
38. Since art. 6 is rather lengthy, the writer will not attempt to summarize its entire
content in the text and would direct the reader's attention to the Appendix.
39. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, 2, done April 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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the alleged offender. First and most importantly, paragraph 5 reflects
commendable concern with the right to communicate with accused persons and a creative approach to facilitating communication in precisely
the circumstances in which it may be most necessary, that is, when relations between the states involved are such that no diplomatic or consular
communication exists. Second, the paragraph diminishes the potential
scope of article 9, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a)(ii),' 0 by broadening the
possible means of communication.
Article 7
Under article 7, where an offender is prosecuted, states party are to
communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the United Nations
Secretary-General, who in turn is charged with transmitting the information to the states and international organizations concerned. The text of
article 7 is a verbatim copy of the comparable article in the Protection of
Diplomats Convention.
Article 8
The central mechanism of the Convention is embodied in this key
provision. States party must extradite the alleged offender or submit the
case to its competent authorities. Article 8 is a verbatim copy of the comparable article in the Protection of Diplomats Convention. Although
there is nothing to add to Mr. Wood's commentary on the Protection of
Diplomats Convention,4 1 it is worth stressing the importance of the
phrase "without exception whatsoever."
The Netherlands again raised the question of redrafting this article
to provide that the obligation to prosecute arose only where there was a
request for extradition which was rejected.4 2 This suggestion did not obtain any more support in the context of hostage-taking than it did in the
negotiation of the Protection of Diplomats Convention and the Netherlands did not press the matter. As Mr. Wood points out, this legislative
history leaves no doubt that the obligation to submit to competent au43
thorities is in no way dependent on a request for extradition.
Article 9
Article 9 excepts from the requirement of extradition cases where the
state party in receipt of the extradition request has substantial grounds
for believing that extradition is sought for "the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.. ."or that the alleged offender's position may
be prejudiced for any of those reasons or "for the reason that communication with him by the appropriate authorities of the State entitled to exer-

40. See discussion in text infra.
41. Wood, supra note 6, at 810-11.
42. Working paper submitted by the Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/L.14, in 1977
Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 24, at 114.
43. Wood, note 6 supra.
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cise rights of protection cannot be effected." 4 4

The express inclusion of the language of this article is a departure
from the previous models. Although it is couched in binding language
prohibiting extradition in certain cases and thus prohibits actions which
were possible under the previous conventions, it is, in its final adopted
form, not likely to mark much if any departure from existing practice
under the previous conventions. The rationale for the insistence of most
countries in the Hague, Montreal, and Protection of Diplomats Conventions on the option of prosecuting instead of extraditing was precisely because there were cases in which they did not wish to be obligated to extradite. Indeed numerous efforts by the Soviet Union to provide for
extradition as the sole acceptable action for states who apprehend a suspect have been routinely rejected on precisely the kind of human rights
grounds set forth in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) and (b). In that
sense, although it might have been preferable to couch the article in
terms that did not appear to restrict the freedom of state action in this
sensitive and complex area, the article can nevertheless be hailed for its
incorporation in conventions of this character of human rights concerns.
The inclusion of paragraph 1, subparagraph (b)(ii) deserves the same
high praise in that the importance all states attach to the right of communication with their nationals who may fall afoul of authorities abroad
is, for the most part, grounded on a desire to ensure knowledge that their
rights are being protected and that they do not feel abandoned. The text,
moreover, is carefully drafted so that it does not bar extradition to state
X merely because the accused is a national of a state which does not
enjoy diplomatic or consular relations with state X.
Rather, extradition is only barred when the requested state has "substantial grounds for believing . . . the person's position may be
prejudiced... for the reason that communication with him..
cannot
.

be effected."' 5 Where, therefore, the legal system of the requesting state
is such as to give every reason to believe due process and a fair trial are
assured, there would seem to be no reason for any bar to extradition. The
wording of paragraph 1, subparagraph (b)(ii), moreover, requires not
merely that there be no consular or diplomatic relations but that the
state entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot effect the same, that
is, that it is unable, as opposed to unwilling, to do so. Thus, an offer by
the requesting state to allow visits by representatives of the entitled state
would seem to remove any bar to extradition.4' There is, moreover, the
well-established practice of the appointment of protecting powers which
44. Hostages Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(a)(b)(ii).
45. Id.
46. The following statement by the representative of Israel potentially is of particular
interest in this case: "[I]n any appropriate case in which Israel might find it necessary to
request extradition under the terms of the Convention, the rights of communication of the
extradited person as envisaged in that clause would be respected." 34 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (14th
mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.14 (1979).
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should further narrow the potential scope of the article.
The express provision in article 6, paragraph 4, concerning the International Committee of the Red Cross, further diminishes the likelihood
that paragraph 1, subparagraph (b)(ii) will prove a serious obstacle to extradition. Even in those cases in which this article proves a bar to extradition, the obligation of article 8 on the state in which the alleged hostagetaker is found to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution will continue to apply in full force.
Under paragraph 2 of article 9, the provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements between states party are modified as between
those states to the extent they are incompatible with the Convention.
Paragraph 2 marks a departure from the earlier conventions and is in
some respects unusual. Since it is limited to the offenses covered by the
Convention it amounts to nothing more than a statement of the rule of
lex posterior as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
47
Treaties.

Articles 10 and 11
These are near verbatim copies, mutatis mutandis, of the comparable provisions in the previous conventions.
Article 12
This article, which deals with the scope of the Convention, especially
its application to liberation movements, together with article 9, proved to
be the most difficult problem faced by the drafters. 48 As noted in the discussion on article 1,"9 the problem of actions by liberation movements
engendered a great deal of discussion. The initial Mexican proposal to
bridge the gaps read as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "taking of hostages"
shall not include any act or acts covered by the rules of international
law applicable to armed conflicts, including conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and foreign occupation and
against racist regimes, in the exercise of the right of peoples to selfdetermination embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations."
As might be anticipated, neither side gave the above-quoted language
of compromise a warm reception. Those who favored special provisions
for liberation movements expressed concern that it did not go far enough
and those who insisted that any and all hostage-taking be covered by the
Convention took the position that no such provision was necessary.
47. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 30.
48. See Nanda, supra note 13, at 98.
49. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
50. Working paper submitted by Mexico, U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/L.6, in 1977 Ad Hoc
Committee Report, supra note 24, at 111.
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At the second session of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1978, some movement of positions began. Some states, primarily African and Asian, indicated their willingness to accept the Mexican proposal and a "number of
Members of the Working Group . ..regarded . . . [this move] as con-

taining a constructive approach for negotiation." '

The problem that many continued to have with the Mexican proposal was that it simply excluded certain cases of hostage-taking from the
Convention without any grounds for confidence that the hostage-taker in
such circumstances would be prosecuted or extradited."2 It was not clear
under the Mexican proposal that all acts "covered by the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict" give rise to an obligation to
prosecute or extradite. If the Mexican proposal had been adopted in precisely the same language quoted above, the Convention would not operate
in cases of armed conflict. There would, in fact, have been no prohibition
against hostage-taking unless the states involved in a particular incident
were parties to the relevant conventions concerning armed conflicts.
The bulk of the 1979 session of the Ad Hoc Committee was devoted
to finding language which eliminated the problems with the Mexican text.
The final text of the article was agreed to at the 1979 session of the Committee. Although complex, the text of article 12 achieves the goal of ensuring that a state will be obligated to prosecute or extradite hostagetakers under the Hostages Convention unless it is equally bound to do so
under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. 53 The
changes from the original Mexican proposal that produced the result
were: (a) instead of the vague reference to international law, the relevant
conventions are expressly named; and (b) these conventions will take precedence over the Hostages Convention when and only when (1) the former prohibit the particular act and provide for an explicit obligation to
prosecute or hand over the actor and (2) the state party to the Hostages
Convention is legally bound to prosecute the actor or extradite him. In
short, the obligation to prosecute or extradite applies in all cases. It
therefore is of no legal consequence whether the hostage-taker is prosecuted or extradited under the Hostages Convention or the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, and of no significance so far as hostage-taking and its consequences what language is used to describe
Protocol I situations. The language actually chosen is the language of article 1 of Additional Protocol I.
One of the incidental effects of the text of this article is to underline
the application of the prohibition against the taking of hostages as to liberation movements. Since this important conclusion is clear on the face of
article 12 once it is carefully analyzed, there is no need to examine the

51. 1978 Ad Hoc Committee Report, note 28 supra.
52. See statements of France and Canada, U.N. Do. A/AC.188/SR.27, in 1978 Ad Hoc
Committee Report, supra note 28, at 63-65.
53. 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, note 29 supra.
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legislative history. That history is, however, consistent with and supportive of this reading. The changes in the initial Mexican proposal make little sense if that was not their intent. The "any person" language in the
fourth preambular paragraph and the "without exception whatsoever"
phrase in article 8 would be inconsistent with any other view. Finally, the statements made in the debate support this view. Both
sides-states inclined to prefer some form of exemption or special treatment for liberation movement actions and those opposed to any exemption or special treatment for hostage-takers based on the motive or goal
of the actor-indicated the same view as to the effect of article 12. The
representative of Pakistan pointed out that "most of the movements
struggling for self-determination were not recognized by the colonial or

occupying States and were usually denied the rights established under
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions."" It was his view that
as currently drafted, article 12 "would allow those States to claim that,
since the Geneva Conventions did not apply, all acts of hostage-taking,
even if they were a reaction to the illegal activity of colonial or occupying

Powers, would be covered by the proposed Convention and would thus be
subject to extradition."' 5 Since "[t]he existing text of draft article 12 did
not clearly exempt the acts of liberation movements. . ." the representative urged that the Working Group should "draft a more comprehensive

provision on that subject."" The representatives of France

7

and the

United States" expressed similar views with respect to the effect of article 12, albeit from the perspective of states opposed to any exception for
hostage-takers based on the motive or goal of the actor.

54. 34 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (14th mtg.) 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.14 (1979).
55. Id.
56. Id. The text referred to by the representative of Pakistan was not changed.
57. The representative of France recalled that
during the previous session's debate on a draft convention against the taking of
hostages, his delegation had stated that it could not participate in any consensus, or vote in favour of a draft convention, unless the entire text, including the
preamble, was free of all lacunae, uncertainties and ambiguities. His delegation's view was that the taking of hostages for what ever motive must be prosecuted and condemned at any time, in any place, and in any circumstances
.... His delegation would be able to support a consensus approving the text
in its final form.
34 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (62nd mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.62 (1979).
58. In accord with France, the United States expressed a similar view as to the effect of
art. 12. The representative agreed that:
the main object of the draft Convention was to stipulate that there should be
no safe haven for the hostage-taker. The taking of hostages was a matter of the
gravest concern and any person committing such an offense should be handed
over to the competent authorities for prosecution or extradited, pursuant to
article 8 of the draft Convention or to the relevant provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto.
Id. at 4. See also, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany, U.N. Doc. A/34/P.V.105 (1979) and
Canada, 34 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (13th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.13 (1979).
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Article 13
Under article 13, the Convention does not apply to acts of hostagetaking where none of the elements of the offense extend beyond the territory and nationals of a single state if the alleged offender is found in the
territory of that state. The text of this article did not create any
problems. It is based on the assumption, common to all the conventions
in this area, that there should be some direct third country involvement
or concern internationalizing the matter to justify action by the international community. The article originally formed the second paragraph of
article 12 and was made into a separate article for purely stylistic reasons.
Article 14
Article 14 proscribes the use of the Convention to justify violations of
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state in contravention of the United Nations Charter. It was included as a result of the
expressions of concern by some representatives that the Convention not
serve as a pretext for the use of force. The initial formulation that was
put forward by a group of states appeared, as drafted, to go beyond the
confines of a convention against the taking of hostages and possibly to
purport to lay down rules concerning the permissible and impermissible
uses of force. 59 There were no objections to the inclusion of something
along these lines though the need for redrafting the proposal was
stressed."e The final text met the needs of those who feared the Hostages
Convention by its very existence could be used to justify uses of force
which would otherwise be prohibited and the views of those who asserted
that the Hostages Convention was an unsuitable vehicle for contracting or
expanding permissible uses of force. The resultant text consequently
leaves the law concerning the use of force, including the use of force to
rescue hostages, exactly where it was before the adoption of the
Convention.61
Article 15
Under article 15, the Convention has no effect on the application of
the Treaties on Asylum in force at the date of the adoption of the Convention as between states party to those treaties. This article reproduces
the language found in article 12 of the Protection of Diplomats Convention 62 and applies only to states party to such a treaty as of the date the
Hostages Convention was opened for signature. A very limited number of

59. Algeria, Tanzania, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, and Nigeria proposed the
following: "States shall not resort to the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of other States as a means of rescuing hostages." U.N. Doc.
A/AC.188/L.7, in 1977 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 24, at 111.

60. See, e.g., the statement of the representative of the United States, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.188/SR.12, in 1977 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 24, at 63.
61. The legal charcter of acts of force to liberate hostages such as the Israeli rescue
mission at Entebbe have been the subject of debate in various fora and the Convention
leaves this unresolved debate where it found it.
62. See Wood, supra note 6, at 813.
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states in Latin America are so situated. It applies, moreover, only between such states and has no force or effect vis-a-vis states not party to
those conventions. The article must, furthermore, be understood in light
of the statement by the representative of Mexico to the effect that nothing in the norms relating to the right of asylum prevented the country
granting asylum and declining to extradite from instituting proceedings
against the individual.63
Further light is thrown on the extremely .limited scope and effect of
this article by the fourth preambular paragraph's statement that "any
person committing an act of hostage-taking shall be either prosecuted or
extradited" and the phrase "without exception whatsoever" in article 8
which embodies the obligation to extradite or prosecute.
Article 16
This article is identical to article 13 of the Protection of Diplomats
Convention. It sets forth the procedures for resolving disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of the Convention. The matter was not
the subject of extensive discussion and what discussion there was followed the identical lines of the discussion in the Protection of Diplomats
negotiation so there is nothing to add to the discussion by Mr. Wood.s"
The writer cannot refrain from expressing regret that it once again
proved impossible to obtain sufficiently broad agreement for simple acceptance of binding third party dispute settlement. The shift over the
years from optional protocols which required an affirmative act to bind
states to accept meaningful dispute settlement to a pattern which requires an affirmative act to avoid dispute settlement must be recognized
as some progress. It will be necessary for states which support third party
dispute settlement to continue to strive for its inclusion in treaties in all
inclusive form. It is to be hoped that in time an increasing number of
Third World states will recognize that such procedures are the best way
they can hope to confront larger and more powerful states on a basis of
equality. Once this happens, even the Soviet Union may begin to find its
unwillingness to run any risk of having its actions judged in any sphere
increasingly revealing and consequently sufficiently politically costly to
stimulate the rethinking of its policy in this regard.
Articles 17 through 20: the Final Clauses
These provisions are of a standard character following existing models. The only controversial issue that was even raised in this context was
the informal suggestion that liberation movements be permitted to be63. 1977 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 24, at 57. Views on the scope of the
article were also exchanged during the 34th Session of the General Assembly. In light of
their conflicting nature concerning, among other things, the conceptual problem of whether
a grant of asylum comes before or after a decision to prosecute and the nature of the obligation to prosecute, it was decided to let the text speak for itself. See Report of the Chairman
of the Working Group on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (53rd mtg.) 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/SR.53 (1979).
64. Wood, supra note 6, at 815.
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come party. The idea was not pressed. It would obviously have created
profound problems to have some entities, related in some unprecedented
way to the treaty, assume obligations which they could not carry out.
So far as the question of reservations is concerned, the matter did
not expressly arise in the negotiation of the Hostages Convention. It is
reasonable to assume from the number of articles common to both the
Hostages and Protection of Diplomats Conventions and the frequent references to the Protection of Diplomats Convention in the debate that the
legislative history of the Protection of Diplomats Convention in this regard was widely known and accepted. It is reasonable to conclude that at
least articles 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, and 11 of the Protection of Diplomats Convention are central to the object and purpose of that Convention and are not
subject to reservation 5 and consequently that at least the comparable articles of the Hostages Convention (articles 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8) likewise are
central to its object and purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Convention will enter into force thirty days after the twentysecond ratification or accession." The relatively rapid pace of signatures
thus far 7 is grounds for hope that the Convention will come into force at
an early date. From the inception of the idea of an international convention against the taking of hostages, through the Ad Hoc Committee, and
to final adoption, the entire process reflects credit on the originator of the
idea, the Federal Republic of Germany, and on the United Nations
system.
Although the United Nations cannot be expected to produce results
when a substantial number of its members are not willing to act, it does
represent an organized institution capable of providing an excellent
means by which governments can cooperate together to a positive end.
Those who so often criticize the failure of the United Nations should not
only take due note of its successes but also rethink some of the reasons
for its so-called failures, not so much in terms of the weaknesses of the
institution but rather in terms of the level of willingness of the member
states to agree on what the problems are and to seek solutions which can
reasonably be expected to be acceptable to rich and poor, free world and
communist. At least in this one instance the requisite common will was,
happily, present and the institution was thus permitted to demonstrate
its considerable strengths. The challenge is to find other instances where
similar opportunities exist and to capitalize on them with comparable energy, imagination, and dedication.

65. See Wood, id. at 816. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 19.
66. Hostages Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
67. See note 2 supra.
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APPENDIX
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES

The States Parties to this Convention
Having in mind the purpose and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and
security and the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among
States,
Recognizing in particular that everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of person, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
Reaffirming the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, as well as in other relevant resolutions of the General
Assembly,
Consideringthat the taking of hostages is an offense of grave concern
to the international community and that, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, any person committing an act of hostage-taking
shall either be prosecuted or extradited,
Being convinced that it is urgently necessary to develop international
co-operation between States in devising and adopting effective measures
for the prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of taking of
hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or
to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group
of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of
hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention.
2. Any person who:
(a) attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
(b) participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts
to commit an act of hostage-taking likewise commits an offence for the
purposes of this Convention.
Article 2
Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in article 1 punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature
of those offences.
Article 3
1. The State Party in the territory of which the hostage is held by the
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offender shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostage, in particular, to secure his release and, after his release, to facilitate, when relevant, his departure.
2. If any object which the offender has obtained as a result of the
taking of hostages comes into the custody of a State Party, that State
Party shall return it as soon as possible to the hostage or the third party
referred to in article 1, as the case may be, or to the appropriate authorities thereof.
Article 4
States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set
forth in article 1, particularly by:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their
respective territories for the commission of those offences within or
outside their territories, including measures to prohibit in their territories
illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of taking of
hostages;
(b) exchanging information and co-ordinating the taking of administrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the commission of
those offences.
Article 5
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over any of the offences set forth in article 1
which are committed:
(a) in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that

State;
(b) by any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate,
by those stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its
territory;
(c) in order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act;
or
(d) with respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that
State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 1 in
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this
article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.
Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any State
Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in
accordance with the laws, take him into custody or take other measures
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to ensure his presence for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal
or extradition proceedings to be instituted. That State Party shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.
2. The custody or other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article shall be notified without delay directly or through the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations to:
(a) the State where the offense was committed;
(b) the State against which compulsion has been directed or
attempted;
(c) the State of which the natural or juridical person against whom
compulsion has been directed or attempted is a national;
(d) the State of which the hostage is a national or in the territory of
which he has his habitual residence;
(e) the State of which the alleged offender is a national or, if he is a
stateless person, in the territory of which he has his habitual residence;
(f) the international intergovernmental organization against which
compulsion has been directed or attempted;
(g) all other States concerned.
3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph
1 of this article are being taken shall be entitled:
(a) to communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national or which is otherwise
entitled to establish such communication or, if he is a stateless person,
the State in the territory of which he has his habitual residence;
(b) to be visited by a representative of that State.
4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which the alleged offender is present subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given
to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 of this
article are intended.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article shall be without prejudice to the right of any State Party having a claim to jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 (b) of article 5 to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit the
alleged offender.
6. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in
paragraph 1 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the States
or organization referred to in paragraph 2 of this article and indicate
whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall in accordance with its laws communicate the final outcome of the proceedings
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit the

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 9:169

information to the other States concerned and the international intergovernmental organizations concerned.
Article 8
1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception
whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory,
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.
Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the
case of any ordinary offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.
2. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in
connexion with any of the offences set forth in article 1 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment
of all the rights and guarantees provided by the law of the State in the
territory of which he is present.
Article 9
1. A request for the extradition of an alleged offender, pursuant to
this convention, shall not be granted if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing;
(a) that the request for extradition for an offence set forth in article 1
has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on
account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion;
or
(b) that the person's position may be prejudiced:
(i) for any of the reasons mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or
(ii) for the purpose that communication with him by the appropriate
authorities of the State entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot be
effected.
2. With respect to the offences as defined in this Convention, the provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements applicable between
State Parties are modified as between States Parties to the extent that
they are incompatible with this Convention.
Article 10
1. The offences set forth in article 1 shall be deemed to be included
as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States
Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable
offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State
Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested State may at
its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in
respect of the offences set forth in article 1. Extradition shall be subject
to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
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existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 1 as
extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
4. The offences set forth in article 1 shall be treated, for the purpose
of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not
only in the place in which they occured but also in the territories of the
States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 5.
Article 11
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the
offences set forth in article 1, including the supply of all evidence at their
disposal necessary for the proceedings.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall not affect obligations concerning mutual judicial assistance embodied in any other treaty.
Article 12
In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war
victims of the Additional Protocols to those Conventions are applicable to
a particular act of hostage-taking, and in so far as States Parties to this
Convention are bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over
the hostage-taker, the present Convention shall not apply to an act of
hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as defined in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, including
armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article 13
This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed
within a single State, the hostages and alleged offender are nationals of
that State and the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State.
Article 14
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as justifying the violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a State in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 15
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the application of
the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of the adoption of this Convention, as between the States which are parties to those Treaties; but a
State Party to this Convention may not invoke those Treaties with respect to another State Party to this Convention which is not a party to
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those treaties.
Article 16
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by
negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the
parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one
of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or ' accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound
by paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be
bound by paragraph 1 of this article with respect to any State Party
which has made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation by
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 17
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States until 31 December 1980 at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
3. This Convention is open for accession by any State. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
Article 18
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or
accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the
deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession, the
Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by
such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 19
1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which
notification is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 20
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall
send certified copies thereof to all States.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention,
opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979.

Comparative Evolution of Technology
Transfer Policies In Latin America: The
Practical Realities*
ROBERT

I.

J. RADWAY**

INTRODUCTION

This article attempts to identify some policies underlying the implementation of the regulation and control systems governing the transfer of
technology to Latin America. In addition, an effort is made to urge sensitivity to, and careful analysis of, underlying problems and efforts to solve
them, despite accompanying rhetoric and overly rigid enforcement by inexperienced, lower-level technocrats.
This discussion assumes that the reader possesses: (1) an elementary
understanding of the laws and regulations governing the transfer of tech4
nology' enacted within the last few years in Brazil,' Argentina,s Mexico,

Chile,' and the Andean Common Market (ANCOM);' (2) some knowledge
of the policies enunciated by these governments within the last few years;
(3) an awareness of the "alleged abuses" in previous technology transfer
arrangements (particularly licensing agreements); and (4) an appreciation
o Copyright retained by author.
* Adapted from a presentation at the XXI Congress of the Inter-American Bar
Association, San Juan, P.R., August 1979.
** Mr. Radway is an attorney in New York City. Member, the Bars of Massachusetts,
Ohio, and New York. B.B.A., 1961, M.B.A., 1962, University of Michigan; J.D., 1969, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Chairman, Committee on International
Law and the Developing Countries, American Bar Association Section of International Law.
Formerly Legal Advisor, Council of the Americas. Coeditor, REFERENCE MANUAL ON DoING
BusINEss IN LATIN AMERICA (1979).
1. For a definition of "technology," see Radway, Transfer of Technology to Colombia:
A Proposal to Modify Decision 24, 12 LAw. Am. 321, 325 (1980):
[Technology] encompasses, at least, all of the knowledge necessary for the productive functioning of a single operation, an enterprise or, perhaps, an entire
society. The term customarily embraces 'hardware,' .. 'software,'... [and]
may or may not involve patents and trademarks, ...
'industrial property
rights'. . . and technical and managerial assistance in any element of the productive system.
2. Nattier, Brazil, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAws AND PRACTICE INLATIN AMERICA 145
(American Bar Association Section of International Law, Monograph No. 2, B. Carl ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Monograph].
3. Radway & Giacchino, Argentina, id. at 217.
4. Hyde & Ramfrez de IaCorte, Mexico, id. at 1.
5. Wesley, Chile, id. at 132.
6. Danino, Peru, id. at 115; Pate, The Andean Common Market (Special Focus on Colombia and Venezuela), id. at 59.
7. See Radway, Negotiations with Latin American Governments: Technology Transfer
and Service Agreements, 9 LAw. Am.282 (1977).
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of the multitude of statements concerning so-called "restrictive business
practices"

allegedly committed by transnational enterprises, frequentlI

in agreements between parents and subsidiaries. Finally, this article
presumes some appreciation of the state of "semi-confrontation" existing
in this hemisphere between transnational corporations (TNC's) and host
governments, but which in the last few years has given signs of a considerable "thaw," thereby producing a renewed interest in constructive

dialogue and cooperation.'
II. BACKGROUND
Frustrations arising out of failures in the economic development
plans and programs of countries in the inter-American system have
caused certain governments, partly for political reasons, to assume adverse positions towards TNC's. Some of these reactions have been extreme and unnecessary, and many of them in turn have generated similar
reactions on the part of TNC's. Thus arises the resulting state of tension.
Part of the failure of economic development plans and programs has
arisen from "inflation economics," 1 and part from socioeconomic and political reluctance on the part of many government officials in North,1"

8. See Joelson, The Proposed InternationalCodes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive
Business Practices,8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 837 (1976). For examples of so-called "prohibitive clauses" contained in laws, see Appendices, A.B.A. Monograph, supra note 2, at 234360, especially Mexico's Law on Transfer of Technology, art. 7, at app. A-i, see also note 53
infra; ANOM's Dec. 24, arts. 20, 25, 51, at app. B-i; see also note 47 infra; Colombia's
Decree 1234, art. 2, at app. C, see also note 51 infra; Venezuela's Decree No. 746, art. 1, at
app. D-1, see also note 60 infra; Brazil's Normative Act No. 15, arts. 2.5.2, 4.5.2, 5.5.2, 6.5.2,
at app. F, see also note 61 infra; Argentina's Law No. 21,617, art. 10, at app. G,see also
note 69 infra.
9. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Roundtable on the Role of
Transnational Enterprises in the Latin American Integration Process, Lima, Peru, June 1216, 1978, Opening Statement by the Chairman. [Hereinafter cited as UNCTAD RoundtableLima.] For a synopsis of what occurred at the UNCTAD Roundtable-Lima, see CTC REP.,
Sept. 1978, at 25.
10. See G. EDzR, INFLATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1968). Eder and

others have spoken (often critically) of the Economic Commission for Latin America, especially for its former Secretary-General, Raul Prebisch, and other Keynesian economists who
believed that development was fostered by rapid industrailization which required massive
borrowings (Central Bank credits) to pay for imported capital goods and raw materials for
these purposes. This overemphasis on import substitution without corresponding export development led to spiraling deficit financing and inflation. Another unfortunate corollary of
these theories was the regrettable neglect of agricultural sector development in these countries, which has only recently received the attention and priority necessary to rectify this
disequilibrium. Since this "merry-go-round" contributed to large outflows of foreign exchange to pay for capital goods and raw material imports, some say it contributed to the
imposition of the same exchange controls which, as they have evolved, have been increasingly used to regulate foreign investment (especially dividend or profit remittances) and
technology. For a detailed historical review of the development philosophy adopted by Dr.
Prebisch and ECLA, see Radway, The Next Decade in Latin America: Anticipating the
Future from the Past (forthcoming 1981).
11. "North America" is defined as Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
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Central,"2 and South America18 to make the necessary commitment to regional economic integration. However, at the regional and subregional

levels integration offers advantages and benefits which can facilitate social and economic development. In fact, one theme of this article is that
greater accountability on the part of government officials is required, as is
increased cooperation among governments and between governments and

TNC's.
III.

HOST GOVERNMENT POLICIES OF REGULATION AND CONTROL

A.

Structural Misalignments
Structural problems in various markets have been identified as factors motivating the passage of recent technology transfer regulatory and

control laws in Latin America. ' This has brought to a head one of the
fundamental problems of developing countries: competition versus protection. In order to foster economic growth and development, it is desirable to take steps necessary to increase competition so as to promote efficiency in the productive process. Greater efficiency obviously is required
to increase exports, a favorite policy objective of many of the countries
under discussion. But exports must compete in the market place with
products from third countries. Advocates of the market theory always
take the position that this competition breeds greater efficiency. But developing countries must offer incentives to attract new industries. These
include protective tariffs and other barriers to enable them to survive the

difficult early stages and mature into viable enterprises. The issue is

joined: protection versus competition.' "

Attacks upon the "multinationals" (now called "transnationals") began in earnest in the mid-1960's." At that time a wave of nationalizations
swept Latin America,17 primarily in the extractive sector, although certain
well-known examples of expropriation in the manufacturing' s and service" sectors are on record. These octopus-like enterprises were said to

12. "Central America" is defined as the five Central American Common Market members (Guatamala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) plus Panama.
13. "South America" is defined as the rest of the countries south of the Panamanian
border with Colombia.
14. UNCTAD Roundtable-Lima, supra note 9, Paper Presented by Constantine
Vaitsos, Who Integrates and with Whom, How and for Whose Benefit?, TAD/EI/SEM.5
(1978). For a summary of this paper, see CTC REP., Sept. 1978, at 11.
15. Another author calls it the conflict between free trade and protectionism. Rubin,
InternationalTrade Law: Recent Developments, 1 Hous. J. INT'L L. 127, 141 (1979).
16. See generally R. BARNEr & R. MOLLR, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974); R.

VERNON,

SOVEmIGNTv

AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL

SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRiszs (1971).
17. For example, Peruvian Decree Law 17,066 of Oct. 9, 1968, operated to expropriate
the International Petroleum Company's properties known as La Brea y Parinas. See generally A. LOWENFELD, EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMmcAs: A CoMPARATiVE LAW SunDY (1971).
18. See generally LoWENELD, note 17 supra.
19. Most expropriation in this sector occurred in the early 1970's in the wake of
ANCOM Decision 24, note 47 infra. However, Venezuela's Banking Law of 1979 (G.O.E.
1454 of Dec. 30, 1970) provides that banks and finance companies are subject to severe
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owe respect to no sovereign, and to be interested only in the strangulation
of the developing countries for profit. Where this view was not believed,

such rhetoric still remained politically expedient and popular in light of
the growing frustration arising from the failures of the integration movement. It was seen at that time that the local private sector (frequently
referred to as the "productive sector" by many of the government techno-

crats) had to be strengthened in order to minimize dependency 0 and reliance on these foreign sources of capital and technology.
State intervention was selected as the most expedient means of redressing this imbalance. In the course of planning the legislative frame-

work for regulation and control of the flow of capital and technology, the
planning models were all permitted to "lean" in the direction favoring the
strengthening of the state enterprise. As this plan evolved throughout the

1970's, policies emerged in Brazil"1 and Mexico"' designed to strengthen
the "national" (as opposed to "state" or "multinational") enterprises.
B.

Alleged Abuses

The abuses allegedly committed in transfer of technology arrangements included overcharges, which were quickly identified as a severe
drain, on precious foreign exchange reserves. It was hypothesized that,
with the introduction of exchange control laws in Brazil' s and Colombia"
(and later several other countries), the TNC's would avoid the ceilings on
profit remittance by extracting royalty payments and technical assistance
fees from their subsidiaries through the use of agreements which trans-

ferred "intangible technology."' 8

In addition, an analysis of large numbers of license agreements for
patents and trademarks revealed that various limitations on the management and control of the national enterprise had been imposed' in the

deposit lending and foreign exchange restrictions until at least 80% of their capital, in the
case of banks, and 60% in the case of finance companies is owned by Venezuelans. Article
29 states that credit restrictions may be imposed on companies 40% or more of whose
equity is owned by foreigners.
20. Sunkel, Big Business and Dependencia: A Latin American View, 50 FORmGN AFF.
517 (1972).
21. See Radway, Joint Ventures in Brazil (forthcoming 1980).
22. See Radway, Doing Business in Mexico: A PracticalLegal Analysis, 14 Iwr'L LAW.
361 (1980). A series of four separate decrees issued between February 2, 1980, and March 19,
1980, via two Secretariats (Patrimony and Industrial Development, and Finance and Public
Credit) constitutes Mexico's New Industrial Development Plan. The abridged version of the
Plan (Secretaria de Patrimonio y Fomento Industrial, 1979) specifies in chapter 1 that this
is one of the objectives.
23. See Nattier, note 2 supra.
24. See generally Radway, note 1 supra; Pate, note 6 supra.
25. "Intangible technological contributions shall give rise to the right of royalty payments, upon the prior authorization of the national competent entity, but they shall not be
ANCOM Decision 24, note 47 infra, art. 21 (aucomputed as a capital contribution .
thor's translation).
26. See Soberanis, Legal Aspects Concerning the Technology Transfer Process in Mexico, 7 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 17 (1977); Camp & Rojas Magnon, Recent Developments
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provisions of those agreements. Thus, much of the productive sector of
the host country was being managed and controlled externally. This is the
so-called "dependencia" theory,"7 which resulted in a strong effort to minimize dependence on external decision-making centers. Referred to in this
article as the "ship of state" approach, this translates into a desire for
nationals to be making decisions which affect the productive sector, and
therefore the entire economy of the host country. No one can quarrel with
this objective.
C. State Intervention
It was felt that the bargaining power between national enterprises
and foreign TNC's had to be equalized because the national enterprises
were at the mercy of the TNC's and were unable to negotiate fair and
equitable technology transfer agreements."8 In addition to the affirmative
objective of strengthening the bargaining power of the national enterprises, there was the parallel objective of limiting the power of the TNC's.
Enacting laws governing the transfer of technology and requiring the registration of all agreements (as defined in the statutes) with the appropriate national body accomplished several purposes. First, an inventory of
the various types of provisions included in these agreements could be developed. This would facilitate analysis to improve the laws in the future.
Second, criteria could be developed to evaluate the prices (in terms of
royalties or fees) to be paid for the technology. Third, the technology itself could be inventoried and methods developed to survey the available
alternative technology, both within the local economy and abroad. Subsidiary objectives included subjecting these agreements to the legal jurisdiction of national courts including the application of national law, which
embodied half of the traditional Calvo Doctrine"s in Latin America. The
movement had been evolving in developing countries to assert greater
sovereignty and control over the natural resources within their territorial
limits.'" Eventually this concept was expanded to mean control over all
"economic activities,"' 1 which loses the traditional justification invoked
by the Calvo Doctrine s' (control over natural resources) and exceeds reasonable bounds of the "ship of state" theory.
In addition to encouraging the strengthening of national enterprises,
Under the Mexican Foreign Investment Law and the Law Regulating the Transfer of
Technology, 8 LAw. Am. 1 (1976).
27. See generally F. CANoso & E. Fg-ro, DEPENDENCiA Y DESAROLLO RN AmRCA
LATMA (1969); Sunkel, note 20 supra.
28. See generally Radway, supra note 7, at 289-90.
29. See D. SHmA, THE CALvo CiAusR: A PRoBmLM OF INTER-AMERCAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY

(1955).

30. See Haight, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAw. 591 (1975).
31. Id. See also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 2, 1 1, contained
in G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
32. Radway & Zwart, Dispute Settlement in Latin America: A Reassessment of the
Calvo Doctrine (forthcoming 1980).
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the "unbundling" or disaggregation of technology packages was highly desired. This concept included separating financing from engineering and
from construction in a turnkey project to build a plant. These separate
components, it was thought, could be obtained independently at lower
cost. However, this theory has never been substantiated, since throughout
history efforts at "eliminating the middle man" have been notoriously unsuccessful in the United States and worldwide. Nevertheless, the objective of breaking down elements of the technology package in order to
identify those raw materials which could be obtained locally was not only
valid but meritorious and generally to the advantage of the technology
supplier. One of the most valid and justifiable objectives was to assure
more effective and "real"" transfer of technology. This goal, as shall be
seen, eventually will require shifting emphasis from the supplier to the
recipient which involves the entire process of selection, transfer, absorption, and effective utilization of the technology-an exceptionally complex process but essential to economic growth and development."
D. Focus on Suppliers
As suggested above, attention had been directed at the source of
technology. This source was, for the most part, the TNC's. They were the
most convenient target for venting frustrations arising from disappointed
growth expectations. But an entire decade of restrictive legislation has
not changed the behavior of the TNC's to any great extent.8' Some
abuses have been identified and partially corrected in many cases. For
example, the Mexican Government boasted a reduction of some 500 million U.S. dollars in royalty payments after five years of operation of the
National Registry of Transfer of Technology." Similarly, in Brazil, subsequent to January 1, 1974, and the dramatic increase in its foreign exchange bill for oil, the financial noose was tightened dramatically, resulting in substantial savings in foreign exchange for technology being
acquired. Much of this savings has resulted from extremely astute implementation of national policies as opposed to legislative requirements.
Another result, much more difficult to document but apparently the
consensus of observers in certain countries, has been a reduction of the
flow of particular technology from United States firms to certain coun33. Pate, Present and Future Venezuelan Technology Policies: Implementation and
Implications for Technology Suppliers and Foreign Investors, in THz A~nAN COMMON
MARK~r. MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY LEGISLATION 12 (F.
Robles ed. 1976).
34. See Contribution of Transnational Enterprises to Future World Development, a
report of the Industrial Sector Advisory Group to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (May 1979).
35. See note 14 supra.
36. Presentation by Lcda. Maria De Lourdes Jimenez C., former Legal Advisor to the
Director of the National Registry of Transfer of Technology, Ministry of Patrimony and
Industrial Development (Mexico), before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
in a seminar entitled The Foreign Investment Battlefield: Transfer of Technology and the

Third World (Mar. 8, 1978).
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tries in Latin America having the most restrictive laws and policies.
E. Different Modalities of Transfer
No analysis of this nature can afford to ignore the fact that technology is transferred in a variety of ways. This fact has been recognized in all
of the major legislation enacted in the region. Perhaps the most obvious
but least significant form for the true transfer of the most essential and
critical technology is licensing. It is on licenses of patents and trademarks, however, that a great deal of attention seems to have been focused
in the planning stages for the laws presently in existance. Part of the contention of this article is that the different modalities of transfer require
entirely different types of treatment.
Technical assistance is the sort of intangible technological contribution for which fees and royalty payments are prohibited in the ANCOM
countries and Brazil when the transfer is between a TNC parent and a
local subsidiary. ANCOM Decision 24 s3 and the application of Brazil's
Normative Act 15" specifically prohibit these payments and the tax deductibility thereof in the event they are made. However, the real value of
technology-including the capacity to adapt it to local conditions and to
continue to train local technicians, engineers, and operators of equipment
and machinery-results from ongoing technical assistance. 8' It is alleged
that this category has been used by TNC's to extract additional payments
from their subsidiaries for services rendered which may have been of
questionable value. However, qualitative criteria should be established to
evaluate these transactions in terms of benefit received or the "arm's
length" test.40 The absolute prohibition is like the giant net that catches
all of the fish swimming within its jurisdiction, including those which
were not sought.
Direct foreign investment has been identified as the source of an
overwhelming majority of transferred technology. How can this factor be
reconciled with the desirable objective of disaggregation of technology
packages to permit the recipient of technology to evaluate, screen, and
select only those elements which must be imported from abroad? Once
again, a qualitative evaluation test is required. There are many transactions in which it is to the recipient's advantage to be able to acquire technology in a nice, neat package, along with the assurance that the supplier
of the entire package has a continuing obligation to assist the recipient in
commercialization of the technology.' 1 An area which was inadequately
understood and which has been gaining importance in recent years is that
of engineering services contracts and turnkey projects. Several countries
37. Note 47 infra, art. 21.
38. Note 61 infra. These prohibitions were first introduced in Brazil in the Profit Remittance Law of 1962, note 43 infra.
39. See Radway, note 1 supra.

40. Id.
41. See DmscoLL & SANS, SuMMARY Rm'oir: BusNass GovmInm&NT SEMNAR ON
Bogota, Colombia (June 4-5, 1979).
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in Latin America are utilizing local engineering or similar organizations to
intervene in a technology transfer in order to absorb the technology, assure its retention locally, and encourage its retransfer and diffusion
throughout the local economy. 4 This is another example of the application of the "ship of state" theory. Increasing attention has been given to
distinguishing between contracts for engineering services with companies
that are in the engineering and/or construction business and other transactions involving the sale of equipment which includes some percentage
of technical services for installation, modification, or adaption. This is an
extremely important area in which more activity is to be expected in the
future.
IV.

CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED LEGISLATION

To provide a graphic picture of the intensity and the orchestration of
the technology regulation and control movement throughout Latin
America, selected events and enactments are included in capsule form

below.
43
1962: Brazilian Law Controlling Remittances/Foreign Exchange
(giving the Central Bank an important role).

1967: Colombian Decree 444" and Chilean Central Bank Regulations 45 (both of which regulated payments in foreign currency, including
all technology payments).
1969: ANCOM created by Colombian technocrats and "Velazquistas"

6
(Peru) with outside advisors from several nonmember countries.'

1971: ANCOM Decision 24;' 7 Peruvian General Law of Industries; 4

Argentine Law on Transfer of Technology;' Brazilian Industrial Property
Code."
42. This has been explained to the author personally by officials of technology transfer
agencies of the governments of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.
43. Profit Remittance Law, No. 4131 of Sept. 2, 1962, as amended by Law No. 4390 of
Aug. 29, 1964. For facts, see A.B.A. Monograph, supra note 2, at 148.
44. Decree 444 of Mar. 22, 1967, 30 LEGISLACION ECONOMICA 191 (1967).
45. "Normas sobre contratos de royalties," Central Bank Circular No. 887, July 24,
1967. This regulation was followed in 1969 by another one adding further clarification:
"Normas para cancelar el pago por regalias y asistencia tecnica," Diario Oficial, Aug. 4, 1969.
See also Silverstein, Sharing U.S. Energy Technology with the LDCs: A Model for International Technology Transfer, 12 J. IT'L L. & ECON. 363 (1978); Wesley, supra note 5, at 134.
46. The Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration (the Treaty of Cartagena) was
signed on May 26, 1969, by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. For text in English
see 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 910 (1969).
47. Andean Common Market Foreign Investment Code, Decision 24: Common Regime
for Treatment of Foreign Capital and Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, Dec. 31,
1970, effective July 31, 1971, amended in 1976. For text in English see 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
126 (1972).
48. Decree Law 18,350 (June 30, 1970), El Peruano, July 30, 1970, regulated by Supreme Decree 001-71-I.C.-D.S. (Jan. 26, 1971). For text in English see 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
1225 (1970).
49. Law No. 19,231 of Sept. 10, 1971, Anales de Legislacion Argentina.
50. Law No. 5772 of Dec. 21, 1971, DOU-I of Dec. 31, 1971, 35 LEx 1740 (S~o Paulo
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1972: Colombian Decree 12341 on Transfer of Technology Contracts.

1973: Mexican Laws on Foreign Investment"8 and Transfer of Technology;5 Argentine Law on Foreign Investment;" Colombian Decree
190055 implementing ANCOM Decision 24.
1974: Venezuelan Decrees 6 2 " and 635' implementing ANCOM Decision 24; New Argentine Transfer of Technology Law" (superseding the
1971 Law); Chilean Decree Law 60" implementing ANCOM Decision 24.
1975: Venezuelan Decree 746;" Brazilian Normative Act 15"6 (both
redefining technology transfer policy).

1976: Mexican Law on Inventions and Trademarks;'2 Argentine New
Foreign Investment Law" (superseding the 1973 Law); Brazilian Normative Act 17;" ANCOM Decisions 103 and 109;65 Ecuadorean Decrees 900
1971).
51. Decree Law 1234 of July 18, 1972, 41 LEGISLACION ECONOMICA 24 (1972), 11 Derecho
de Ia Integration 324 (Oct. 1972).
52. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, effective
May 8, 1973, Diario Oficial, Mar. 7, 1973. For text in English see 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 643
(1973). See generally Radway, note 22 supra, and Hyde and Ramirez de la Corte, Mexico's
New Transfer of Technology and Foreign Investment Laws-To What Extent Have the
Rules Changed, 10 INTr'L LAw. 231 (1976).
53. Law on the Registration of Contracts and Agreements Regarding the Transfer of
Technology, Dec. 28, 1972, effective Jan. 30, 1973, Diario Oficial, Dec. 30, 1972. For English
translation see 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 421 (1973). See generally Radway, note 22 supra, and
Hyde & Ramirez de Is Corte, note 52 supra.
54. Law 20,557 [1973] C. Anales 3670. For English translation see 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
1489 (1973).
55. Decree 1900 of Sept. 15, 1973, 43 Legislacion Economica 256 (1973).
56. Decree 62, Gaceta Oficial (Gac. Of.) 1650 Ex. (Apr. 29, 1974). For text in English see
13 INT'L LEGAL. MAT. 1220 (1974).

57. Decree 63, Gac. Of. 1650 (Apr. 28, 1974). For text in English see 13 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 1220 (1974).
58. Law No. 20,794, sanctioned Sept. 27, 1974.
59. Decree 600 (July 13, 1974), Diario Oficial, July 13, 1974. For English translation see
13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1176 (1974).

60. Decree 746 of Feb. 11, 1975 (revised Mar. 1, 1975), 11 Derecho de I Integration 318
(Mar. & July 1975).
61. Ato Normativo No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, promulgated by the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce, National Institute of Industrial Property, Revista De Propriedade Industrial No. 256 of Sept. 16, 1975; A.B.A. Monograph, supra note 2, at 283. See generally
Daniel, The Legal Ins and Outs of Technology Transfer, BRAZILuIN Bus., (Nov. 1977), at 17.
62. Law of Dec. 30, 1975, and Regulations of Oct. 8, 1976. See also Hyde & Ramirez de
la Corte, note 4 supra; Radway, note 22 supra; Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, note 52 supra.
63. Law No. 21,382 of Aug. 13, 1976 [1976] C. Anales 2071. For English translation see
15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1364 (1976). The implementing law, Decree No. 283/77, was published
Feb. 5, 1977. See generally Studwell & Cabanellas, The New Argentine ForeignInvestment
Law: an Analysis and Commentary, 1 HASTINGS INT'L & Coup. L. Rzv. 37 (1977); McKinnis,
The Argentine Foreign Investment Law of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357 (1978).
64. Published May 25, 1976. See generally Nattier, note 2 supra; Daniel, note 61
supra.
65. Dec. 103: Amends. to Dec. 24; Dec. 109: Amends. to Dec. 14. Twenty-first period
(Nov. 1976).
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A and B" (implementing ANCOM Decision 24).
1977: Chilean Revised Decree Law

600;67

Argentine Industrial Pro-

motion Law," Transfer of Technology Law" (superseding the 1974 Law),
and Tax Law Revisions;70 Venezuelan Decrees 203171 and 24427 (superseding Decrees 62 and 63 of 1974).
1978: Peruvian Labor Stabilization Law73 changed, and Export Incentive Law " enacted; Brazilian Normative Acts 30'5 and 32;76 New Venezuelan Tax Laws Affecting Technology
Transfer;"7 Colombian Resolu78
tion on Reinvestment of Earnings.
1979: Mexican Industrial Incentive Decrees; 79 Regulations to Venezuelan Tax Laws Affecting Technology Transfer;80 Argentine Mining Promotion Law. 81

V. PRACTICAL

RESULTS OF NEW RULES AND REGULATIONS

A.

Implementation of Policies
In order to understand the practical application of this legislation by
the various countries in the region, it is useful to consider a spectrum
from left to right (no political suggestion intended). On the left would be
the most rigid policy with respect to application of the technology transfer control and regulatory system. Brazil would have to occupy this position at the extreme end. Although its stated policy does not always read
as the most rigid, the practical application in Brazil, often administered

by able and well-informed individuals, produces some of the most intran66. Published Nov. 26, 1976.
67. Published as Decree 1748, Mar. 18, 1977, after Chile's withdrawal from the Andean
Pact in 1976 and its abrogation of Decision 24. For English translation see 17 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 134 (1978). Replaces 1974 version of Decree No. 600, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
1176 (1974).

68. Law No. 21,608 of July 23, 1977 and Regulations (Decree 2541 of Aug. 26, 1977).
69. Law No. 21,617 of Aug. 12, 1977.

70. Law No. 21,680 of Oct. 31, 1977. This law amended Law No. 21,280 of Apr. 2, 1976
(Tax on Transfer of Securities), Law No. 21,647 of Sept. 27, 1977 (Tax on Sale of Foreign
Exchange), Law No. 21,604 of July 22, 1977 (Income Tax), and Decree 142 of Jan. 21, 1977,
regulating Law No. 21,284 of Apr. 2, 1976 (Tax on Contingent Profits).
71. Decree 2031, Gac. Of. 31,171 (Feb. 9, 1977). For text in English see 16 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 1531 (1977).
72. Decree 2442 (Nov. 8, 1977).
73. Decree Law No. 22,126 of Mar. 21, 1978.
74. Decree Law No. 22,342 issued Nov. 22, 1978.
75. Published Jan. 19, 1978. See generally Nattier, note 2 supra; Daniel, note 61 supra.
76. Published May 9, 1978. See generally Nattier, note 2 supra; Daniel, note 61 supra.
77. See Decree 2932 of Nov. 7, 1978, and Decree 3106 of Feb. 28, 1979, containing regulations to art. 56 of the Venezuelan Income Tax Law (May 16, 1978), which defines "technical assistance" and "technological services" and the determination of net taxable income
thereon.
78. Res. 29 of Dec. 1978 of the National Council of Economic and Social Policy (CONPES), 53 LEGISLACION ECoNOMCA 348 (1979).
79. See Radway, supra note 22, at 371-72.
80. Decree 476 of Dec. 31, 1979 (Superseding Decrees 2932 and 3106, note 77 supra).
81. Law No. 22,095, published Nov. 1, 1979.
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sigent results. In defense of the Brazilian Government, however, it is suggested that its balance of payments problem is the most serious in Latin
America. Thus, it is essential for Brazil to negotiate the best possible
terms and to use the "great Brazilian market" as attractive bait to lure
the foreign technology supplier.
Next to Brazil would be Colombia, the most rigid of the Andean
Group. Once again, part of the intransigence of the Colombian policy
82
arises from attitudes on the part of members of the Royalty Committee
within that government with respect to the role of TNC's in their economy. Next to Colombia would be Venezuela, with its Decree 746 of February 1975 imposing some additional restrictions which go beyond those
enumerated in Decision 24. Perhaps Peru would then fall next on the
spectrum, approaching the middle of the array.
Mexico falls squarely in the middle. Mexico's pragmatic application
of its laws and policies has resulted in considerable flexibility in order to
accomplish the results the country deems to be in the national interest.
Continuing toward the more liberal end of the spectrum, we would encounter Ecuador and Bolivia of the Andean Group. These states have not
applied Decision 24 as rigidly as the countries previously mentioned. Ecuador has made creative interpretations to accommodate its development
needs. Bolivia has not yet fully implemented that law, but has developed
guidelines to suit its development needs.
Continuing to the other end of the spectrum, we find Argentina with
its 1977 revision of two earlier laws on the subject. Officials of the Argentine Government expressly stated their intent to reverse the trend of the
prior laws which had resulted, in their words, in a virtual "drying up" of
technology flow to that country.8 3 At the far right of the spectrum is
Chile, which now boasts Latin America's most open and flexible laws and
rules regarding technology transfer. Chile's Decree Law 600, although
based to some degree on Decision 24, establishes a "rule of reason" approach and permits technology to be utilized as a capital contribution
when fair market value can be established, even going so far as to permit
the supplier to establish that value by a sworn affidavit which, if not challenged within 120 days, is accepted." Argentina also has permitted technology to be capitalized, and the value must be established by negotiation
between the supplier and the Registry. 5 Both of these laws would appear
to give greater weight to the ability of local entrepreneurs to negotiate
more effectively than was presumed by other governments.

82. The Royalty Commitee was established by Decree 444, note 44 supra, for the purpose of approving technology agreements in accordance with stated criteria. It is comprised
of representatives of the Ministry of Development, the National Planning Department, the
Superintendent of Foreign Trade, the Prefect of Exchange Control, and the Head of the
Central Bank's Exchange Office. For further discussion, see Radway, note 1 supra.
83. See explanatory preface to Law No. 21,617, note 69 supra.
84. Note 67 supra, art. 2(c).
85. Law No. 21,617, note 69 supra, art. 12.
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Relationship to Import Controls

It is well known that the import control laws, regulations, and policies relate directly to transfer of technology policies. s6 Where countries
must restrict imports for balance of payments purposes, the import controls establish severe obstacles for the importation of foreign raw materials and semi-processed and finished products. This may be reasonable in
view of balance of payments constraints, but often has been misused as
an arbitrary barrier to competition and the importation of capital equipment by TNC's and smaller enterprises. Improving prospects of economic
growth would require reevaluation of import control policies throughout
the hemisphere.
C.

Relationship to Other Policies
In Brazil, as indicated, the technology transfer policies arise directly
from, and are a function of, the balance of payments problem presently
being addressed. Brazil has developed the most outstanding program in
Latin America for the creation of indigenous technology.87 It has established a network of technology development centers across the country
where exciting new developments are taking place with some frequency."
Since oil imports are the major item in the foreign exchange bill, considerable attention is being given to the development of alternative sources
of energy. All of this is designed to strengthen control of the "ship of
state."
Mexico's technology policy is affected by the formidable requirement
of having to create approximately 750,000 new jobs per year to absorb the
expanding work force. Thus, ranking high among the criteria utilized by
the Mexican Government to evaluate technology agreements for registration is the contribution to the solution of this vital employment problem.
Following the same logic, various countries have utilized their technology
regulation and control systems to reflect the prevailing economic and political thinking. Critics, however, suggest that technology should not be
utilized to solve political problems."9
D.

Results of Policies

The policy in Chile is beginning to pay off. Although the market is
decidely smaller than that of the other countries discussed, new invest-

86. As evidence of this proposition, see "Importacion Procedimiento" for each of the
Latin American countries, in REGIMEN DE LA TRANSFERENCIA DE TECHNOLOGIA EN LOS PAISES
DE AMERICA LATINA: TEXTOS LEGALES Y PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS (Instituto para la
Integraci6n de America Latina, Banco Interamericano de Desarollo 1977).
87. Decree 77,355 (Mar. 31, 1976) published in the Official Gazette, Apr. 5, 1976, approving II PBDCT (II Basic Plan for Scientific and Technological Development) of the
Presidency of the Republic of Brazil. See also Radway, note 21 supra.
88. Creating Alternatives to Imported Technology, BRAZILIAN Bus., May 1978, at 18.
89. Somer, A Survey of Development Efforts in Turkey, in THE TECHNOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 163 (Proceedings of the NBS/AID
UNCSTD Seminar, National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Maryland, Oct. 16-17,
1978, NBS Special Pub. No. 543, R. Sangster ed. Apr. 1979).
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ment is beginning to show a dramatic increase. Argentina has not yet begun to "take off"' in the same manner as Chile, but technology flow, along
with new foreign investment, has increased notably since the implementation of new foreign investment and technology transfer laws within the
last three years. Venezuela and Colombia, on the other hand, appear to
have leveled off in terms of new investment and the flow of new technology. Although it is well known that technology has continued to flow into
those countries from the TNC's, it is equally well known that much of the
technology has been directed at mere maintenance of the existing operation (market share) and not necessarily at the expansion, modernization,
and increased efficiency desired by the host countries and the firms themselves. The inference is that this omission is directly attributable to the
inability of the TNC/technology supplier to recover separate economic returns for the separate contribution of intangible technology.'"
Mexico's investment and technology statistics are improving dramatically. This is to a great extent attributable to increased wealth reported
by that country. The foreign investment and technology regulatory system, however, has been modified during the present administration in order to attract the capital and technology which was definitely leaving
Mexico toward the end of the last political regime. On the other hand,
Brazil remains an anomaly. It may well be that the tactic of using the
largest market in the region as bait for foreign capital and technology has
been successful thus far. New investment and technology have continued
to enter the country. However, the negative feedback is beginning to increase. Whether or not these complaints by the TNC's will accumulate to
the level where decisions are made to change their policies is yet to be
determined.
VI. JOINT VENTURE SOLUTION
A. Focus on Recipient
The solution advocated by more and more government planners, academicians, host country (quasi-governmental) corporations, and increasingly the foreign investment community, is the joint venture. The joint
venture has gained momentum in Latin America in the last few years,
particularly since the advent of the legislation discussed in this article.
One result of this movement has been to direct the attention of the
host government back toward the infrastructure of its own economy. To
encourage successful joint ventures and effective transfer of technology
through this modality, the recipient (and its environment) must be capable of effectively absorbing and utilizing technology and adapting it to
prevailing local conditions. Training programs that place a greater emphasis on increasing skill levels across all sectors of the economy have
now been initiated in various countries in Latin America. 91 Moreover, at-

90. See Radway, supra note 1, at 331.
91. See, e.g., Radway, Venezuela: Certain Legal Considerationsfor Doing Business, 8
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 289, 306 (1976).
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tention also has been directed at the structural character of the market
within various industries. As mentioned above, oligopolies have been
identified and criticized in most of these industries. Current thinking,
however, begins to shift away from discouraging the TNC's and toward
increasing competition, designed to facilitate the strengthening of local
enterprises by increasing productive efficiency.ss Accordingly, the whole
question of import policies and protectionism has once more been
brought under review. It is clear that Chile, Argentina, and to some extent Mexico have adopted policies designed to introduce more competition and to drive inefficient producers out of the relevant market. Public
announcements in December 1979 by a high Venezuelan Government official93 and the fact that Brazil will phase out its "similars" law" appear to
have extended this trend. Although this results in short-term displacement, which is politically unacceptable, the government decision-makers
apparently have accepted these consequences as the price of long-term
improvements.
B. Objectives
These policies result in increased competition, improved efficiency,
reduced inflation rates, improved capabilities for economic growth, job
expansion, and more realistic negotiations for economic integration on the
regional level. Similarly, promotion of exports should be a reflection of
more realistic market forces, which should enable government planners to
more accurately predict fluctuations in payments balances and assist
them in establishing budgetary priorities for national planning purposes.
One of the most important results of all these policies, however, will
be the creation of more indigenous solutions to the technological challenges facing each country. The joint venture vehicle has, as a major advantage, the opportunity for the local partner to identify those aspects of
any particular process, piece of equipment, or product that can be replaced by local resources without sacrificing ultimate performance objectives or specifications. This technique has been successfully5 observed in
an increasing number of joint ventures in the hemisphere.9
C. Control Problems
One of the constraints traditionally discouraging United States firms
from entering into joint ventures with a minority equity position is the
dual problem of management and control. Here the practicing attorney
can play an important role since, within the limits of practicality and prudence, the attorney/advisor is in a particularly strategic position to interpret for his client the realities of the trends that evolved over the last
92. "Production deepening" is one expression which has been used by leading technocrats to summarize this trend. See note 14 supra.
93. Speech by 11. E. Luis Ugueto Arismendi, Minister of Finance of Venezuela, 15th
Annual Meeting of the Council of the Americas, New York (Dec. 7, 1979).
94. Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 19, col. 1.
95. Sources for this conclusion include a number of speeches by local business executives of leading industrial groups, particularly in Brazil and Mexico.
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decade in Latin America. Many firms make decisions on the expectation
that some of these laws will eventually be removed from the books. A
more prudent prognosis would suggest occasional revisions and modifications of the laws, but that the blueprint would appear to be in place for
the present. Thus, the advisor can point out that, although the law of the
host country may require, or its policies may dictate, a minority equity
position by the foreign TNC, there may be distinct advantages in this
position. These include a lower profile for the TNC in an era which has
seen "creeping expropriation" in addition to outright nationalizations.
Also, the TNC as supplier of technology will be able to realize a greater
return on the technology, particularly the intangible portion (know-how,
technical assistance), through qualifying by virtue of the minority equity
position to receive the technical assistance fees and royalties in those
countries in which such payments would otherwise be prohibited.
In addition, it is well known that many joint ventures are actually
controlled on an operational basis by the party who maintains control of
the technology. This is achieved through continuous infusions of new improvements and developments, a constant flow of technical -assistance,
and sheer experience on a global basis with the application of its technology in a variety of environments. Control of the joint venture is also
maintained by the firm which has the ability to assist in the distribution
of the product or the output of the process due to its great experience in
marketing accumulated over many years. This fact, when coupled with
parallel experience in procuring a constant flow of the supplies vital to
maintaining continuous production, results in a degree of practical control which may not be offset by legislation.
D. Technological Adaptation
One factor which has not yet been fully appreciated is the ability of
the local partner to identify the unique local resources which strengthen
the utility of the product or process when applied to the conditions prevailing locally. This can reduce expenditure of scarce foreign exchange
reserves used to import elements that may be readily obtained from local
resources, or by more labor intensive methods of accomplishing certain
aspects of a process or operation. Moreover, adaptation of the technology
is facilitated by the ongoing interaction between appropriate representatives of the local enterprise and the local government officials who grant
approvals for related activities. The local partner then is in a unique position, and maximum mileage can be obtained from such conscientious efforts by the joint venture. This is often referred to as the local partner
supplying the "know-who" while the foreign firm supplies the "knowhow."
E. Capital Resource Allocation
Aside from the lower profile for the TNC and realization of a greater
return on the technology when transferred to a minority-held subsidiary,
the allocation of the human resources in the TNC's own organization is
an increasingly complex management problem. By giving greater emphasis to the development of more formalized training for local management
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personnel programs, TNC's can extend their own limited human resources and at the same time satisfy an important objective of the host
countries. This results in the requirement of fewer home country nationals being sent abroad. The realities are that changes in home country tax
laws (for example, I.R.C. § 911) have made it increasingly difficult to accept foreign assignments.
F. Creation of New Sources of Technology
The indigenous solution that creative Brazilians will inevitably develop may, in fact, be applicable to a particular plant location in Wyoming, Canada, Australia, or elsewhere. Due to constraints existing in various countries in Latin America, the motivation is extremely high to
develop new solutions to difficult problems within available resource limitations. This kind of mentality creates technological leadership and innovation. The message is clear: indigenous development under joint venture
arrangements can contribute to increasing the "improvements pool"
maintained by technology suppliers with worldwide licensing networks, or
worldwide arrangements for engineering services or technical assistance
agreements.
VII. RESTORING EQUILIBRIUM
A. BargainingPower (Negotiations)
The problem of equalizing bargaining power, which has been identified by every LDC government," has no easy solution. In the long term,
the training programs being offered by various United Nations agencies
(for example, the World Bank) and other institutions, generally called
"Technical Cooperation for Developing Countries," will improve capabilities of more host government officials to negotiate with TNC's.7 In the
near term, however, more governments in the region are retaining consultants to assist with evaluations and negotiations of large technology
projects. In addition to technical consultants, who have been retained for
many years, governments are now retaining more financial, economic, and
legal advisors, many of whom are experienced negotiators and even participate in the direct negotiations themselves.
B. Resolving Conflicting Objectives
Many of the objectives of host governments have been referred to
earlier. They include preserving scarce foreign exchange reserves, increasing jobs, decentralizing industrial concentrations and population, improving training and skill levels of the work force, and promoting exports."
The objectives of the suppliers are also well-known, including among
other things: (1) gaining a position for a new product or market entry, or

96. See Radway, supra note 7, at 289-90.
97. See, e.g., Transnational Corporations: Issues Relevant to the Development and Implementation of Technical Co-operation Programmes and Projects in Developing Countries,
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations Pub. No. 78-40859, Feb. 1978. See
also Negotiating with TransnationalCorporations:Workshops for Developing Country Officials, CTC REP., Dec. 1977, at 18.
98. See Radway, supra note 7, at 288.
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expanding or maintaining existing market position; (2) ensuring adequate
return on investment of capital, including technology and human resources; (3) protecting a reputation for quality and service worldwide; (4)
maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets and confidential
processes; and (5) protecting industrial property rights. Some of these respective objectives are in direct conflict with each other, and again the
attorney or other advisor has an important role in the negotiation process: accommodating the conflicting objectives in order to promote the
interests of the client within the context of profitable business operations
and economic and social development.
C.

Long-Term Attitude
Appreciation of long-term attitudes requires mutual sensitivity on
the part of host governments and TNC's. The host government, for its
part, must contribute to the creation and maintenance of a stable climate
for investments. TNC's require certainty and predictability in order to
make decisions on resource allocations to specific projects. For its part,
the TNC must make a commitment and a contribution to the social and
economic development of the host country. The firm is, after all, a guest
in the foreign country. Most United States technology suppliers are fully
willing to make this type of commitment, within reasonable limits.
Within the context of cooperation, not confrontation, it is suggested
that regional economic integration and oligopoly are both here to stay.
The latter is the result of efficiency factors within the market forces operating in any given industry and is not, by definition, an evil. In fact, it
may result in substantial benefit to the ultimate consumers, the society as
a whole. The issue is not necessarily reducti on of dependence on foreign
sources of control, capital, and technology. The question may well be
what kind of interdependence can be created to facilitate economic
growth and development, and to provide opportunities for Latin American countries to export their technology, now and increasingly in the future, without attracting retaliation. A similar problem has preoccupied
experts in international trade matters for years.
D. Host Governments Should Offer Incentive for Effective Transfer
The bottom line is that the technology transfer transaction has to be
in the interest of each party. Thus, when the government identifies priorities that involve selection of a particular technology, it must make a commitment to obtain that technology and insure to the extent possible an
effective transfer. This could include various incentives such as those involving the taxation of various economic activities. It is not necessary to
elaborate, since many of these alternatives have been discussed in virtually each government in the region.
There are also other special provisions which could be applied to
high priority technical projects, and in fact have been for years. These
provisions include a qualitative evaluation of the technology and its role
in national priorities, which could result in granting longer durations than
those permitted by law, protection of confidentiality for longer periods
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than presently permitted, and protections for the supplier as are included
in the Argentine law as an added assurance and incentive for the supplier
concerned about protecting trade secrets. In other words, the host country must accept the economic realities of the TNC's.
E.

TNC's Must Respond in Kind
The TNC's, in order to meet their own economic objectives, must be
prepared to accept and accomodate those vital and national objectives of
the host country. Among the more obvious negotiating trade-offs is the
commitment to training which should be made by the companies in virtually every major technology transfer project. This could include training
more than the minimum number of welders, electricians, production foremen, or other skilled personnel required for a project. The TNC should
be prepared to design a program to train additional numbers of nationals,
both in its own interest (for example, to build a reserve force of skilled
craftsmen to replace those attracted elsewhere) and also to contribute to
the satisfaction of national training objectives. It is contended that this is
not necessarily "uneconomic" or "unproductive" in the long run. The
backup system" is already in use in certain countries.
Another obvious trade-off which can be offered by the TNC's is what
will be termed "adaptation centers." The well-known development engineering techniques, which have been perfected in the United States in a
variety of industries, can be applied to the development of small (two or
three persons) centers devoted to the investigation and application of
those elements of technology (the product, process, equipment or materials) which can be replaced by a local equivalent without sacrificing product or process integrity. This should be obvious in the agribusiness sector
but is equally applicable to most aspects of industrial activity. Also, by
staffing these centers with one foreign engineer or technician and possibly
two national counterparts, the kind of training that may be transferred to
the local engineers or technicians working with the expatriate would be of
the highest possible caliber.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

State capitalism is a way of life in many countries in Latin America,
as well as in Europe and elsewhere. But state capitalism does not preclude cooperation between governments and TNC's in accomplishing social and economic development objectives that each respect. The decade
of the 1970's has witnessed enormous activity in this hemisphere as governments sought appropriate regulatory vehicles to satisfy their goals. At
the same time, normal developments resulted in various changes of governments in the region. This contributed to a perception of instability by
suppliers of foreign capital and technology. Whether or not this perception is accurate, the result has been the creation of additional constraints

99. The backup system includes an extra individual for each specific position in the
organization so that when the initially-trained individual leaves, the replacement is already

trained.
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on the development and integration of the region.
Pragmatism and flexibility are required on the part of the government officials implementing technology transfer laws and policies, and
also on the part of attorneys and others who advise TNC's in the United
States and Latin America. Creative methods must be designed to accomodate the objectives of the TNC's and those of governments.
There is no lack of opportunity for profitable business operations in
Latin America in the 1980's. However, there is a shortage of resources,
including capital, technology, and human resources. The joint venture
would appear to present a viable vehicle for the transfer of technology
and the allocation of resources in such a way as to meet the principal
objective of the suppliers of technology while satisfying overriding national requirements of host governments. This would result in a strengthening of national enterprises and of the private sector throughout Latin
America. To implement these concepts effectively, a certain long-term attitude and vision is required of TNC's and host governments, as well as of
negotiators who advise either. It is hoped that increased sensitivity and
awareness will contribute to those creative solutions required to meet the
challenges of the 1980's and 1990's.

Trademark Protection in the People's
Republic of China
HEINZ DAWID*

I.

SOCIALIST TRADEMARK RATIONALES

At first glance, the existence of a law on trademarks in a socialist
country is bound to strike the reader as somewhat anomalous, if not as a
downright abandonment of basic principles of the socialist system. After

all, trademarks are used to identify and distinguish the products of individual manufacturers offered for sale side by side to the general public to
foster fair and effective competition. In a socialist economy where private
property rights in the means of production have been abolished and the
state is the sole producer and distributor of goods, why should there be a
need for trademarks? Should it not be sufficient to identify goods by their
generic names?1 But not only do practically all socialist countries have
laws on trademarks, but the majority (excluding the People's Republic of
China) are also members of the Paris Convention under which they have
agreed to register and accord protection to foreign trademarks.'
While it took the U.S.S.R. almost twenty years to introduce its first
trademark law in 1936,3 the People's Republic of China (PRC) has moved
considerably faster. In fact, less than a year after the PRC was established in October 1949, provisional regulations governing the registration
of trademarks were enacted "to assure the right of exclusive use of exclusive trade marks of industry and commerce in general."'
© Copyright retained by author.
* Partner, Weiss Dawid Fross Zelnick & Lehrman, New York, N.Y. Editor, PINNER'S
WORLD UNFAIR CoMI IOmN
LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2d ed. 1980). Dr. jut., University of Berlin,
1935; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School, 1951.
1. See S. PIsAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 328-32 (1970), dealing with basic issues of
trademark use in socialist countries, and Hsai & Haun, Laws of the People's Republic of
China on Industrial and Intellectual Property, 5 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 743, 765-66
(1973), dealing particularly with the People's Republic of China.
2. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, ratified May 5, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2140,
T.I.A.S. No. 7727. At the present time, aside from the People's Republic of China (PRC),
the non-members among the socialist countries are Albania, Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam.
MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (OcTROOmBUREAU LOS EN STIGTER-AMSTERDAM) (1979) [hereinafter

cited as OCTROOmUREAU], § Paris Convention 5-6 (1978). In particular, the U.S.S.R. has
been a member of the Paris Convention since 1965 and the Madrid Arrangement on the
International Registration of Trademarks since 1976. Id. at § U.S.S.R. 1 (1976), § Paris
Convention (Countries) 3 (1978). The U.S.S.R. adhered to the Trademark Registration
Treaty in 1980.
3. S. PIsAR, supra note 1, at 328.
4. Provisional Regulations of Aug. 28, 1950, Concerning the Registration of Trade-
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These regulations provided that "public or private factories,
merchants and cooperatives" requiring the exclusive use of trademarks
for merchandise which they produce, manufacture, process, or select,
shall apply for registration to the Central Bureau of Privately Operated
Enterprises of the Committee of Finance and Economics of the Political
Affairs Yuan. 5 The regulations in most respects contained language which
differed little from the trademark laws of nonsocialist countries. Article
32 of the regulations stated that "[clertificates in respect of trademarks
formerly registered with local people's governments must, after the promulgation of these regulations, be exchanged for new ones." In other
words, while the regulations of 1950 provided for the first nationwide registration of trademarks, they were preceded by regulations providing for
registration by municipal governments that must have been in effect
within the first eighteen months following the conquest of China by Communist armies.
The 1950 Regulations also took note of the existence of trademark
registrations issued prior to October 1949. Article 33 stated: "A new application shall be made after the promulgation of these regulations for the
registration of trade marks registered by the Trade Marks Bureau of the
former Kuomintang reactionary government."
The 1950 Regulations remained in effect until April 10, 1963, when
they were replaced by a new set of regulations for the control of trademarks.' On April 25, 1963, the Central Administration of Industry and
Commerce (CAIC), the authority in charge of trademark registration, issued the implementing rules under which trademarks are presently pro7
tected in China.
If the PRC, like most other socialist countries, recognizes trademarks, adopting a system for their registration and protection despite
their capitalistic, free enterprise origin, this must be due to the fact that
the trademark system offers benefits not only to private enterprise as
trademark owners, but also to other groups who play a role in the economic process, such as the authorities who in socialist countries supervise
the exchange of goods and the general public (or in socialist terminology,
the "masses"). After all, regardless of whether a factory is privately
owned or government-operated, the public has an interest in being protected against shoddy or defective merchandise, and trademarks identifymarks, art. 1, [1952] 1 CHUNG YANo JEN MIN CHENG Fu FA

LING

Hui

PIEN

(Collection of

Laws and Decrees of the Central People's Government) 528 [hereinafter cited as 1950 Regulations]. For English translation see 58 PAT. & T.M. REV. 359 (1960).
5. Id. art. 2.
6. Regulations of Apr. 10, 1963, Concerning the Control of Trademarks, [1964] 13
CHUANG HUA JEN MIN KUNG Ho Kuo FA Kun Hui PIEN [FKHP] (Collection of Laws and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China) 241 [hereinafter cited as 1963 Regulations].
For English translation see 62 PAT. & T.M. REV. 247 (1964).
7. Rules of Apr. 25, 1963, Concerning the Implementation of the Regulations Governing
the Control of Trademarks, [1964] 13 FKHP 164 [hereinafter cited as 1963 Rules]. For English translation see 62 PAT. & T.M. REv. 249 (1964).
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ing the products of particular factories, or distinguishing goods of higher
quality from goods of lower quality, render an important service to the
customer. Therefore, a system of trademark registration and protection
including a trademark law is not necessarily alien to socialist economies.
Foreign trade, of course, is another justification for the maintenance
of a trademark system. No socialist country has been able, or has found it
to its benefit, to cut off all foreign trade. Instead, such trade plays an
important role not only among socialist countries, but also between East
and West. The 1950 Regulations of the PRC took this into account and
provided that trademarks consisting of foreign letters could be registered
if they were applied to merchandise marketed abroad or imported from
foreign countries.8 The regulations further provided that foreigners whose
countries had concluded commercial treaties with the PRC could, within
the limits laid down by such treaties, apply for registration of their
trademarks.'
The 1963 Trademark Regulations, to a much greater extent than the
1950 Regulations, emphasize the socialist character of the PRC's trademark policy, and at the same time make special allowances for foreigners
and foreign-owned trademarks in order to promote commercial intercourse with foreign countries. 10
The socialist character of the 1963 Regulations is evidenced by their
title, "Regulations Concerning the Control of Trade Marks, 1 emphasizing "control" over, rather than rights in, trademarks. This principle is
further developed in article 1 which proclaims that the purpose of the
regulations is "to strengthen the control of trade marks and to encourage
enterprises to ensure and improve the quality of their products," and in
article 3 which defines a trademark as a "marking representing certain
quality of a commodity." Article 3 states further that "industrial and
commercial administrative. authorities shall. . . exercise supervision and
control of the quality of the commodity." Finally, in line with the stated
purpose of the regulations and their definition of a trademark, article
11(1) provides that a registration shall be cancelled by the CAIC "where
the quality of a commodity deteriorates as a result of rough and scampy
work."
Article 11 contains another ground for cancellation far less clear in
its meaning, unless understood as a restatement of a basic political principle that there is no definite right in a trademark for the person who obtains the registration. It provides simply that a registration may be cancelled by the CAIC "where the masses of the people, or an office or

8. 1950 Regulations, supra note 4, art. 4(iv).
9. Id. art. 5.
10. See Haia & Haun, supra note 1, at 764, 769-70.
11. 1963 Regulations, supra note 6. See also Regulations on the Verification of Trademarks, INDUS. PROP., June 1974, at 30. The word "control," however, has been asserted to be
more meaningful than "verification" in the context of other regulations and rules. Butler,
Trade Marks in the People's Republic of China, 17 CAN. PAT. RaP. 76, 77 (1975).
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association or enterprise recommend its withdrawal, which upon examination is considered appropriate." Another feature of Chinese trademark
policy which, to a Westerner, is difficult to comprehend, arises out of the
general structure of political power in China. The principle of division of
power, especially division into legislative, administrative, and juridical authorities, is not recognized. The individual, therefore, is facing an all-powerful authority not subject to the control or supervision of any other
agency. The problem is further aggravated by the lack of statutory
mandates.
Applying this feature of Chinese political power to the law of trademarks, it follows that the CAIC has the sole power to determine whether
a trademark is registrable, whether it is anticipated by a prior registration, or whether it should be cancelled, because of deterioration of the
product bearing the trademark, because of nonuse, or because some other
party has asked for the cancellation. There is no appeal from its decision.
In this connection, again, the 1963 Regulations differ from the 1950 Regulations. By the latter, any decision by the authority in charge of trademark registration could be appealed to the Committee of Finance and
Economics of the Political Affairs Yuan (State Administration Council),"2
a higher administrative authority. An appeal to a court was not possible
under the 1950 Regulations except in case of infringement where the local
People's Court had jurisdiction."'
Since the 1963 prescriptions give the regulatory agency complete authority as to their application, the CAIC also appears to have the right
not to apply the regulations when it deems it appropriate. For instance,
article 11(3) provides that a registration shall be cancelled "where a trade
mark has not been in use for one full year and no permission has been
granted for its reservation." However, it is generally understood that this
rule does not apply to trademarks owned by foreign registrants." ' Likewise, concerning the application of article 2, requiring all trademarks used
by an enterprise to be filed with the CAIC, it was intimated to a visiting
foreign trademark petitioner that, in the case of a foreign applicant, if a
mark were used without the benefit of filing a registration application, the
owner of the trademark would be given adequate notice to correct the
omission before any drastic measures would be taken."
II. FEATURES OF THE PRC TRADEMARK REGULATIONS
The following is a summary of the most important features of the
1963 Regulations.
1. Trademark rights depend solely on registration. Prior use is not

12. 1950 Regulations, supra note 4, art. 28.
13. Id. art. 29.
14. See Offner, Trademark Quality Control and Compulsory Registration Requirements in the People's Republic of China, 74 PAT. & T.M. REV. 319, 321 (1976). See also
Butler, supra note 11, ot 81, who simply disregards art. 11(3) as inapplicable to foreign
trademark owners.
15. Butler, supra note 11, at 78.
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recognized as a basis for registration or for challenging the registration of
another party. In case of conflict between two applications, the one filed
first will be given preference. If it is desired to apply a registered trademark to other goods, a new application must be filed.16
2. While a trademark confusingly similar to another trademark pre17
viously registered for the same or similar goods may not be registered,
there is no way for a prior registrant to oppose such an application. 6
However, it would appear that after the trademark has been issued, cancellation may be requested under article 11(4) on several grounds.'
3. China has a classification system consisting of no less than sev20
enty-eight classes, and an application must be limited to a single class.
According to information received from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), the agency officially appointed to
represent foreign applicants before the CAIC, 1 the introduction of the
International Classification System is under consideration .
4. So far it is not possible to register service marks in the PRC, and
information from the CCPIT refers only to the international classification
of goods but makes no reference to service classes.23
5. The 1963 Regulations fail to indicate a definite term for a trademark registration and contain no provisions regarding renewal proceedings, allowing the conclusion that each registration has an indefinite term.
In the case of registrations owned by foreign registrants, however, the
CAIC takes the position that such registrations subsist for only a ten year
term," another example of the discretion of the CAIC in interpreting the
5
regulations.2
6. As previously pointed out, article 11(3), which provides for cancellation of a registration if a mark has not been used in the course of the
preceding year, is not deemed applicable to foreign registrants."
7.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Trademark registrations may be freely assigned. While this is not

OcTaoomuRwAu, supra note 2, § People's Republic of China 3 (1977).
1963 Regulations, supra note 6, art. 7.
OcraooisumAu, supra note 2, § People's Republic of China 2 (1977).
Id. at 4.

20. Id. at 2.
21. See 1963 Rules, supra note 7, art. XV, which refers to representation by the China
International Trade Advancement Committee. Evidently the name of the body representing
foreign applications has been variously translated or changed as it has also been known as
the Chinese Council for the Development of International Commerce. 0CRoomUEAu,
supra note 2, § People's Republic of China 2 (1977). It is now designated as the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). Hsia & Haun, supra note 1, at
769,
22. Letter from CCPIT to the present writer (Dec. 31, 1979).
23. Id.
24. OCTaoomuRaAu, supra note 2, § People's Republic of China 1 (1977).
25. The regulations explicitly give the CAIC discretion to set the period of validity.
1963 Regulations, supra note 6, art. 12.
26. OcTRoomuREAu, supra note 2, § People's Republic of China 4 (1977).
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specifically stated in any of the articles of the regulations, it would appear
to follow from the 1963 Rules: "Where a registered trade mark is to be
transferred to another enterprise, the transferor and transferee shall
jointly make an application for the transfer of the registration.' 7 The
regulations contain no provision regarding trademark licensing, but they
also contain no provision prohibiting licensing. Therefore, it would appear
that this matter is really left open, and bearing in mind that trademarks
may be freely assigned, it would seem logical that a trademark license
should also be possible, at least as long as the quality of product is maintained. A possible argument against this theory results from the fact that
the rules which provide for the recording of assignments do not provide
for the recording of licenses."s In response to an inquiry in May 1978, the
CCPIT stated: "As you already know, at present there is no provision for
trademark licensing in our Trademark Law. The registered trademark
can only be used by the registered owner."' 29 However, there may have
been a slight modification of the position of the CCPIT in recent months.
In response to a telex, the same authorities stated on December 19, 1979:
"No provision for trademark license in our present Trademark Law.
However, it can be stipulated in contract of joint venture, if U.S. companies want to use their registered marks on goods manufactured by the
joint venture."' 0 The Joint Venture Law became effective on July 8,
1979,3" and is thus subsequent to the 1963 Regulations, which do not
mention the licensing of trademarks. It might then be argued that as a
result of this Joint Venture Law the previously ignored trademark licensing problem has now been clarified in favor of the recognition of licenses.
Therefore, it would follow that if, in connection with a proposed revision
of the trademark regulations a 2 a specific provision regarding trademark
licenses is introduced, this would only recognize the situation resulting
from the promulgation of the Joint Venture Law and the implicit change
in the official interpretation of the trademarks regulations.
8.

Neither the regulations nor the rules contain any provision re-

27. 1963 Rules, supra note 7, art. X.
28. See 1963 Rules, supra note 7, art. XIX-XX.
29. Letter from CCPIT to the present writer (May 24, 1978). Several authorities had
theretofore stated that trademark licenses were not allowed, that only the registered owner
of the mark was entitled to the use of the mark, and that use by another enterprise could
lead to cancellation. OcToomuEAu, supra note 2, § People's Republic of China 3 (1977);
Butler, supra note 11, at 89. Butler goes on to say, however, that amendments to permit
licensing are currently under consideration. Id.
30. Telex from CCPIT to the present writer (Dec. 19, 1979).
31. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment, done July 1, 1979, translatedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1163 (1979). This
law allows foreigners to make capital and technological investments in the PRC through a
joint venture-limited liability company, contributing at least 25 percent of the registered
capital which may be in the form of intellectual property. For a general explication of the
Joint Venture as related to the PRC, see Blackshaw, Business Through Joint Ventures, XV
LEs NOUVELLES 26 (Mar. 1980).
32. Butler, supra note 11, at 89.
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garding the protection of a trademark owner against an infringement.
One authority takes the position that there is no need for infringement
proceedings, since the trademark can only be used if it is registered and,
if a mark which is confusingly similar with a previously registered mark is
registered, the owner of the prior mark can institute cancellation proceedings under article 11(4).31 Presumably, this is also what the CCPIT had in
mind when, in reply to an inquiry by the author, it stated: "In our country, there are no statutory provisions concerning similar marks. However,
this matter will be investigated and decided by the competent authorities,
as the case may be."'"
III. PROTECTION OF FOREIGN TRADEMARKS
As stated above, the PRC has from the very beginning been conscious of the problems connected with the protection of foreign-owned
trademarks in China. The aforementioned article 5 of the 1950 Regulations, allowing trademark registration by nationals of countries having
commercial treaties with China, has been replaced in the 1963 Regulations by article 12, which sets forth two requirements: (1) a reciprocal
agreement on the registration of trademarks between the country of the
applicant and the PRC must be in force; and (2) the applied-for trademark must be the subject of a prior registration in the applicant's home
country.8 5
Agreements of the kind referred to in article 12 had, in fact, been
concluded between the PRC and other countries well before the 1963
Regulations came into effect. The first of these had been concluded with
the United Kingdom in 1956, and Denmark and Switzerland in 1958."
Subsequent to the 1963 Regulations, additional agreements were concluded with Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France,
the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
7
Norway, and Sweden.
The absence of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the
United States since 1949 constituted a special problem for American
trademark owners. Although China has never been a party to the Paris
Convention, 8 American citizens had been able to protect their trademarks through registration in pre-revolutionary China as a result of treaties in effect between the two nations,8 ' the last of which became effective

33. Id. at 90.
34. Letter from CCPIT to the present writer (Dec. 31, 1979).
35. 1963 Regulations, supra note 6, art. 12.
36. Hsia & Haun, supra note 1, at 767 n.92.
37. OcTRoomuRAu, supra note 2, § People's Republic of China 1 (1977).
38. Note 2 supra. See Pavelic, Exporting to the People's Republic of China, 11 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 337, 375 (1979), for a prediction that the PRC will join the Paris Convention in the near future.
39. The first U.S.-China treaty took effect in 1860, and the first trademark law in China
was enacted on May 3, 1923, article VI of which dealt with infringements. J. RuEGE, TRADE-'
MARK LAWS OF THE WORLD 160 (1928).
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November 30, 1948.40 However, the establishment of the People's Republic in Peking in 1949 brought forth a basic change in this situation, and
with the exception of the island of Taiwan, where the national government maintained its old trademark system, 4 ' American trademark owners
were unable either to maintain their trademark protection on the Chinese
mainland through renewal or add to it through new registrations. Not
only were they prevented from registering their trademarks by the PRC
requirement for commercial treaties under the 1950 Regulations, 2 replaced in 1963 with the requirement for reciprocal registration agreements,4 3 but also by United States Foreign Assets Control Regulations,
according to which payments regarding trademark and other industrial
property proceedings in China had to be made into a "blocked account"
in the United States from which no payments could be made without a
license."
The United States, however, evidenced a desire to change its relationship with the PRC with regard to payment for industrial property
protection as early as 1969. In response to an inquiry by the author, the
Foreign Assets Control Office advised that it was prepared to license remittances to the PRC concerning the payment of registration fees without
requiring deposit into a blocked account. The Office went on to state:
"Equally, we would be prepared to license such remittances by a foreign
subsidiary when it secures a registration in its name.""' The only way for
American trademark owners to protect their marks in the PRC at the
time was, in view of the lack of any trademark agreement between the
two countries, to file through one of their subsidiaries, provided the subsidiary was located in a country which had recognized the PRC and which
had concluded a trademark agreement with it, and that the subsidiary
had registered the trademark in question in its own name in its home
country. When these conditions were met, the subsidiary was in a position to secure a valid registration, even of trademarks generally known to
be American marks. Of course, this procedure was not only cumbersome

40. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, with accompanying protocol,
entered into force Nov. 30, 1948, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871. This treaty is now applicable only to Taiwan. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1979, at 38,
233 (1979). The late Dr. S.P. Ladas tried to persuade the authorities of the PRC to refer to
this treaty as a basis for granting American applicants the right to apply for trademark
registration in Peking, but failed since this would have been contrary to the policy of the
PRC not to regard itself as the successor to the Nanking government. Address by S.P.
Ladas, Symposium on Laws of the PRC, Georgetown University (Mar. 1973).
41. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1979, at 38, 233 (1979).
42. 1950 Regulations, supra note 4, art. 4(iv).
43. 1963 Regulations, supra note 6, art. 12.
44. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.528 (1978). These regulations differ from the ones applicable, for instance, to Cuba, where payments in trademark and other industrial property matters could always be deposited into an open account and where there exists a general license
under which such payments are permitted. 31 C.F.R. § 515.527 (1978).
45. Letter from the Foreign Assets Control Office of the United States to the present
writer (Aug. 11, 1969).
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but also contrary to the basic trademark policy of many American corporations which prefer being the registered owners of their foreign
trademarks."
IV.

UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADEMARK RELATIONS
FOLLOWING DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

Although full diplomatic relations between the United States and the
PRC were established in December 1978,' a basic change in United
States-China trademark relations had occurred earlier, in March 1978,
when the CCPIT advised the National Council for United States-China
Trade in Washington, D.C. that the Chinese Government had decided to
apply the principle of reciprocity under article 12 of the Trademarks Regulations. 8 That is, the CCPIT stated that the PRC noted that PRC
trademarks could be registered in the United States under the Lanham
Act"9 and, accordingly, registration of United States trademarks would be
permitted beginning in January 1978.50 Further, if it were confirmed that
a copy of the home registration would not be required for registering PRC
trademarks in the United States, then a home registration certificate
would no longer be required in the PRC.5 1
With this ruling, American trademark owners suddenly received not
only equal treatment with other foreign applicants who could avail themselves of a specific reciprocity agreement as required by article 12, but
they were freed of the second requirement of article 12, whereby the registration to be obtained in Peking was dependent on a prior registration
in the applicant's home country.52 Subsequently, the Chinese authorities

46. In some countries, such as Switzerland, it was unnecessary for American corporations to transfer ownership of their Swiss trademarks to their Swiss subsidiaries. Under
article 6a of the Swiss trademark law, subsidiaries were authorized to take out separate
Swiss registrations for the same trademarks, which could then serve as a basis for the filing
in China. See H. DAWID, COMMENTARY TO THE Swiss TRADEMARKS LAW 16 (1960). Parallel
filings have also been common for many years in France, Germany, and Italy, where the
trademark registrar makes no examination for conflicts with prior registered marks. OcTROOIaUREAU, supra note 2, § France 18 (1979), § Germany (Federal Republic) 8 (1978), §
Italy 6 (1979).
47. People's Republic of China-UnitedStates: Establishment of Diplomatic Relations,
18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 272 (1979).
48. BULL. U.S. T.M. Ass'N, Apr. 18, 1978, at 1. See also Pavelic, supra note 38, at 373.
49. Id.; Lanham Trademark Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976).
50. BULL. U.S. T.M. Ass'N, note 48 supra.
51. Id.
52. Although section 1 of the Lanham Trademark Act makes no requirement of citizenship or domicile for registration of a trademark in use in commerce, under section 44, a
foreigner may register a trademark not being used in commerce in the United States only if
he provides a copy of the home country registration. Lanham Trademark Act, §§ 1, 44, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1126 (1976). Thus, reciprocity technically exists only with respect to trademarks actually in use. Article 2 of the Paris Convention provides that member nations will
extend the same protection to foreign nationals as to their own, while article 6 quinquies
provides that every trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be protected.
Countries which have interpreted article 6 quinquies as independent of article 2 have also
not required copies of home country registrations, and this interpretation has been widely
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granted the same privilege to numerous other countries, including West
5
Germany. 3
As a result of the CCPIT's declaration in March 1978, American applicants, prior to the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the
PRC, were able to register with the CAIC any trademark they wished to
protect, whether or not they had a prior United States registration. Considering the difficulties which often arise in obtaining a United States registration, the ability to file an independent application with the CAIC
has been of considerable value.
At present, it is not possible to evaluate the manner in which the
CAIC administers the trademark regulations. No gazette is published
containing the particulars of registrations issued, 54 despite article 9 of the
1963 Regulations which provides: "Following the approval of the registration of a trademark, the CAIC shall publish it in an official bulletin and
issue a Certificate of Registration." However, in response to inquiries, the
CCPIT has definitively stated that a publication will issue "in the near
future."55 Because of the lack of a publication, it is practically impossible
for the owner of any registered trademark to make sure that infringing
marks are not registered and to proceed against them.
According to article 6 of the trademark regulations, the official examination of an application should include a check regarding conflicting
prior registrations," but the author is not aware of any objections raised
over the past few years on grounds of anticipation.
The trademark law of the PRC is limited to regulations consisting of
fourteen articles and twenty-one implementing rules.5 7 These provisions
fail to deal with many of the problems for which provisions can be found
in the trademark laws of other countries. Moreover, there is no jurisprudence interpreting the Chinese trademark regulations, or at least no published decisions. Also, a considerable degree of discretion exists with
which the CAIC interprets the rules and regulations. Given this, it may
well turn out that the most important rules determining trademark rights
of Americans in the PRC can be found in, or may be developed from, the
interpretation of the Agreement on Trade Relations between the two
countries concluded on July 7, 1979," which is expected to be ratified in

followed. See 2 S. LADAS, PATENT TRADEMARK AND RELATED RIGHTS 970-71 (1975).
53. BLATT FOR PATENT-MUSTER UND ZEICHENWESEN 75 (Jan. 19, 1979). West Germany
tried for some time prior to 1978 to work out an arrangement with the PRC dispensing with
the home registration requirement, but in the end had to settle for an agreement similar to
those in effect between China and other countries, requiring home registration.
54. Publication of such a gazette was discontinued in 1966. Butler, supra note 11, at 81.
55. Letter from CCPIT to the present writer (Dec. 31, 1979).
56. "Trade marks under application for registration may not be confused with those
trade marks of which registration has been made by other enterprises for the same or similar kind of commodities." 1963 Regulations, supra note 6, art. 6.
57. 1963 Regulations, note 6 supra; 1963 Rules, note 7 supra.
58. Agreement on Trade Relations, Jul. 7, 1979, China-United States, reprinted in 18
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1041 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Agreement on Trade Relations].
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the near future. An analysis of the provisions of this treaty follows.
Article VI of this agreement is devoted exclusively to the protection
of industrial and intellectual property rights, including the protection of
trademarks." For example, whereas subparagraph 1, providing that
"[b]oth Contracting Parties in their trade relations recognize the importance of effective protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights,"
may have only symbolic significance, subparagraphs 2 and 3 deserve serious consideration. Subparagraph 2 reads as follows: "Both Contracting
Parties agree that on the basis of reciprocity legal or natural persons of
either Party may apply for registration of trademarks and acquire exclusive rights thereto in the territory of the other Party in accordance with
its laws and regulations."" Insofar as the registration of trademarks is
concerned, this provision merely confirms the existence of the right of
American applicants to apply for registration, as has in fact been conceded to them by the PRC Government under the March 1978 CCPIT
declaration." However, of somewhat greater significance appears to be
the reference to the acquisition of "exclusive rights" to registered trademarks which are to be granted to citizens of either party. This may lead
to problems not only in China but also in the United States, in view of
the fact that under United States law it is not the registration of a trademark, but its actual use, which creates trademark rights.
A similar situation arises with regard to the PRC insofar as it could
be argued that the recognition of "exclusive rights" in trademarks constitutes a basic change in Chinese trademark protection since, as previously
pointed out, the 1963 Regulations carefully avoid any recognition of "exclusive rights" and, instead, emphasize that the purpose of a trademark is
to enable the people and authorities to exercise "control" over the activities of the trademark owner." It could be argued that such a change
would require an actual modification of the Chinese trademark regulations in view of the qualification, contained in subparagraph 2, that the
registration of trademarks must be "in accordance with its laws and
regulations."
Similar questions as to the real significance of the trademark clause
in the July 7, 1979 agreement also arise with regard to subparagraph 3,
which states: "Both Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall seek,
under its laws and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to
legal and natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and
trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party." The reference to "equivalent
protection" is certainly a new feature in the international law of trade-

59. Id. at 1047.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Note 48 supra.
See note 11 supra.
Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 58, at 1048.
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marks, which has been based in the past on the principle of "national
treatment," requiring that nations provide the same treatment to foreign
nationals as to their own." Indeed, it was the recognition of the "national
treatment" principle in 1880 which made it possible to conclude an international convention despite the fact that, at the time, there were considerable differences in the degree and extent of protection which each country granted under its own laws. 60
However, before reading into article VI, subparagraph 3, an important new departure in the international law of trademarks, one must bear
in mind that this provision of equivalent protection merely sets an objective for the two parties, an objective to be achieved through legislative
reform. The provision does not create rights for the citizens of either
party that might enable, for instance, American companies to demand
protection of their trademarks in China to the same degree as under
United States law. Indeed, any such theory would practically amount to
the reintroduction of extraterritorial rights! Certainly this could not have
been the intent of this agreement. It would also appear that by adhering
to the Paris Convention, the PRC might well be in a position to claim
that it has thereby fulfilled its commitments under subparagraph 3, since
it would thus grant American citizens the same degree of protection as
7
they are entitled to in the other eighty-nine member countries.
Considering that subparagraph 2 of article VI merely reaffirms the
existing situation and that subparagraph 3 is of no immediate significance, it would seem that the most important part of article VI is subparagraph 4, which reads as follows: "Both Contracting Parties shall permit
and facilitate enforcement of provisions concerning protection of industrial property in contracts between firms, companies and corporations,
and trading organizations of their respective countries, and shall provide
means, in accordance with their respective laws, to restrict unfair competition involving unauthorized use of such rights. 6' The second part of
this provision, dealing with the restriction of unfair competition, may also
require the Chinese Government to enact new legislation.
The first part of the provision, however, would appear to be of immediate effect, and its significance results from the absence of statutes for
the protection of industrial property. 9 The provision should enable
American companies doing business in China, by means of joint venture
agreements,7 0 by setting up factories in the PRC, or by concluding other

65. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property Rights, supra
note 2, art. 2.
66. See S. LADAS, supra note 52, at 968.
67. OCTROOIBUREAU, supra note 2, § Paris Convention 5-6 (1978).
68. Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 58, at 1048.
69. There can be no doubt that the term "industrial property" is meant to include
trademarks as well as patents, whereas copyright protection is dealt with separately in subpara. 5 of art. VI. Id.
70. Note 31 supra.
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types of agreements providing for the delivery or distribution of products
bearing trademarks, to insert into their agreements appropriate provisions giving them maximum protection. Considering the recent interpretation of the trademark regulations as not barring the licensing of trademarks under proper controls, 7 it would follow that under article VI,
subparagraph 4, compliance with the terms of a license agreement may be
demanded. The same should apply to provisions under which a distributor or employee may be prohibited from using or registering confusingly
similar trademarks, and it should be possible to insist that such provisions should survive the agreement itself for a reasonable period of time,
in line with the interpretation of such clauses in the United States and
other countries where they are recognized as part of the fair and equitable arrangements between such parties. The same should also apply to
trade name agreements and to agreements regarding the preservation of
trade secrets.
In connection with article VI, subparagraph 4, another provision of
the Agreement on Trade Relations should also be borne in mind. This is
article VIII, which deals with the settlement of disputes arising from contracts and urges "friendly consultations, conciliation, or other mutually
acceptable means."' "7 This provision also urges parties who have not been
able to settle their disputes through any of these means to submit them
to arbitration. It further recognizes stipulations regarding arbitration as
binding on the parties to an agreement; this would include stipulations
naming the arbitrating authority, which may be located in China, in the
United States, or in any other country. It also provides that the rules of
procedure of the arbitration institution agreed upon by the parties may
be followed, and specifically, it declares applicable the arbitration rules of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.7 Subparagraph 3 of article VIII permits each contracting party to ensure that arbitration awards are recognized and enforced by the competent authorities
where enforcement is sought in accordance with applicable laws and
74
regulations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The People's Republic of China has long recognized trademarks as
necessary to protect the public against defective merchandise and to encourage foreign trade. In order for a foreign corporation to register its
trademark in the PRC, Chinese law requires a reciprocal agreement between the corporation's home country and the PRC. Through 1977,
United States corporations were thus able to register their marks only in
the names of foreign subsidiaries based in countries which had established such reciprocal agreements with China.

71. Telex from CCPIT to the present writer (Dec. 19, 1979).
72. Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 58, at 1049-50.
73. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, International Commercial
Arbitration Rules, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 34, U.N. Doc. No. A/31/17 (1976).
74. Note 71 supra.
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In January 1978, however, even before the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States and China, China expressed
its willingness to accept trademark applications from United States corporations. The 1979 Agreement on Trade Relations between the two
countries is expected to provide a basis for interpretation and arbitration
of trademark conflicts in the PRC. Considering that, for the first twenty
years following the establishment of the PRC, there had been no friendly
intercourse between the United States and China, and that it has been
less than two years since the normalization of relations, it would seem
that substantial progress has indeed been made toward returning China
to the international legal community insofar as the international law of
trademarks is concerned.

FACULTY COMMENT

Law and Economic Development*
LEONARD

J.

THEBERGE**

The role of law in the development of the Third World countries is of
great intellectual interest and considerable political importance. In this
Comment, I would like to review some of the themes in the literature
dealing with this topic.
We in the American Bar Association, and our clients, have good reason to value the predictability and stability to which Max Weber and
other authors refer in the passages I shall be quoting. The general legal
framework in a country, and the specific investment laws to which foreigners may repair, are part of the investment climate which prospective
investors examine in developing and developed countries alike.
With the emergence of scores of new nations in the Third World over
the last twenty years, governments, foundations, and legal scholars have
been trying incessantly to determine the extent to which the role of law
influences economic development in less developed countries (LDC's).
Empirical evidence is elusive. Nevertheless, the foreign investor and his
lawyer act upon the assumption that there is such a relationship, and
they rank it in importance next to economic opportunity, political stability, and investment incentives. Early on, it was recognized that the rapid
economic development sought by Third World countries would require an
effective legal framework. 1 But conceptions of how such a framework can
be created have changed over the course of two decades' research in the
field of law and development.
Law, it has been suggested, can have three possible functions in soci*
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the desire for rapid developin the process of growth.

This concept was the outgrowth of Western economic development.
It stemmed from Max Weber's formulation that consistency and reinforcement of norms provided by the law were essential elements in the
industrial development of Europe.3 Burg's study of the law and development literature cites five qualities in law which render it conducive to
development: (1) stability; (2) predictability; (3) fairness; (4) education;
and (5) the special development abilities of the lawyer." The first two
qualities are prerequisites for any kind of economic system to function. In
the words of one scholar,
the law's greatest encouragement to economic development lies in its
protection of the fruits of labor .... It is the security of expectations,
assured by law in the form of institutions of property, that leads men
to work, save, and invest .... The concern for security, i.e., the concern for a development-conducive state of mind, must be a primary
one for any government engaged in a massive social reform.'
The need for predictability is especially great in countries where most
people are entering for the first time into economic relationships beyond
their traditional social environment. 6 Included in the stability function is
the potential of law to balance and accomodate competing interests.
Aspects of fairness, such as due process, equality of treatment, and
standards for government behavior, have been emphasized by other writers as necessary for both the maintenance of the market mechanism and
the prevention of bureaucratic excesses.7 A lack of standards of fairness is
said by some scholars to be one of the greatest problems confronting
LDC's. In the long run, the lack of such standards may be the chief cause
of loss of legitimacy by their governments. Conversely, by codifying societal goals, then creating new habits and responses,8 law can foster feelings
of nationality in many LDC's whose inhabitants previously were only conscious of belonging to a family or tribe.
Two means by which the lawyer's talents can be utilized for the purposes of economic development have been suggested.9 For example, in the

2. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline,
and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 457, 462 (1977).
3. M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SocIETY (G. Roth and C. Wittich eds. 1968), discussed in

Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development,
82 YALE L.J. 1, 11-16 (1972).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Burg, supra note 1, at 507.
Karst, Law and Developing Countries, 60 LAw LIB. J. 13, 15-16 (1967).
Nyhart, The Role of Law in Economic Development, 1 SUDAN L.J. 394, 400 (1962).
Burg, supra note 1, at 508-09.
Nyhart, supra note 6, at 401.

9. See generally Friedmann, The Role of Law and the Function of the Lawyer in the
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United States, the unique role of the judiciary has provided lawyers with
opportunities to debate and decide policy issues in the courts. Also, lawyers' general ability to apply reasoned analysis to situations in all conceivable aspects has led to their serving in non-legal roles as community
and national leaders. Indeed, this situation also seems to have occurred in
the Third World, where many of the leaders of independence movements
of India and elsewhere were trained as lawyers.'"
The prevalent view in the 1960's was that law, particularly the legal
system of the West, was a valuable instrument of development in LDC's.
Customary law in the Third World was "antithetical to development.""
Throughout the Third World there was clamor for new programs aimed
at rapid development to take effect immediately." And it was thought
that the enactment of massive new legislation would be the most direct
and inexpensive means of satisfying this need. As Ren6 David, the French
legal scholar who was invited to Ethiopia to draft an entirely new civil
code, explained: "Ethiopia cannot wait 300 or 500 years to construct in an
empirical fashion a system of law which is unique to itself.... The development and modernization of Ethiopia necessitate the adoption of a
'ready made' system ..
.I Western lawyers were told that they had an
opportunity and duty to serve these new nations and bring them the
fruits of their knowledge." Governments and foundations of the United
States and other Western countries soon took on this challenge and assigned lawyers to their foreign aid missions.
Unhappily, the wholesale importation of Western-style law has not
measured up to expectations. Hindsight suggests that the major difficulty
encountered might have been anticipated, had there been a serious comparative examination of the law/development relationship in Western
countries. Such an analysis almost certainly would have revealed the extent to which the law depends on the sociocultural circumstances of the
society it is supposed to govern.
Though early development lawyers were aware of the need to orient
law reform to the societies they were trying to transform, 5 they did not
foresee the extent to which their sensible-sounding reforms would be resisted.' 6 That Europeans and Americans brought their own cultural biases
to the developing world can be inferred from a glance at European recommendations for civil law systems in Turkey and Ethiopia, and at American recommendations for U.S.-style legal education in Brazil, India, and

Developing Countries, 17 VAND. L. REV. 181 (1963).
10. See generally Friedmann, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1969).
11. Burg, supra note 1, at 502, 524.
12. Id. at 505-06.
13. David, A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification of the Civil
Law in African Countries, 37 TuL. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1963).
14. Burg, supra note 1, at 496.
15. Nyhart, supra note 6, at 407.
16. See generally Merryman, note 2 supra; Trubek, note 3 supra.
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Korea. 17 Not only were the small groups of foreign experts unfamiliar
with their target cultures, they also enjoyed an artificially privileged access to power. Together with immunity to the consequences of their actions, this may have led them to innovate in inappropriate ways.'
Development lawyers also underestimated the difficulties that new
laws would encounter because of lack of infrastructural and educational
facilities. " Moreover, lawyers in many LDC's are in a comparatively poor
position to serve as agents for economic change because their fellow citizens regard them as "manipulators," "fixers," "professional liars," and
"spouters of legalism," concerned only with their own financial gain. 0
Lawyers in many Latin American countries retain little popular trust because they historically have been seen as servants of the vested interests."1 Even the most well-meaning lawyers may be ill-equipped to use the
law for development purposes, since their training has generally involved
memorization of statutes and principles without a broader understanding
of law and society.22

Western legal concepts have not been much use in Third World development, according to Trubek, because of the fundamental differences
in economic structure between the West and the Third World.28 The
Western legal systems are designed for a market economy, with law's role
being to set limits on the behavior of actors so as to provide the necessary
predictability for market transactions. Most LDC's see too much of a
pressing need for rapid development to wait for the market to work, and
the state is naturally looked to as the leader in achieving economic
growth. Trubek suggests that aspects of a legal system for a "command
economy" might be appropriate for many of these countries. 4 In such a
system, legalism is generally replaced by state directives in production;
law's function in the economy is mostly a regulatory one of controlling
bureaucratic abuse.
Law reformers also do not seem to have taken into account the historical resentment of Third World inhabitants to colonial rule. The populations of many LDC's resented the imposition of unfamiliar foreign laws

over their own traditional laws and have clung to their preindependence
attitudes of resistance to authority.25 What made this pattern especially
17. See, e.g., Trubek, note 3 supra.
18. Merryman, supra note 2, at 480-81.
19. Burg, supra note 1, at 516-19.
20. Id. at 518.
21. See, e.g., Hager, The Role of Lawyers in Developing Countries, 58 A.B.A. J. 33
(1972); Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and
its Developmental Implications, 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 514 (1971).
22. Murphy, Legal Education and the Development of Law in Traditional Cultures:
Learning from the Korean Experience, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 234, 239 (1975); Hager, supra
note 21, at 37.
23. Trubek, supra note 3, at 15-16.
24. Id. at 35-37.
25. Myrdal, The "Soft State" in Underdeveloped Countries, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1118,
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difficult to overcome was the precarious leadership position of most LDC
governments. They could not survive politically if strong measures were
taken to compel adherence to new laws. 6
Given these difficulties, advocacy of Western-style laws in LDC's has
led to predictable results. A wide discrepancy, referred to as "the Gap" by
Burg, has developed in these countries between the laws on the books and
actual practices, and its manifestations can be seen throughout the Third
World.2 7 Seemingly sound and valuable programs in such areas as land
reform either have not been enforced by complacent courts (aided by a
complacent bar) or have brought little benefit, and sometimes harm, to
agricultural sectors. 28 When the only legal precedents were from the
West, the rule of stare decisis was of no more value to common law LDC's
such as Tanzania and India than were the doctrines of Henry IV to Mr.
Justice Holmes. Without relevant precedents to rely on, cases were often
decided in these countries "based on expediency rather than law."29 In
Brazil, the gap between the law and actual practice has been so vast that
it has given rise to a new class of people called despachantes (expeditors),
whose professional duties are to help clients evade bothersome laws."0
The overall concept of the role that law can play in development has,
therefore, narrowed in the minds of most analysts since the 1960's. This
does not mean, however, that countries of the Third World need not endeavor to improve their legal systems. To the contrary, the lack of an
effective legal framework has been a major factor in the continued stagnation of many of these countries. For example, the lack of observance or
enforcement of the law in India may, according to Gunnar Myrdal,3 1 be
the root cause of that country's prolonged malaise. The heavy increase in
corruption and terrorism that has affected so many LDC's is a natural
result of this lack of an effective legal system. The drafting of a new legal
code in China, intended to guarantee equality before the law and due
process after thirty years of arbitrariness, is yet another indication that
that provides some deno society can mature without a legal framework
2
gree of fairness, predictability, and stability.
Thus, the problem that will continue to face LDC's is determining
what type of improvements in their legal systems will speed the development process. Although lawyers experienced in economic development
have not yet come up with any definitive answers, it is evident that some

1123 (1968).
26. Id. at 1123-24.
27. Burg, supra note 1, at 511.
28. Id. at 514; Hager, supra note 21, at 34-35.
29. James, Implementing the Arusha Declaration-the Role of the Legal System, 3
AFRIcAN REV.179, 180 (1973), quoted in HUller, The Law-Creative Role of Appellate Courts
in Developing Countries: An Emphasis on East Africa, 24 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 205, 245
(1975).
30. Rosenn, supra note 21, at 536.
31. Myrdal, supra note 25, at 1126.
32. CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 45.

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 9:231

kinds of changes will be more effective than others. There is general
agreement, for example, that a stable legal framework will tend to encourage foreign investment.3" South Korea is one of several countries in
East Asia which has successfully attracted foreign capital to assist in its
development.3" The Koreans offered not only a stable system of foreign
investment laws but complete tax exemptions to all foreign firms for their
first five years, as well as exemptions from foreign exchange restrictions.3 5
Yet, as a 1910 study 6 of the effect of Ethiopia's modern code indicated,
modern laws by themselves are not sufficient to attract foreign investment: "the existence of a modern legal system will not produce investment unless there are economic reasons for such investment, reasons that
37
investment laws attempt to enhance.
In other areas, LDC law reformers will have to pay more attention to
the factors mentioned earlier which diminish the utility of Western-style
law. It seems reasonable to suggest that in societies whose precepts are
being shaken to their foundations, lawmakers should hesitate before discarding traditional laws. Admittedly, many of these rules are rooted in
subsistence economies and do not address themselves to development
needs.3 8 Nevertheless, to replace these rules with unfamiliar and possibly
inappropriate modern laws might undercut the stability that had existed
previously. According to one commentator:
[G]iven the extent of rural-urban ties in Africa and the pluralistic behavior patterns of the African townsman, the processes of customary
court dispute-settlement and the nature of customary law may be peculiarly well-suited to solving many of the legal and social (adjustment) problems encountered by individuals involved in the transition
from rural to urban environments. In brief, customary courts and customary law may 3be
important links in the modernization and urban9
ization processes.
The astonishing success in economic development exhibited by Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore may have some instructive
value for development lawyers elsewhere. With the possible exception of
Singapore, the economic booms experienced were unaccompanied by
rapid changes in law.4 0 In fact, the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cul-

33. Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking,
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39. Smith, Man and Law in Urban Africa: A Role for Customary Courts in the Urbanization Process, 20 AM. J. CoMP. L. 223, 237 (1972).
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tures all are distinctively "non-legalistic." As late as 1972, Japan and Korea had only 8,000 and 700 practicing lawyers respectively;4 moreover,
much of the work of these attorneys is in international practice. 42 The
lesson to be learned from this experience is not that law is unimportant in
development. Order and obedience to authority, two of the hoped-for
consequences of a rule of law, have been fundamental precepts in East
Asia since the time of Confucius. Rather, the lesson is that law can be a
useful tool in development as long as it makes use of the popular senses
of fairness and stability that already exist in a society.
In countries where these developed senses of order and fairness do
not yet exist, there will be a greater need for the promulgation of new
laws. If these reforms are to be successfully implemented, there will have
to be a means of bringing themto the general populace. One way of accomplishing this is to open up legal services clinics in poor or middle-class
areas. The United States Government and some American foundations
have recently become involved in funding legal services programs in Latin
America. It is hoped that such programs will help to bridge the gap between "real" and "paper" laws in such areas as land and labor reform.
Another goal is to sensitize local law students to the legal problems of
their society by instilling a greater sense of due process and the need for
appropriate laws. The next generation of lawyers may then build a more
responsive legal system. This idea is subject to the caveat that an improvement of the skills and capacity of lawyers could lead to more effective resistance to development from the still conservative legal profession.4 Critics on the left view such programs as mere "Band-aids" to
patch up substantive "infections" in existing laws, or leading merely to
greater social stratification." The suggestion of many writers that a more
principled analysis of law and its role
in society be included in Third
45
World legal education also has merit.
If nothing else, the law/development literature shows that there is no
neat, orderly relationship between the legal structure of a country and its
rate of economic growth. The experience of the past two decades has
shown us that the Third World cannot wave away its problems with a
magic legal wand and that the importation of laws from the West is not
the answer to the legal problems of LDC's, even if their laws are hopelessly antiquated. Experience does seem to have shown, though, that
LDC's need a stable and fair legal order if they are to develop, and that

41. Murphy, supra note 22, at 244; OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 107 n.32
(1976).
42. See generally LAW IN JAPAN (A. von Mehren ed. 1963); Huang, Foreign Enterprise
and Chinese Trademark and Patent Laws-A Digest-Commentary on Some Important
Cases, 12 INT'L LAW. 397 (1978).
43. Burg, supra note 1, at 527-28.
44. Valdez, Legal Development and Social Change in Latin America and the Caribbean, 62 A.B.A. J. 484, 485 (1976).
45. See generally Hager, supra note 21; Murphy, supra note 22; Nyhart, supra note 6.
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lawmakers must be on guard to ensure that their laws are consistent with
the needs and backgrounds of their constituents. If the law does not stay
within these bounds, it may run so far ahead of its people as to lose its
meaning.

CASE NOTE

Treaty Termination and the Separation of
Powers: The Constitutional Controversy
Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct.
533 (1979) (Mem.)
DAVID
I.

A.

GOTrENBORG*

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States Constitution expressly provides how the
President may make treaties,1 it is completely silent as to the process by
which treaties should be terminated. In Goldwater v. Carter,2 a number
of members of Congress sought to have the constitutional question regarding the proper procedures required for the termination of treaties judicially resolved.3 The suit was filed in response to President Carter's announcement 4 that he was terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954
with the Republic of China.' Therefore, while the narrower issue was
whether the President could unilaterally terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty without first consulting the Congress, the entire separation of
powers question as to the extent of permissible congressional involvement
in treaty terminations was opened for judicial review.
* B.A., 1977, The Colorado College; J.D. candidate, 1981, University of Denver.
1. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides in relevant part: "He [the President] shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur. .. "
2. 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).
3. Plaintiffs in the Goldwater suit were Senators Barry Goldwater (R., Arizona), Strom
Thurmond (R., South Carolina), Jake Garn (R., Utah), Orrin Hatch (R., Utah), Jesse Helms
(R., North Carolina), Gordon Humphrey (R., New Hampshire), Paul Laxalt (R., Nevada),
and James McClure (R., Idaho), and Representatives Robert Bauman (R., Maryland),
Steven Symms (R., Idaho), Larry McDonald (D., Georgia), Robert Daniel, Jr. (R., Virginia),
Bob Stump (D., Arizona), Eldon Rudd (R., Arizona), John Ashbrook (R., Ohio), George
Hansen (R., Idaho), John Rousselot (R., California), Robert Dornan (R., California), Don
Young (R., Alaska), Newt Gingrich (R., Georgia), James Collins (R., Texas), Mickey Edwards (R., Oklahoma), Dan Quayle (R., Indiana), Clair Burgener (R., California), and Ken
Kramer (R., Colorado). Carl Curtis (R., Nebraska), also a plaintiff, was a member of the
Senate in 1954 and participated in the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty, note 5
infra.
4. 14 WEEKLY Cop. op PREs. Doc. 2266 (Dec. 15, 1978).
5. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T. 433,
T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
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The District Court for the District of Columbia decided the broad
constitutional question in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the approval of either a two-thirds senatorial majority or a simple majority of
both Houses of Congress was required before a President could terminate
any international treaty. 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia based its decision to reverse on the narrower issue of
whether the President could terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954.' In holding that the President was not required to seek congressional approval for such termination, the Court of Appeals strictly limited
its decision to the unique circumstances of the case at bar.8 On petition
for writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, granted certiorari, vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint.'
While the statement filed by Justice Rehnquist, to which a plurality
of the Court ascribed, 10 specified that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated in order that it would not "spawn any legal conse' an analysis of the statements
quences,"11
filed with the Supreme Court's
memorandum decision and of the decision of the Court of Appeals is
helpful in determining whether other current treaties"2 may be terminated in a like manner and what steps, if any, Congress can take to assure
itself of a role in future treaty termination processes.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Constitutional Authority
The President's treaty making powers are expressly enumerated in
the U.S. Constitution, which requires the executive to seek "the Advice
and Consent of the Senate . . ." before a treaty can be ratified by the

President. 18 The Constitution offers no guidance, however, on the question of whether any similar procedure is required for treaty terminations.
It was this issue which the plaintiffs sought to present to the United
States Supreme Court in Goldwater v. Carter.
B. Inherent Executive Authority
Above and beyond the relatively few specified constitutional powers
of the executive 1 ' lies the power which is universally recognized as inher6. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. Rac.
S14787-93 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
7. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
8. Id., slip op. at 25.
9. Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).
10. Id. at 536.
11. Id. at 538.
12. The North Atlantic Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Outer Space Treaty,
among others, contain termination provisions similar to those contained in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. See note 128 infra.
13. Art. H, § 2, cl. 2; see note 1 supra.
14. The powers of the executive, set forth in Art. II of the Constitution, are broad and
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ent in a sovereign head of state. International law provides that a head of
state may, in determining the conduct of the state, effectively terminate
treaties or portions thereof. 5 This sometimes occurs when the executive
responds to a breach by the other party to a treaty and declines to be
further bound by the treaty e or when the circumstances have changed so
as to make abiding by the treaty no longer feasible.17 These powers are
incidents of what has been termed the "foreign affairs power'" of the
President.'9
C.

Treaty Termination Historically

The first treaty terminated by the United States was abrogated by an
Act of Congress. By this act, Congress declared the United States to be
no longer bound by the Treaties of 1778 with France.20

general in comparison with the direct and specific powers of Congress set forth in Art. I.
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President .... " U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. Unlike
the defined powers granted to Congress, the "executive Power" vested in the President is
significantly left undefined.
15. See, e.g., 5 J. MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319-87 (1906); 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1516-58 (2d ed. 1945); 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
297-390 (1943).
16. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 473 (1913).
17. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.
18. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
19. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus played a large, albeit implicit, role in the decision of the Court of Appeals. See Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 27-28 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 30, 1979). This was despite the settled rule that the party causing the circumstances to change may not make use of such as grounds for terminating the treaty. See
generally 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349-59 (1943).
20. Act of July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578. The Act provided:

Chap. LXVII-An Act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with
France, no longer obligatory on the United States.
WHEREAS the treaties concluded between the United States and France
have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French government; and the
just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed
have been refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of
all complaints between the two nations, have been repelled with indignity: And
whereas, under authority of the French government, there is yet pursued
against the United States, a system of predatory violence, infracting the said
treaties, and hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right
freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties, and of the consular
convention, heretofore concluded between the United States and France; and
that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the
government or citizens of the United States.
APPROVED, July 7, 1798.
Chief Justice Marshall once stated that a "principle introduced at a very early period in our
history [and] deliberately established by legislative acts ... ought not to be lightly disregarded." McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400 (1819). The Supreme Court
has also recognized that when acts are "passed shortly after the organization of the government under the Constitution [when] [almong the members of that Congress were many who
had participated in the convention which formed the Constitution . . . the act has always
been considered, in relation to that instrument, as a contemporaneous exposition of the
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Fifty-four treaties have subsequently been terminated by a variety of
means: (1) by the President acting upon his own initiative and volition;
(2) by the President acting with senatorial consent; (3) by the President
acting pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress or other expression of
congressional concurrence; and (4) by the President acting pursuant to
specific legislation directing such a termination.' Although the number of
treaties terminated by the sole action of the President is subject to dispute," it is nevertheless clear that none were as significant as the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954."3 It is also beyond dispute that the vast majority
of treaty terminations took place with some form of congressional concurrence. Perhaps the single most important fact to be derived from the tangled history of treaty terminations is that the diversity of such historical
precedents leaves an inconclusive basis on which to decide the issue of
what actions, if any, Congress or the President must take in order to terminate a treaty.
D.

Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954

Following the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, a mutual defense treaty was made between the United States and the Republic of
China (ROC or Taiwan) primarily to protect the ROC against the perceived threat of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Treaty was
signed by representatives of both nations on December 2, 1954.1' The
Senate advised ratification of the Treaty on February 9, 1955, without
taking any action by condition, amendment, or reservation to reserve for
itself a role in the termination provision of the Treaty.2 Article X of the
Treaty, which the Senate approved unamended, provided that although

highest authority." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 300-01 (1930). In 1798, when the
first treaty termination occurred by legislation, John Adams, President at that time, had
been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. Four members of Congress had signed the
Constitution and other members had undoubtedly participated in the various State ratifying conventions. Joirr CoMmrrrm ON PRINTING, UNrrEn STATES CONGRESS, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE AmslUcAN CONGRESS 1774-1927 at 60, 1202 (Senator Langdon); 62, 1413,
1414 (Senator Pinckney); 60, 664 (Representative Baldwin); 61, 891 (Representative Dayton) (1928).
21. See generally Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: Hearings on S.
Res. 15 Before the Sen. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1979) ("History of Treaty Terminations by the United States," an appendix to a memorandum prepared by the Department of State Legal Adviser); Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination
as Applied to United States De-Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARv. INT'L L.J.
931, 979-85, 993-95 (1978).
22. The defendants claimed that 13 treaties had been so terminated. See Brief for Appellant at 54-55, Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979). Judge MacKinnon, in his dissent, argued that only two treaties had been terminated in such a manner. See
Dissenting Opinion at 25-42, Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
23. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 had symbolized the United States' commitment to deter communist expansionism in the years following the Korean War and its termination marked the first time that the United States had terminated a major military
alliance with a friendly, fiercely anti-communist government.
24. 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
25. 101 CONG. Rzc. 1379-1416 (1955).
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the Treaty would otherwise remain in force "indefinitely," "[e]ither Party

may terminate
it one year after notice has been given to the other
26
Party.

The Treaty was subsequently ratified and proclaimed by President
Eisenhower on April 1, 1955.'1 The main thrust of the Treaty was found
in Article V which provided that, in the event of an attack on Taiwan, the
Pescadores, or United States Territories in the western Pacific, each
party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.""

A decade and a half later, the United States sought to establish
closer ties with the PRC. An ultimate goal of full "normalization of rela-

tions between the PRC and the United States" was announced in the
"Shanghai Communiqu6" released simultaneously by both countries upon

President Nixon's visit to the PRC in February of 1972.20 The PRC conditioned such normalization of relations on the United States' derecognition of the ROC, a total military withdrawal from Taiwan, and a termina0
tion of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC.3

26. 6 U.S.T. at 437.
27. Id. at 433.
28. Id. at 436.
29. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972); 8 WEEKLY Comp. oF PREs. Doc. 473-76 (Feb. 28,
1972).
30. It became obvious shortly thereafter that the United States and the PRC held
somewhat divergent views as to what the goal of "normalization" encompassed. The PRC
considered normalization to be the establishment of de jure diplomatic relations. The
United States' interpretation of the term varied depending upon the political philosophies
of the administration currently in office. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated on behalf
of President Nixon that the United States had every intention of adhering to its defense
commitments in the Western Pacific Area and of maintaining its traditionally close diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 330, 428 (1972). Dr. Kissinger's position appears to have been taken in an attempt to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise with
the PRC and in an effort to demonstrate that the United States' view of normalization took
the form of a long negotiated process. Cf. 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 486 (1976) (Dr. Kissinger's
announcement that "President Ford is committed to continue the process of normalization
...in accordance with the principles of the Shanghai Communique") (emphasis added).
The United States moved still closer to the PRC's view of normalization in the latter part of
the Ford Administration but continued to withstand the PRC's efforts to impose all of the
"Shanghai" preconditions. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, described the goal of "normalization" as the "establishment of full diplomatic relations on a de jure basis with the People's Republic of China." United StatesChina Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations: Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 94th Cong.,
1st & 2d Seas. 120 (1975-1976).
The Carter Administration, however, abandoned the groundwork laid by previous administrations which had attempted to achieve "normalization" while retaining the nation's
historically close ties and defense commitments with the ROC. President Carter readily accepted all three of the previously unacceptable preconditions set forth by the PRC in the
"Shanghai Communique," thereby precipitating this very controversy over the extent of
Congress' role, if any, in such matters of foreign affairs.

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 9:239

On December 15, 1978, while Congress was not in session,8 1 President
Carter announced that, effective January 1, 1979, the United States
would formally recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China
and would simultaneously withdraw recognition of the ROC.5 ' In addition, the President announced that "in accordance with the provisions of
the [Mutual Defense] Treaty," the ROC would be notified of the United
States' intent to terminate the Treaty. 8 On December 23, 1978, the State
Department formally notified the ROC that the Treaty would terminate
on January 1, 1980.
III. THE GOLDWATER DECISIONS
A. The District Court Opinion
One week after the President's announcement on December 15, 1978,
the plaintiffs filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia alleging that the President had violated his sworn duty to uphold the laws, including the treaties, of the United States. The plaintiffs
claimed that the executive had no unilateral authority under the Constitution to terminate treaties, and that the United States Government, not
the President, was the party invested by Article X of the Mutual Defense
Treaty with the power of termination."
By Memorandum-Order dated June 6, 1979, the District Court dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the plaintiffs
had not suffered the injury in fact needed to gain standing." The court
noted that resolutions then pending in the Senate might settle the dispute, without necessitating judicial intervention.86 The court reasoned: "if
31. A few months before President Carter announced the termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty, Congress passed and President Carter signed into law the International
Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 746. Section 26 of that Act (the
Dole-Stone Amendment) provided:
(a) The Congress finds that
(1) the continued security and stability of East Asia is a matter of major
strategic interest to the United States;
(2) the United States and the Republic of China have for a period of
twenty-four years been linked together by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954;
(3) the Republic of China has during that twenty-four year period faithfully and continually carried out itsduties and obligations under that treaty;,
and
(4) it is the responsibility of the Senate to give itsadvice and consent to
treaties entered into by the United States.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. (22 U.S.C.
§ 2151 (Supp. 11 1978)).
32. 14 WEEKLY Comp. or PasS. Doc. 2266 (Dec. 15, 1978).
33. Id.
34. No. 78-2412 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S14787-93 (daily
ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
35. No. 78-2412 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979).
36. Only one of the resolutions, S. Res. 15, introduced by Sen. Harry Byrd, Jr., reached
the floor of the Senate. See also S. Res. 10, 125 CONG. REc. S209 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979)
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the Congress approves the President's action, the issue . . .would be
moot. If the Senate or the Congress takes action, the result of which falls
short of approving the President's termination effort, then the controversy will be ripe for a judicial declaration . ..."
Literally within hours of the District Court's June 6, 1979 order, the
Senate voted fifty-nine to thirty-five in favor of substituting Senator
Harry Byrd, Jr.'s amendment into Senate Resolution 15. The amended
resolution provided: "[t]hat it is the sense of the Senate that approval of
the United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and another nation. 3 7 No final vote
was ever taken on the resolution and it was returned, as amended, to the
Senate calendar."
Although the Senate action was admittedly not a decisive or formal
one, the amended resolution was characterized by the court in its October
17, 1979, opinion as "the last expression of Senate position on its consti-

(introduced by Sen. Dole); S. Con. Res. 22, id. at S219 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (introduced
by Sen. Goldwater).
37. 125 CONG. REc. S7015, S7038-39 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). S. Res. 15, as reported by
the Foreign Relations Committee, would have recognized 14 different situations in which
the President could unilaterally act to abrogate United States treaty obligations:
(1) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty;
(2) by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting
states;
(3) where it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of
denunciation or withdrawal;
(4) where a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature
of the treaty; .
(5) where it appears from a later treaty concluded with the same party and
relating to the same subject matter that the matter should be governed by that
treaty;
(6) where the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those
of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the
same time;
(7) where there has been a material breach by another party;
(8) where the treaty has become impossible to perform;
(9) where there has been a fundamental change of circumstances;
(10) where there has been a severance of diplomatic or consular relations and
such relations are indispensable for the application of the treaty;
(11) where a new peremptory norm of international law emerges which is in
conflict with the treaty;
(12) where an error was made regarding a fact or situation which was assumed
by that state to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an
essential basis of its consent to be bound;
(13) where a state has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent
conduct of another state; and
(14) where a state's consent to be bound has been procured by the corruption
or coercion of its representatives or by the threat or use of force.
S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979).
38. After oral argument in the Court of Appeals, the Senate debated the resolution, but
again took no formal action. 125 CONG. REc. S16683-92 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
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tutional role in the treaty termination process." 39 In rejecting the Foreign
Relations Committee's proposal, which would have expressly approved of
the President's unilateral action,' 0 the court held that the Senate had sufficiently demonstrated its belief that at least some congressional participation was required in treaty terminations. 41 As the possibility of the congressional acquiescence that would have mooted the issue was deemed to
be no longer likely, the informal action was determined to have met the
standing requirement set forth in the court's Memorandum-Order of June
6, 1979.42 The District Court concluded that the Senate action fell far
short of congressional approval of or acquiescence in the executive's action and that the plaintiffs had therefore clearly suffered "injury in fact
to their legislative right to be consulted and to vote on the termination of
the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty."'
The District Court also ruled that the situation did not present a
nonjusticiable political question as the court was neither endeavoring to
determine the wisdom of the underlying political considerations nor attempting to substitute its judgment for that of a political department, but
rather was merely determining whether the President's unilateral action
to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty was permissible under the
Constitution."
In reaching the merits of the case, the District Court identified the
issue as whether the President was a "party" for the purposes of Article
X and thus able to take unilateral action in providing the notice of termination required under the provision."
The defendants set forth two basic arguments in support of their position that the President possessed such authority. Their first contention
was premised on the executive power over foreign affairs. This power is
derived from the enumerated Article II powers and cloaks the President
with such authority as to make the executive the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."" The defendants
contended that the termination of treaties was similar to the removal of
executive officers as both require senatorial consent as a precondition to
appointment or ratification. As the Supreme Court has held that the
President may unilaterally remove executive officers, 7 the defendants argued that a similar power exists with respect to the termination of
treaties."'

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

125 CONG. REC. S14788 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
See note 37 supra.
125 CONG. Rac. S14788 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
Id.
Id.
Id. at S14788-89.
Id. at S14789.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926).
125 CONG. Rc. S14789 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
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District Court Judge Oliver Gasch disagreed, holding that the two
were not comparable as the removal power is merely concerned with the
President's administrative control over his subordinates."' Unilateral termination of a treaty, on the other hand, conflicts with the "substantial
role of Congress in foreign affairs."6 0 The court concluded by reasoning
that the President is not the sole maker of foreign policy and, moreover,
"the conduct of foreign relations is not a plenary executive power." 81
The defendants' second argument was based on the fact that as the
termination of the Treaty was a condition to the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC, the President's action was
authorized by his exclusive "[plower to remove.

. .

obstacles to.

.

.rec-

ognition," a power that had been expressly upheld by the Supreme
Court. 2
The court reasoned that an unconstitutional action does not become
permissible merely because it is ancillary to an act of recognition." Such
a limited power of recognition could not be used to "bootstrap" an otherwise unconstitutional action into the realm of legitimacy."
The court noted the inherent inconsistencies which would arise if the
President were deemed to possess unilateral power to terminate treaties."
Reference was made to the Supremacy Clause" which provides that "all
Treaties.

.

.shall be the supreme Law of the Land.

.

." and to the fact

that it would be contradictory that "a constitutional policy requiring joint
action for external agreement and internal legislation could allow that
agreement and law to be terminated by the president alone, against the
intentions of the legislature.' 7 It is undisputed that the President must
obtain senatorial consent before the terms of a treaty can be amended."
The court pointed out that it is even more inconsistent for the President
to ignore the Senate before he completely annuls those same terms.'9
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 125 CONG. REc.S14789 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979). See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1934).

53. 125 CONG. REc. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
54. Id. Contra Justice Brennan's statement filed in the United States Supreme Court's
decision at 100 S. Ct. 533, 539 (1979) (Mem.): "Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking government ..
55. 125 CONG. REc. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
56. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
57. 125 CONG. R.c. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979). See Reisman & McDougal, Who
Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1979, at 19.
58. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1921).
59. 125 CONG. REc. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
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The District Court concluded therefore that treaty termination, like
treaty formation, is a shared power, which can only be exercised by the
President upon the consent of two-thirds of the Senate (as a treaty is
formed) or upon approval by a majority of both Houses of Congress (as
other "laws" are rescinded)." Therefore the court determined that the
"party" to which the termination provision referred was the United
States, not the President, and that such termination can only be accomplished by an adherence to United States constitutional procedures which
require a form of legislative concurrence.61
B.

2
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the District Court's decision, but in so doing, it strictly limited its finding that
the President possessed the requisite authority to terminate the Treaty,
based on the particular facts of the present case." Although the decision
of the Court of Appeals was subsequently vacated by the United States
Supreme Court," an analysis of its decision is helpful in determining
what effect Goldwater v. Carter could have on current and future treaties.
The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs had sufficient standing to bring the suit if, for purposes of the standing issue, their constitutional theories were accepted as valid." The court held that, as a result of
the executive's unilateral denial of their alleged right to prevent the termination of the Treaty, the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite injury in
fact." The court stressed that no single element was decisive in its determination, but rather its decision was based upon the consideration of a
7
number of factors .

The constitutional interpretation set forth by the District Court"
which differentiated the executive's power to remove appointed officers
from his power to terminate treaties was refuted by the Court of Appeals."9 The latter court reasoned that if the Constitution required senatorial consent to terminate treaties, it would also require such consent
before an executive could remove appointed officers, 70 which the Supreme
Court had long held not to be required.71 The court concluded by noting
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
63. Id. at 25.
64. 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).
65. No. 79-2246 at 9 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
501 (1975).
66. No. 79-2246 at 9-10 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979); see also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190, 211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
67. No. 79-2246 at 13-14 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
68. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
69. No. 79-2246 at 14-15 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
70. Id.
71. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) with In re Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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that merely because the Constitution required senatorial consent for
treaty formation, it did not necessarily imply that such is required for
treaty termination."' The court recognized that "it is not abstract logic or
sterile symmetry that controls [the expansion of the clause], but a sensible and realistic ascertainment of the meaning of the Constitution in the
context of the specific action taken."7 '
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the District Court's finding of
an alternative source of termination authority in an approval by a majority of both Houses of Congress. The District Court had reasoned that as
the Supremacy Clause7 1 included treaties as part of the "supreme Law of
the Land," they could be terminated in the same way other legislation
was repealed, that is, by a majority of both Houses of Congress." The
Court of Appeals interpreted the Supremacy Clause to provide that each
of the specified supreme laws acted to preempt conflicting state law.' e
This preemptive status did not provide any reason to determine that a
treaty must be terminated in the same manner by which it was made or
7
in the manner by which a statute is made or repealed. 7
In addition, the Court of Appeals characterized the Article II, Section
2 treaty-making provision as "a special and extraordinary condition of the
. . . [executive] powers under Article II. '" Such a limitation on the
otherwise relatively undefined executive powers was not to be extended
by implication unless such implication was "unmistakably clear. '" s The
court found the District Court's blanket extension of the constitutional
provision to cover all treaties to be unwarranted and held that such a
limited condition could not be so extended. 0
Moreover, the court noted that while the Article I powers of the legislature are detailed and specific, the Article II powers of the executive
are not so defined or limited. 1 The foreign affairs power is vested in the
President s ' and no limitations upon that power appear in Article II, Section 1. Therefore, the court warned that to read such a limitation into the
Constitution, where none exists either expressly or impliedly, would "inalterably affect the balance of power between the two Branches laid down

72. No. 79-2246 at 14-15 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
73. Id. at 15.
74. Note 56 supra.
75. 125 CONG. Rac. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
76. No. 79-2246 at 16 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
77. Id. The court's reasoning at this point is supported by the fact that the U.S. Constitution, also designated in Art. VI, cl. 2 as a supreme law of the land, cannot be repealed in
such a manner.
78. No. 79-2246 at 17 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id. Compare art. I, § 1: All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress.. . ." (emphasis added) with art. H, § 1: "The executive Power shall be vested in
a President.. .. "
82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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in Articles I and II."83
The court, in distinguishing a treaty from domestic law, noted that in
the former instance, the Constitution conferred the major role upon the
President, while in the latter instance, it was primarily the domain of the
Congress." The court reasoned that, as a practical matter, Congress could
decline to implement a non-self-executing treaty or preempt a treaty's
effect on domestic law by subsequent legislation.85 It did not follow,
though, that the existence of such power can imply the power to prevent
the termination of a treaty when the President deems it desirable to do so
in the national interest and pursuant to a clause in the treaty itself."
In a logical extension of the plaintiffs' argument, the court recognized
that if a treaty could only be terminated by the identical process by
which it was made, a one-third plus one Senate minority would have the
power to block such a termination."' International law permits the termination of treaties upon a change in circumstances that frustrates the purpose of the treaty" or upon a breach by the other party.8 ' Many of these
treaties involve costly and dangerous obligations. The court recognized
the need for the President to be able to react immediately in many of
these situations, and that to give a Senate minority the power to block
such action would severely curtail the foreign policy powers of the
President."
The Court of Appeals noted that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
and the ability to terminate upon a breach by the other party enabled the
President to effectively terminate a treaty in such instances.' 1 The court
held this to be included within the foreign affairs power of the President
and disputed the District Court's suggestion that the President is limited
to being merely a channel of communication."
The court declined to approve the strict constitutional interpretation
advocated by the plaintiffs and set forth by the District Court as it recognized that circumstances had certainly differed in the past and were sure
to do so in the future."3 Such a strict interpretation was held unnecessary
in the instant case and therefore would not be applied." Nor would the
83. No. 79-2246 at 19 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 19-20. See, e.g., Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 151, ch. 11, § 3 (Commercial Convention of 1850 with Switzerland); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888) ("a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation" and may be superseded just as a statute).
86. No. 79-2246 at 19-20 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
87. Id. at 20.
88. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
89. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
90. No. 79-2246 at 21 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 25.
94. Id.

1980

GOLDWATER V. CARTER

court limit such an interpretation to certain important treaties as no judicially manageable basis existed for such a determination."5 The court emphasized that its decision not to require either a two-thirds senatorial
consent or a majority vote in both Houses was solely limited to the present circumstances."
The unique circumstances were of particular importance in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Both the PRC and the ROC asserted that
each of them was the sole legitimate government of China. Prior to December 15, 1978, the United States Government recognized and did not
challenge this fact," but had officially recognized the ROC as the legal
government of China. On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that, effective January 1, 1979, the United States would withdraw recognition from the ROC and thereafter recognize the PRC as "the
sole legal government of China."'
The court recognized that the Constitution" as well as Supreme
Court decisions 1"0 had granted the President the power to recognize and
derecognize foreign governments. While not deciding that such power enabled the President to remove any and all conditions set forth by the
state being recognized, the court deemed it an "important ingredient"
that the President decided that the circumstances had changed so as to
preclude the continuation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. 01
Finally, the fact that the Treaty contained a termination clause was
"of central significance" to the court and "an overarching factor in this
case, which in effect enables all of the other considerations to be knit
together." 1 1 The Senate had consented to a termination provision which
contained no conditions as to who was to act to give the termination notice.1 0 3 As no specific role was reserved in either the Treaty or the Constitution for the Senate or the Congress as a whole, the court ruled that the
President could act unilaterally to terminate the Treaty according to the
termination provision of Article X.104
Concluding, the court cautioned the executive branch against ignor-

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see The Shanghai Communique, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972): "The United
States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is
but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that position."

98. Note 4 supra.
99. Art. II, § 3 provides: "[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers
100.
U.S. 324
101.
102.
103.
104.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
(1934).
No. 79-2246 at 27-28 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
Id. at 28.
6 U.S.T. 433, 437.
No. 79-2246 at 29 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
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ing the legislature in the termination of treaties.1 0 5 The legislature possessed a great deal of inherent power with which it could demonstrate its
displeasure with the executive. This power included control over fiscal
policy, 106 discretion to implement non-self-executing treaties,1 0 7 discretion
to confirm executive appointments,108 and the ultimate power of impeachment.10 9 The court found, however, that in the present case, the President
did not exceed his authority in terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954 with the ROC pursuant to Article X, without legislative consent.1110
Chief Judge Wright, with whom Judge Tamm joined, concurred in a
separate opinion but would have denied the plaintiffs standing to sue and
would not have reached the merits of the case."' They did not find a
sufficient legal injury as no formal congressional action had ever been
taken which expressly disapproved of the action taken by the President
112
in terminating the Treaty.
Judge MacKinnon, also in a separate opinion, concurred in the majority's finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the question
presented was a justiciable one. He dissented, however, with the majority's decision on the merits of the case.1 13 Judge MacKinnon argued that
as the termination of treaties was not one of the enumerated powers of
the Constitution, it was an implied power vested in the government. "
Therefore, Congress was empowered under the Necessary and Proper
Clause'1 to pass legislation directing the President to terminate treaties.116 Moreover, Judge MacKinnon agreed with the District Court's interpretation of the Supremacy Clause to imply that since a treaty was
designated to be a "Law of the Land," it must be terminated in the same
manner as any other "law," that is, by a formal act of Congress approved
by the President. Although Judge MacKinnon generally agreed with the
District Court's reasoning, he would have limited the termination procedure to joint congressional action and would not have granted a termination as did the District Court. 171 Therefore, despite Judge MacKinnon's
dissent, his opinion would also have required a reversal of the District
Court's decision.

105. Id. at 30.
106. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

107. Id.
108. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
109. Id. art. I §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 4.
110. No. 79-2246 at 30 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
111. Id., Concurring Opinion at 1.
112.- Id. at 6.
113. Id., Dissenting Opinion at 1.
114. Id. at 2.
115. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 provides that the Congress shall have power "To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or officer thereof."
116. Dissenting Opinion at 2, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).

117. Id.
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C.

The Supreme Court Decision"O
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court granted
the petition for certiorari, and then vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The case was remanded to the District Court which was directed
to dismiss the complaint. No majority opinion accompanied the Memorandum Decision, but all of the Justices, save Justice Marshall who concurred only in the result, either filed statements or joined those which
were filed.
Justice Powell, although concurring in the judgment, would have dismissed the complaint as not ripe for judicial review.119 Justice Powell
found that as no formal confrontation had occurred between the executive and legislative branches of government, it could not be definitively
said that Congress disapproved of the President's action.120 In the absence of such a formal disapproval and resulting stand-off, the case was
not ripe for judicial review.
Justice Rehnquist filed a statement in which Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens joined. Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the judgment but would have dismissed the complaint as a nonjusticiable political question.1 2 1 He recognized the historic interchange between
Congress and the President with regard to the termination of treaties and
made note that each branch possessed adequate resources with which to
safeguard its interests and to assert its powers. 32 Therefore, in light of
the fact that different procedures had historically been used in terminating various treaties, Justice Rehnquist argued that this particular case
was controlled by the political standards that had controlled like cases in
the past and that the Court should refrain from setting forth concrete
judicial standards pertaining to the termination of treaties. 1 8
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion, which Justice White joined, dissenting to the dismissal of the case. Justices Blackmun and White would
have given the case plenary consideration for a decision on the merits
regarding the issue of whether the President possesses the power to unilaterally terminate a treaty as he so alleged. 1 " As Justice Blackmun
noted, "if the President does not have the power to terminate the treaty
118. Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).

119. Id.
120. Id. at 534.
121. Id. at 536.
122. Id. at 538. Judge Wright observed in his concurring opinion:
Congress has a variety of powerful tools for influencing foreign policy decisions
that bear on treaty matters. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it
can regulate commerce with foreign nations, raise and support armies, and de-

clare war. He has power over the appointment of ambassadors and the funding
of embassies and consulates. Congress thus retains a strong influence over the
President's conduct in treaty matters.
Concurring Opinion at 13, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
123. 100 S. CL at 537.
124. Id. at 539.
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• . .the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect."'' 2
Justice Brennan also filed a statement in which he dissented from
the dismissal order. Justice Brennan would have affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals to the extent that its decision rested upon the right
of the executive to recognize and to derecognize foreign governments. ' 6
Justice Brennan would have resolved the constitutional question on the
narrow ground that the termination was a "necessary incident" to the
7
recognition process of the PRC."
IV. THE EFFECT OF GOLDWATER

V. CARTER ON OTHER CURRENT

TREATIES

The plaintiffs, the District Court, and Judge MacKinnon of the
Court of Appeals all warned that a number of current treaties contained a
termination provision similar to that found in the Mutual Defense
Treaty.1 8 They suggested that if the President prevailed in this situation,
a number of major treaties essential to the national security would be
continually vulnerable to the unchecked judgment of a single individual.
The United States Supreme Court sought to allay those concerns in
the statements filed with its decision. In the plurality statement filed by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court's decision was analogized to the method of
disposition followed in disposing of cases which became moot prior to resolution by the Supreme Court.' 1' In disposing of such cases, the Supreme
Court had instructed lower courts to dismiss the complaints in order to
"prevent a [lower court] judgment, unreviewable because of mootness,
from spawning any legal consequences."'' 0

125. Id.
126. Id. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
127. 100 S. Ct. at 539.
128. See, e.g., The North Atlantic Treaty, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No.
2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, art. XIX: "1. The present Agreement may be denounced by any
Contracting Party after the expiration of a period of four years from the date on which the
Agreement comes into force."
The Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Treaty, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,
480 U.N.T.S. 43, art. IV provides:
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawals to all other Parties to the
Treaty three months in advance.
The Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
205, art. XVI states: "Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from
the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depository Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this
notification."
See also the Biological Weapons Convention, April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No.
8062, art. XIII; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, art. X.
129. 100 S. Ct. at 538.
130. Id. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1950) where the Supreme Court described the procedure as one which "clears the path for future relitigation of
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The plurality noted that invoking this procedure with regard to political questions, which should never have been decided on their merits, was
even more imperative in order to keep such lower court decisions from
"spawning any legal consequences." '' Therefore, the plurality sought to
make it clear that although President Carter would not be precluded, in
this instance, from unilaterally terminating the Treaty, the lower court
decisions were not to have any precedential effect whatsoever.8 3
Notwithstanding the vacating of the prior judgment, the fact remains
that President Carter was not precluded from unilaterally terminating
the Treaty. This result raises the question of the circumstances under
which other treaties of the United States might be similarly terminated
83
by the unilateral actions of the executive.
Although the Supreme Court did not file a majority opinion with its
decision, the reasoning of the individual Justices who filed statements
with the memorandum decision as well as the majority opinion of the
Court of Appeals is helpful in determining the necessary ingredients for a
determination on the merits of the legality of any future executive attempts at treaty termination.
The common thread running through all of the somewhat discordant
decisions and opinions regarding the case (save perhaps that of the District Court) was the recognition of the unique circumstances involved.
One such circumstance was the relatively restrained reaction of Congress.
That reaction was manifested largely by the substitution on Senator
Byrd's amendment in Resolution 15. While seemingly sufficient as "the
last expression of Senate position on its constitutional role in the treaty
termination process"''
to provide the plaintiffs with a small foothold
with which to obtain the requisite standing, this reaction ultimately
proved to be the Achilles' heel of the plaintiffs' argument. A formal resolution passed by both Houses of Congress which opposed the executive's
action and which had asserted its constitutional role in the treaty termination process would have provided the concrete constitutional impasse
required before the Supreme Court could, or even should, decide the issue
3 5
based upon a constitutional interpretation.
Justices White, Blackmun, and Brennan disagreed with the majority's order that the case be dismissed, thereby recognizing that a sufficient

the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented
through happenstance. When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which . . .was only preliminary."
131. 100 S. Ct. at 538.
132. Id.
133. Compare the ensuing analysis with S. Res. 15, note 37 supra.
134. 125 CONG. REc. S14788 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
135. "If the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Tawan, the resulting uncertainty could have serious
consequences for our country. In that situation, it would be the duty of this Court to resolve
the issue." 100 S. Ct. 533, 536 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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stand-off between the parties had occurred as a result of the amended
resolution. Justice Powell, however, made clear in his statement that the
lack of a formal confrontation between the two branches of government
was the sole reason for his decision to dismiss." 6 Although Justice Powell
charged Justice Rehnquist with suggesting that "the issue presented by
this case is a nonjusticiable political question which can never be considered by this Court,"""' a close examination of the plurality statement filed
by Justice Rehnquist reveals that it too was confined to this particular
case and hinted that a formal confrontation between the executive and
legislative branches of government might affect subsequent decisions.'"
The plurality statement begins by perceiving that "the basic question
presented by the petitioners in this case is 'political' and therefore nonjusticiable.

. ...

"s,

After analogizing the present case with the Supreme

Court opinion in Coleman v. Miller,"0 Justice Rehnquist continued to
emphasize that "the controversy in the instant case is a nonjusticiable
political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the Government."'4 Pointing to the fact that no
judicial standards existed which pertain to treaty termination and that
such matters have historically been accomplished by a variety of political
methods, the plurality continued to confine its decision to the present
case, concluding that "the instant case . . . also 'must surely be con-

trolled by political standards.' "14 Recognizing that no constitutional impasse had been reached and that the matter was still in the realm of political resolution rather than deadlocked in an impasse requiring a
judicial settlement, the plurality noted that, should they so desire, each
such coequal branch of government "has resources available to protect
and assert its interests

..

."

and again concluded that "the question

presented in this action is nonjusticiable .... .
The repeated reference by the plurality to the instant case and the
limitation of the decision to the issues presented by it was both pointed
and conspicuous. Justice Powell's claim that the plurality suggested that
this issue is one which could never be decided by the Supreme Court appears to be unfounded as the plurality had every opportunity to do just
that but consistently drew the line just short. Moreover, the declaration
that each branch possessed the means to protect its own interests appeared to be an invitation to Congress to take such measures in the future and, in such a manner, remove the issue from the political realm in
which it had historically dwelt.
136. "If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so. I
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case." Id. at 534.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 538.
139. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
140. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
141. 100 S. Ct. 533, 537 (1979) (emphasis added).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
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The Court of Appeals listed a number of considerations that entered
into its determination that the President possessed the requisite authority in the present circumstances to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty. " Two of the considerations were peculiar to the unique circumstances of the present suit and, as such, their absence in future situations
could provide a basis for distinguishing those instances from the present
case.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of this case was the fact that the
termination occurred simultaneously with the derecognition of the government of the ROC and the recognition of that of the PRC. Although
the Court of Appeals was careful to note that the recognition power did
not authorize the President to take any action that was required or requested by the government being recognized, it regarded as an "important ingredient" the fact that the President had determined that the conditions surrounding the Treaty had so changed as to preclude its
continuance.' 5 Similarly, Justice Brennan stated in his dissent to the
Supreme Court's decision to dismiss that he would have affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals only to the extent that it relied upon
the President's authority to recognize and derecognize foreign governments. 4"
This emphasis on the fact that the termination occurred as the government of the ROC was being derecognized in favor of the government
of the PRC was a significant consideration and one which is unique in the
historical context of treaty terminations.' The particular circumstances
of the present situation form an obvious basis on which to distinguish
future executive attempts to terminate treaties.
Another significant consideration which was peculiar to the Goldwater situation was the termination provision of the treaty itself.",8 The
Court of Appeals emphasized that as the termination clause was silent as
to any required procedures, the authority to enact the clause rested in the
President as the nation's foreign affairs representative."' It would appear, therefore, that if a treaty or subsequent legislation provided that
the Congress should play a role in the termination of the treaty, the President would be obligated to seek such participation prior to an effective
50
treaty termination.

144. No. 79-2246 at 13 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
145. Id. at 27-28; see note 19 supra.
146. 100 S.Ct. at 539, citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410
(1964) and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1942). No indication was made,
however, as to the extent of this executive power in the absence of circumstances involving
the recognition or derecognition of sovereign states.
147. See note 21 supra.
148. 6 U.S.T. at 437. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
149. No. 79-2246 at 29 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
150. Id. at 28, 29. An analogous situation currently exists in an area of foreign affairs
formerly the exclusive domain of the executive. The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541 et seq. (1976), requires the President inter alia to "consult with Congress before
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Therefore, although dire consequences had been predicted if the
President were to be allowed to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty,
none would apear to be forthcoming. Notwithstanding the decision of the
Supreme Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, the reasoning of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals incorporated
the unique circumstances of the present situation so as to make future
attempts at termination readily distinguishable. Moreover, a formal disapproval of the executive's action by Congress is necessary in order to
crystallize a constitutional impasse which could be resolved by a judicial
determination on the merits.
V.

GOLDWATER V. CARTER AND THE INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As the modern world has become more complex and interdependent,
Congress has necessarily begun assuming a larger role in the foreign affairs of the United States. It has not done so ultra vires but has substantial constitutional authority for influencing executive foreign policy decisions as well as its own involvement in the realm of foreign affairs." 1
Such influence appears to be increasing as Congress seeks to assert some
of its heretofore primarily dormant powers. One question raised by Goldwater v. Carter is whether the Senate can condition its approval of a
treaty upon the inclusion of a provision which requires some form of congressional assent before a treaty can be terminated. The decision of the
Court of Appeals and the plurality statement of the Supreme Court,
while not expressly stating that the Senate has the power to reserve to
itself in treaties at the time of their submission a specific role in their
termination, seem to imply that such may not be expressly barred. 52
Therefore, Congress might consider enacting legislation (or in the alternative, the Senate might contemplate a Senate Resolution) providing
53
for a specific termination clause to be included in all future treaties.
introducing United States Armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated . . . ." The Dole-Stone Amendment to the
International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 746, § 26 (see
note 31 supra) can be distinguished from such legislation since that amendment neither
specifically referred to the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty nor required congressional assent for such termination. Should Congress seek to assure itself of a role in future
treaty terminations, such specificity would appear to be required.
151. See note 122 supra.
152. See 100 S. Ct. at 538; No. 79-2246 at 30, 31 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
153. This type of resolution, analogous to the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§
1541 et seq. (1976), (see note 150 supra), is considered "framework legislation" and provides
statutory guidelines for constitutional functions of the entire governmental process based on
a congressional interpretation of the Constitution. Signed and approved by the executive
branch of government, such legislation provides specific answers to questions regarding con-

stitutionally vague powers based on a common understanding and mutual agreement of the
executive and congressional branches of government. Professor Gerald Gunther describes it
as "an unusual, quasi-constitutional variety of congressional action, delineating not substantive policy but processes and relationships." G. GuNTHER, CAsms AND MATERIALS ON CONSnTUTIONAL LAW 429 (9th ed. 1975). The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
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This termination clause could be drafted along the lines of those currently in use which provide for the termination of a treaty by either party
after a specified grace period in accordance with the terminating state's
"constitutional processes." The phrase "constitutional processes" could
be defined in the statute or resolution to require the approval of both the
President and two-thirds of the Senate.
Although the effects of such legislation would be many, it should not,
by any means, be considered a panacea for the issue raised in Goldwater
v. Carter.'" The President, as the "sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations,"15 5 retains the exclusive power to
negotiate international treaties and could not constitutionally be required
to include such a termination clause. The Senate, whose approval is required before a treaty can be ratified by the President, has the power,
however, to effectively require such a clause by either of two methods: (1)
in approving the treaty, attach an "understanding," reserving to the Senate a role in its termination, such "understanding" to be accepted by the
executive upon the Senate's ratification of the treaty; or (2) withhold its
approval of a treaty which fails to include such a provision or make its
approval contingent upon the subsequent inclusion of such a provision.
Therefore, not only would the Senate be assured of a role in the termination process but foreign states would be relieved of the current uncertainty and confusion surrounding the meaning of the phrase "according
to constitutional processes" as it relates to United States treaty terminations. Finally, such legislation would not "set in concrete a particular constitutionally acceptable arrangement by which the President and Congress are to share treaty termination,

15 6

a result which was sought by at

least as many people as those who opposed it in the Goldwater litigation.
To the contrary, such legislation would retain the multifarious political
means by which treaties have traditionally been terminated. 5 7 Congress
could still unilaterally initiate the termination of treaties by delegating
power or by granting authorization to the President to terminate treaties'1 and could continue to enact legislation having the effect of nullifyof 1974, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1976), is another example of framework legislation.
154. One unfortunate effect of such legislation would be a rise in the number of executive agreements by the President so as to circumvent the requirements of Senate approval
for ratification and termination. Even without the presence of legislation such as that herein
proposed, Congress is becoming particularly concerned about the rising number of executive
agreements. See Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
155. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
156. Concurring Opinion at 13, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
157. See generally Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: Hearings on S.
Res. 15 Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1979).
158. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961)
(Commercial Convention of 1902 with Cuba); J. Res. of Jan. 8, 1865, 13 Stat. 566 (1866)
(Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 with Great Britain); J. Res. of June 17, 1874, 18 Stat. 287 (1875)
(Commercial Convention with Belgium). See also Ropes v. Clinch, 20 F. 1171 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
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ing the domestic effects of a treaty, thereby obligating the executive to
formally terminate the treaty. 1" The framework legislation or resolution
would merely assure the Senate of a role in those treaty terminations initiated by the executive. If there are any insights at all to be gathered
from Goldwater v. Carterregarding the senatorial role in treaty terminations, it can only be that such is not a constitutional right per se, and it
has become readily apparent that in such cases the Supreme Court will
only help those who help themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Goldwater v. Carterhas added yet another chapter to the convoluted
history of congressional and executive interaction on the question of termination of international treaties. Although the issues had never before
confronted the judiciary in such a seemingly concrete manner, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the constitutional question presented.
The Court had historically been reluctant to interpret the Constitution
where other legal grounds existed on which to base a decision, and Goldwater was no exception. Whether history will deal kindly with the addition of such an obviously expedient decision to the confusion surrounding
the question of executive treaty termination power is not yet clear. What
is clear, however, is that the confusion remains.

1871).
159. See, e.g., Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 151, ch. 11, § 3 (commercial Convention of 1850 with Switzerland); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)
("[A) treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation" and so may be superseded by such.).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The International Air Transportation
Competition Act of 1979
Congress recently enacted the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 (IATCA or the Act).' Like its domestic counterpart,
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,' the IATCA contains several provisions which codify a policy favoring reduced fares for consumers and promoting competition in international air transportation. The Act amends
many provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA) 8 and consists
of four key elements.
First, the IATCA sets forth a clear procompetitive policy statement
to guide the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) as well as negotiators in the
Departments of State and Transportation. While the Deregulation Act of
1978 amended general policy provisions of the FAA to place domestic emphasis on "competition to provide efficiency, innovation, and low prices,
and to determine the variety, quality, and price of air transportation services,"' it left the policy that applied to international air transportation
unchanged. The IATCA adopts this new standard for foreign air transportation and thereby establishes a clear congressional mandate encouraging new entries in international, domestic, and overseas markets.5 The
Act also sets forth a needed procompetitive aviation policy to guide negotiators in the Departments of State and Transportation. 6 In 1977 the
United States negotiated an air services agreement with the United Kingdom known as Bermuda II. The agreement has been called a major step
backward by many of its critics because of concessions made by the
United States in a last-minute effort to avoid interruption of air services
1. International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94
Stat. 35 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as
IATCA]; reprinted in [1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws.
2. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1976)).
3. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1976)).
4. Section 2 of the IATCA (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)).
5. S.REP. No. 329, 96th Cong., 2d Ses.3 (1980), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEws 356, 368.

6. Section 17 of the IATCA (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1502).
7. Air Services Agreement, July 23, 1977, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T.
5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641.
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between the two countries.$ Attempting to avoid similar occurrences,
Congress has clearly set out guidelines for future bilateral negotiators and
international policymakers.
Second, the IATCA strengthens the United States' ability to respond
to discriminatory acts by foreign governments. The Act grants the CAB
the power to summarily suspend the license of a foreign carrier or of a
third party country with whom it has pooling arrangements for impairing
operating rights of any United States carrier. 9 This authority may be exercised if approved by the President and to the extent such authority is
consistent with treaty obligations of the United States and principles of
international law.10 Additionally, the IATCA amends the Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974" so that the CAB or any United States carrier
may initiate proceedings for "discriminatory, predatory, or anti-competitive" acts.
Third, the Act permits domestic carriers to lease foreign crafts and
allows foreign carriers to carry domestic traffic under special circumstances. Currently the CAB is precluded from authorizing a foreign carrier to operate between two points in the United States." This prevents a
domestic carrier from leasing a foreign craft even where the service is essentially on behalf of a United States carrier."3 The IATCA removes this
obstacle and allows a domestic carrier to lease a foreign craft when it is
determined by the CAB that a flexible lease exchange will serve the public interest (that is, to obtain maximum operational efficiency).14 The Act
further authorizes a foreign carrier to fly between two points in the
United States when domestic carrier resources are unable to meet the
needs of the traveling public,15 as was the case in the grounding of the
DC-10.16
Finally, the IATCA parallels domestic provisions closely in establishing a "zone of reasonableness" so that fares falling within this zone are
exempt from suspension by the CAB.' 7 The zone creates a five percent
upward and fifty percent downward pricing flexibility in the standard foreign fare level,' s eliminating the current case-by-case method of resolving

8. See Comment, Bermuda II: The British Revolution of 1976, 44 J. AiR L. & CoM. 111
(1978).
9. Section 9 of the IATCA (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1372).
10. 49 U.S.C. § 1502.
11. International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-623, 88 Stat. 2102 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1976)).
12. 49 U.S.C. § 1508(b).
13. See S. R"p. No. 329, supra note 5, at 8.
14. Section 13 of the IATCA (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1386).
15. Id.
16. For hundreds of thousands of air travelers, the grounding of the DC-10 meant cancelled, delayed, or rerouted flights and crowded planes. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 21,
1980, at 60.
17. Section 24 of the IATCA (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1482(j)).
18. Generally, the "standard foreign fare level" is any fare filed with the CAB within
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disputed prices and vesting in carriers substantial pricing discretion."9
While Congress enacted the IATCA to reduce consumer fares and
promote competition in international air transportation, whether it can
achieve these goals is a question largely dependent on the willingness of
other countries with restrictive agreements to approve proposed fares.2 0
Several countries have argued that anticompetitive measures are necessary to protect their national aviation resources. 2 On the other hand, recent bilateral agreements between the United States and the Netherlands, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Korea, and
Singapore'" indicate a desire to promote an international aviation system
based on competition among airlines. The attractiveness of lower consumer fares resulting from these bilateral agreements' s should induce
many countries who were reluctant to do so in the past to enter into comparatively more flexible agreements with the United States.
Michael T. DePinto

certain time limitations as provided in the IATCA for the same or essentially similar class of
service. See section 24(a) of the IATCA (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1482).
19. S. REP. No. 329, supra note 5, at 13.
20. Bus. WEEK, Apr. 21, 1980, at 61.
21. After World War II, several countries possessing obsolete aircraft and related
equipment believed that a competitive market would be detrimental to their national aviation resources. Consequently, they adopted anticompetitive measures as a method of protecting their national interests. The British, for example, have insisted on regulatory authority over the control of routes and rates. See Sims, InternationalAir Transportation: The
Effect of the Airline DeregulationAct of 1978 and the Bermuda II Agreement, 10 TRANSP.
L.J. 239, 241 (1978). This argument loses much of its impact, however, due to changed circumstances. Today the British, for instance, are significant competitors in international aviation. ProposedAmendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958: Hearings on H.R. 5481
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1969) (statement of James Ferrer). And European manufacturers continue to develop competitive lines of aircrafts to cover the market adequately for
the coming 20 to 30 years. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 23, 1978, at 51. Nevertheless,
markets in international aviation have remained structurally noncompetitive. S. REP. No.
329, supra note 5, at 13.
22. S. REP. No. 329, supra note 5, at 13.
23. The impressive effects of competition in international markets, particularly the
Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, have been realized. Prices
dropped dramatically while many carriers maintained profits at high levels due to the load
factors produced by record traffic levels. Hearings on H.R. 5481, supra note 21, at 43.

Vance v. Terrazas Expands the Erosion of
the Equal Rights of Dual Nationals
Laurence J. Terrazas, a dual national,1 applied for a certificate of
Mexican nationality using a form which provided for an express renunciation of his United States citizenship.' Terrazas applied for the certificate
to satisfy a graduation requirement of a medical school in Monterrey,
Mexico. He had met all other requirements for graduation and was assured by his father, a Mexican government official, that his dual nationality status would not be affected.3 The United States Department of State
processed this certificate and determined that Terrazas had committed
an act of expatriation, and this determination was upheld by a federal
district court." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and held that section 1481(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act' was unconstitutional. This section provides that the prosecuting
party in an expatriation proceeding may prove expatriation merely by a
preponderance of the evidence. The court of appeals based its decision on
the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard of proof established in

1. A dual national is one recognized by the laws of two countries as a national of each.
In the case of the United States, the second nationality is respected. Terrazas was an American citizen both because he was born in the United States (jus soli) and because he was
born of an American parent (jus sanguinis). Because Terrazas' father was a Mexican citizen,
under the laws of Mexico, which apply the principle of jus sanguinis, Mexico recognized
him as a Mexican national. See generally 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
352 (1942); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1131-32 (2d ed. 1945); 3 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 518-19 (1906).
2. It was argued by Terrazas' attorney and factually conceded by the United States
Government that the blanks on the application were not filled in when Terrazas signed it.
See Brief for Appellee, at 22, Vance v. Terrazas, 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980); see also Brief for
Appellant, at 4 n.2.
The application Terrazas signed stated:
I therefore hereby expressly renounce citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of
-,
of which I might have been subject, all protection foreign to the laws and
authorities of Mexico, all rights which treaties or international law grant to
foreigners; and furthermore I swear adherence, obedience, and submission to
the laws and authorities of the Mexican Republic.
100 S. Ct. at 542 n.2.
3. Brief for Appellee, at 2, Vance v. Terrazas, 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980).
4. A national of the United States loses his nationality upon "taking an oath or making
an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or political subdivision thereof ....
" 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1976).
Interestingly, the State Department recognized Terrazas' nationality to have been affected upon the issuance of the certificate of nationality, rather than upon his signing the
application for the certificate, the closest he came to taking an oath. Brief for Appellant, at
5 n.2, Vance v. Terrazas, 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976).
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the earlier Supreme Court case of Nishikawa v. Dulles,$ on the fact that
several lower courts had applied that stricter standard,' and on the reasoning that an individual's overriding interest in his citizenship required
a strict standard for the showing of voluntary intent to renounce one's
citizenship.6
The Supreme Court in Vance v. Terrazas9 reversed the Seventh Circuit and upheld the constitutionality of section 1481(c). As a result, once
it has been proved by a preponderance of evidence that one has performed an act statutorily deemed expatriating, the presumption of his
voluntary commission must be rebutted. While finding specific intent to
relinquish one's citizenship to be a necessary element in an expatriation
case, 10 the Court dispelled any notion that subjective intent should play
any part in the determination. Thus, the burden of proof is on the
charged citizen. Terrazas may have ended an earlier trend to invalidate
various expatriating statutes. At the very least, it has become another
step in a retreat from the view that the value of citizenship is absolute. 1
That view arose from Afroyim v. Rusk,"' an earlier Supreme Court expatriation case. In a broader sense, Terrazas may expand the erosion of the
equal rights of all dual nationals and other nonnaturalized citizens.
Lastly, since its application may leave a nonnaturalized citizen stateless,
Terrazas is also a decision with far-reaching international implications
which lacks a discussion of the international policy considerations.
In American jurisprudence, the concept of expatriation began as a
recognition of the need to allow immigrants to the United States to effectively renounce their former citizenship in order to become American citi-

6. 356 U.S. 129 (1958). Nishikawa involved a dual national of the United States and
Japan who was found to have served in the military in Japan during World War II. The
expatriation section of the Code, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1976), provides that a United States
national will lose his nationality by "entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign
state unless, prior to such entry or service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in
writing by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
... The Court held that
the former soldier could only be expatriated upon a showing of "clear, convincing and unequivocal" evidence of a voluntary act of expatriation. Thus, the Supreme Court established
a stricter standard of proof in an expatriation case while arguing no constitutional basis for
it.
7. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1976); Tanaka v. I.N.S., 346
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1965); Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972); Cafiero
v. Kennedy, 262 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.J. 1966); United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 203 F.
Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963), afl'd, 377
U.S. 214 (1964). In Berenyi v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 630 (1967), the stricter standard was also
applied.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1976).
9. 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980).
10. Id. at 544.
11. See Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to ExpatriateAmerican
Citizens, 53 GEo. L.J. 315, 333-38 (1965). Without directly so stating, the "absolutist view"
is ascribed to in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See Note, Acquisition of Foreign
Citizenship: The Limits of Afroyim v. Rusk, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 624 (1969).
12. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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zens. Thereafter, a corresponding right of Americans to relinquish their
United States citizenship was recognized. The definition of expatriation
evolved to include a statutory recognition of expatriating acts. 8 By 1952
there were ten acts by which one could lose his citizenship." In 1967 the
Court decided Afroyim v. Rusk, thereby invalidating a subsection of the
Immigration and Nationality Act which provided that expatriation occurred when one voted in a foreign election.1 5 By that time the Court had
already invalidated several other subsections of the Immigration and Nationality Act dealing with expatriation. Thus, expatriation could no
longer result from such circumstances as desertion of military or naval
service during time of war,1 6 evasion of military obligations during time of
war,1 7 or residence of a naturalized citizen in the territory of the foreign
state of his birth or former nationality."8
At the time, the Afroyim decision seemed to preclude Congress from
defining any act as expatriating unless there was an express renunciation
of citizenship by the individual. 9 If Congress could not directly define an
act as expatriating absent express renunciation, then how could it do so
indirectly by altering the burden of proof? If by a mere preponderance of
evidence an individual could be proven to have committed an act statutorily described as expatriating, would not a presumption of voluntariness
limit the opportunity for the actor to offer evidence regarding his subjective intent? That is, gauged by Afroyim, does not any statutory presumption of intent limit the right of one to retain his citizenship by all acts
other than express renunciation? Accordingly, after 1967 it was expected
that the remaining expatriating statutes would be struck down by courts
2
following the rationale of Afroyim. 0
In fact, this has not occurred. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,",
the Court did strike down a subsection of the expatriation statute on the
13. For a history of the concept of expatriation, see Gordon, supra note 12, at 317-26;
see also Schwartz, American Citizenship After Afroyim and Bellei: Continuing Controversy, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1003, 1003-13 (1975).
14. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, chap. 477, §
349(a)(1)-(10), 66 Stat. 267 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1976)).
15. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
16. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
17. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
18. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
19. In overruling Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), the Afroyim Court found the
government's interest in preventing embarrassment to the U.S. Government abroad whenever a U.S. citizen voted in an election in a foreign country did not provide sufficient justification for a concomitant loss of nationality by the actor unless there was attendant an express renunciation of nationality. See Black, The Supreme Court-1966 Term, 81 HARV. L.
Rxv. 69, 139 (1967).
20. See Black, supra note 19, at 139.
21. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Mendoza-Martinez invalidated a subsection of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that based expatriation on avoidance of the draft during
time of war or a period of national emergency by departing from or remaining outside the
United States. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, chap. 477, §
439(a)(10), 66 Stat. 267 (1952).
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ground that it constituted a penal rather than regulatory action. On the
other hand, the Rogers v. Bellei" Court averted a similar determination
by distinguishing Fourteenth Amendment, first sentence citizens, that is,
those born in the United States or naturalized, and upholding the expatriation of any others born abroad of an American parent who do not
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-seven come to the United States
and reside here continuously for at least five years. The erosion of the
equal right of each nonnaturalized citizen to his citizenship thus had begun, and Terrazas expands that erosion.
Born in this country, recognized as a dual national, Terrazas was, by
virtue of an oath of allegiance to his "other" nation, deemed to have expatriated himself upon the showing of a mere preponderance of evidence
that he committed the act. The Court denied the existence of an opportunity for a showing of subjective intent on his part. While he would have
been allowed to rebut the presumption of voluntariness on remand, this
opportunity is questionable as he had not previously raised the issue. To
the contrary, Terrazas had always argued that he never intended to expatriate himself. That is, by upholding the constitutionality of section
1481(c), the Court arguably allows Congress to do indirectly that which
Afroyim found it could not do directly. Furthermore, a separate class of
"Fourteenth Amendment, first sentence citizens" may now exist. If Terrazas had not been a dual national, and had taken the "oath" described
under the circumstances conceded," and the Mexican Government had
refused to grant him the application he sought, would the Court have
24
ruled that he had thus expatriated himself?
Section 1481(c) became law on September 26, 1961. In assessing the
legislative history of section 1481(c) it is striking to note that the purpose
was "to enact evidentiary rules governing adjudication of cases arising
* , *where it is claimed an act or conduct causing loss of nationality was
involuntary."25 The efficacy of the standard may be argued in a case
where voluntariness was at issue. It was not dealt with in this case.2 6 It is
also pointed out that these rules of evidence are specifically aimed at ob-

22. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
23. For a discussion of the distinction between "dramatic" and "dull" oaths, and the
requisites of each, see Note, supra note 11, at 631-32. In Duvall, Expatriation Under
United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REv. 404, 438-43 (1970), the "meaningfulness" of the oath is discussed.
24. See Duvall, supra note 23, at 439-41, which discusses the cases of a dual national
who was found not to have expatriated himself upon affirmation of allegiance to Mexico in
order to secure a Mexican passport necessary for travel in connection with his law practice;
and an American raised in Canada who, after taking the oath required for admission to the
Canadian bar, was found not to have relinquished his American citizenship.
25. See S. REP. No. 646, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2984 (emphasis added).
26. As has been pointed out, Terrazas did not argue that his actions to procure the
certificate of nationality were involuntary. He did argue that his subjective intent was not to
expatriate himself.
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viating the rules established in Nishikawa and Gonzales v. Landon,"7 but
will "not affect the rules of evidence applicable to denaturalization cases
laid down in 1943 in Schneiderman v. United States ...
."2 It may have
been an oversight or misstatement in the legislative history, but it is difficult to understand how the less strict standard of section 1481(c) will circumvent the problem of the application of Nishikawa leading to "vitiating outright not only the intent of the statute. . . but doing violence to
its very letter . . . by ascribing involuntariness to absences from the
United States for business purposes or in order to avoid military service. ' On the other hand, the State Department can and did deny a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality when an individual was "naturalized in
Canada in order to qualify for admission to the Quebec Bar.
...
o Will
officials responsible for expatriation proceedings ever be able to completely ignore the subjective intent of the actor? Is it arguably discriminatory or unfair to state that subjective intent is immaterial in expatriation
proceedings once they reach the level of the courtroom?
The Court could have espoused cogent reasons to follow Nishikawa
and Gonzales and to set forth stricter standards of proof in expatriation
cases. Because Nishikawa was not grounded on constitutional principles,
however, there is no reason to assume that Congress was absolutely free
to enact the much less strict standard of proof of section 1481(c). To state
that an expatriation proceeding is civil rather than criminal in nature and
therefore that a stricter standard of proof is not necessary may be an
exaltation of form over substance. As Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out in
his dissent in Terrazas, the Court in Addington v. Texas 1 found the
"clear, convincing and unequivocal" standard of proof necessary in a case
involving the commission of an individual to a mental hospital. 8' Thus,
one's "liberty" arguably is affected by a loss of nationality only if the
Court can abide by more than the most narrow definition of liberty.
By upholding section 1481(c), the Court arguably ignored an incongruity it created. Whereas the stricter "clear, convincing and unequivocal" evidence standard exists to prove the fraudulent attainment of nationality in a denaturalization proceeding, 8 a mere preponderance of
27. 350 U.S. 920 (1950). Nishikawa established the "clear, convincing and unequivocal"
evidence standard in expatriation cases. See note 6 supra. Gonzales equated denaturalization and expatriation proceedings.
28. See [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2984. See also Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). Further discussion of Schneiderman appears in note 33 infra.
29. [19611 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws, at 2985. If there is an expatriation question in
the matter referred to in the legislative history, it is not stated therein.
30. Duvall, supra note 23, at 441; PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TENTH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION INsTrruT 379, 394 n.51 (1977).
31. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
32. Id. at 432.
33. In Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118 (1943), it was determined that the strict
standard of proof was necessary because "citizenship rights are 'precious and.., conferred
by solemn adjudication,' not to be 'lightly revoked.'" (Citations omitted.) See generally
Liss, The Schneiderman Case: An Inside View of the Roosevelt Court, 74 MICH. L. Rzv.
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evidence standard to prove loss of citizenship in the case of a naturalborn or naturalized citizen is sufficient in a determination of status proceeding involving the purported commission of an act deemed expatriating by statute. As policy, the Court may have argued that subjective intent, which is difficult of proof, should not in an expatriation case become
an affirmative defense as it is in a tort case. Yet, it did not. In this
writer's view, the Court should have adopted Chief Justice Warren's argument that the right involved is paramount," and decided that to allow
the less strict standard of proof was unconstitutional:
Whenever there is a radical upheaval in the Supreme Court's personnel in a relatively short time, the possibility of a retreat from the principles enunciated in a closely divided decision occurs. Such a retreat
from the principles of Afroyim seems to [have been] implied by the
Burger Court's decision in Rogers v. Bellei."
By the time of Terrazas, the "Burger Court" was missing not only Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, who were in the majority in Afroyim,
but also the late Justice Black who wrote that opinion. 6 As indicated by
Terrazas, the current Court soundly rejects the earlier rationale of
Afroyim which was extremely critical of a policy that would leave a right
as fundamental as citizenship "in the hands of virtually invisible administrative bodies. 's7 At least in the case of dual nationals, the diminution of
the right of citizenship can be perceived.
Karen L. Yablonski-Toll

500, 551 (1976).
34. Chief Justice Warren first espoused the right of citizenship as the "right to have
rights" in his dissent in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958), which was overruled by
Afroyim.
35. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1020-21.
36. Id. at 1020 n.68.
37. See Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man, With Soul So Dead
?", 1963 SuPRwm COURT REv. 325, 355-56 (Kurland ed. 1963).

Federal Diversity Jurisdiction for
Naturalized Dual Nationals-Sadat v.
Mertes
Moheb A.H. Al Sadat, a naturalized American citizen who was also
an Egyptian citizen, brought an action in United States District Court to
recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident in Wisconsin. At the time of the accident Sadat was a domiciliary of
Pennsylvania. When the action was brought, however, he was residing in
Egypt. Sadat invoked the court's jurisdiction based on "diversity of citizenship" since the defendants were either citizens of Wisconsin or Connecticut. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because of the plaintiff's connection with Egypt, he was not a "citizen" of
Pennsylvania for the purposes of diversity.'
On appeal,' Sadat based two of his three arguments on the diversity
section of the U.S. Code, which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects
or a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.'
First, Sadat argued that he was domiciliary of Pennsylvania and
could thus be considered a citizen of a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Second, he argued that by virtue of his dual American-Egyptian citizenship he was a citizen of a foreign state and therefore jurisdiction existed for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction, that is, he was a
"subject" of a foreign state.4 Third, he argued that the defendants should
have been estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court since
two years had lapsed from the filing of the action before the defendants
asserted the jurisdiction defense. The Court of Appeals summarily disposed of the first and third contentions. It found that Sadat was not a
domiciliary of Pennsylvania at the time the action was commenced, find1. Sadat v. Mertes, 434 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
2. 615 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
4. The power conferred on the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) is often referred
to as alienage jurisdiction.
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ing instead that he was an American citizen domiciled abroad and therefore not a citizen of a State for purposes of diversity.'
Sadat contended, and the court of appeals admitted, that Egypt had
consented to his request for permission to acquire American citizenship
but that that consent was conditioned upon his retention of his Egyptian
citizenship. The court recognized that the generally accepted test for determining whether a party to a suit is a foreign citizen is whether the
country whose citizenship is claimed would recognize the party as one of
its citizens. The court stated that "whether a person possessing dual nationality should be considered a citizen or subject of a foreign state within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) [was] a question of first impression
in the courts of appeals." Two other district courts had reached "seemingly different conclusions '" in their encounters with the question.
In the case of Aguirre v. Nagel,' the plaintiff was a native-born
American citizen who possessed dual nationality by virtue of her parents'
Mexican citizenship. Since both the minor plaintiff and the defendant
were citizens of the same state the trial court agreed with the defendant's
contention that the court lacked jurisdiction through diversity. The court
found that the position of the plaintiff as a citizen of Mexico, despite her
American citizenship, placed her squarely within the provisions of subsection (a)(2) of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, that is, "a citizen or subject of a foreign
state."
The Court of Appeals in Sadat found "[t]he Aguirre court's opinion
did no more than determine that the cause fell within the literal language
of the statute without regard to the policies underlying alienage jurisdiction." 9 The court noted that the decision was criticized by commentators,
but the principle focus of those critics dealt with the fact that the Aguirre
decision violated the rule of complete diversity established in the early
Supreme Court case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss0 since both parties were
residents (and thus citizens) of the same state. As pointed out by one of
the critics cited by the Sadat court of appeals, the Aguirre decision is
also inconsistent with the accepted rule that both citizenships of a corporation (the state in which it is chartered and the state of its principal
place of business) must be considered to determine if jurisdiction exists
under diversity." If any of the parties opposing the corporation is a citizen of either of the states of which the corporation is a citizen, diversity
jurisdiction will not be found. Since Sadat was not a citizen of the same
state as any of the defendants, finding jurisdiction under subsection (2) of
5. 615 F.2d at 1178.
6. Id. at 1185.
7. The District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin was a third court to consider the question.
8. 270 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
9. 615 F.2d at 1185.
10. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
11. See, e.g., Brocon v. Clorox Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 306, 128 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1976).
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) would not have violated the complete diversity requirement established in Strawbridge, nor would it have offended the
rule with respect to corporations.
A contrary view was offered by the District Court for the Central
District of California in Raphael v. Hertzberg,12 in which a recently naturalized British subject asserted dual nationality as the basis for federal
jurisdiction. The plaintiff and all of the defendants were residents of California. The court found that the holding in Aguirre violated the requirement of complete diversity established in Strawbridge and dismissed the
plaintiff's claim upon the finding that he did not possess dual citizenship
but was only a citizen of the United States since he was required to renounce his allegiance to Britain in order to acquire his American
citizenship.
Although the Raphael decision was founded upon Raphael's renunciation of his allegiance to Great Britain, the court noted in dicta several
policy reasons to reject the plaintiff's claim even if he were found to be a
dual national. Besides violating the complete diversity requirement in
Strawbridge, the court noted that there was "no reason to expect bias
from state courts'" where both parties are residents of the same state.
Moreover, there would be little reason to expect Great Britain to be affronted by a decision affecting one of its subjects if that decision was not
made on a national level since the plaintiff had voluntarily subjected himself both to the laws of the United States and of the individual states by
choosing to become an American citizen. Finally, the court concluded that
opening the federal courts to naturalized citizens based on the concept of
dual nationality would render their rights superior to those of native-born
American citizens by providing the former with greater access to federal
courts than the latter.
The court of appeals in Sadat rejected the holding set forth in the
Raphael decision and adopted the rationale set forth in the dicta. In its
analysis, the court first set forth the reasoning behind alienage jurisdiction, citing Hamilton's Federalist Paper No. 80 for the proposition that
"the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of the part.""'
Alienage jurisdiction is designed to insure the maintenance of harmony
with foreign states by handling suits involving their citizens at a national
rather than local level, as well as to protect against the failure of individual states to give protection to foreigners under treaties. The court continued to state the general test for the determination of foreign citizenship for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction, that is, "whether the
country in which citizenship is claimed would so recognize" the claimant
as a citizen.1 5 By recognizing the "right of each country to determine who

12.
13.
14.
15.

470 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
Id. at 986.
615 F.2d at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
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. ..its nationals are,"1 6 the court seemed to be setting Sadat up for cov-

erage squarely within the literal language of subsection (a)(2). Unlike the
Raphael court, however, the Sadat court of appeals made no finding that
the plaintiff's naturalization and renunciation of allegiance to foreign

states or sovereignties resulted in the recognition by U.S. courts of only
one citizenship-his U.S. citizenship-for purposes of jurisdiction. Thus,

although the court noted that the U.S. Government's official policy is to
discourage dual nationality, it also noted that U.S. courts and the State
Department consistently have recognized its existence.
Having found that Sadat possessed dual citizenship, being a citizen
of both the United States and Egypt, the court determined that Sadat
was not a citizen or subject of a foreign state within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Rather than relying on the literal language of the

statute, which it accused the Aguirre court of doing, it followed the dicta
of Raphael and looked to the policies underlying alienage jurisdiction to
find that the statute was not meant to cover a foreign citizen who was

also a United States citizen.
There is authority for such a liberal interpretation of the statute.17 In

going beyond the literal language of the statute, the court stated that
"the paramount purpose of the alienage jurisdiction provision [is] to

avoid offense to foreign nations because of the possible appearance of in-

justice to their citizens."18 The court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law" for the principle that a national is not responsi-

16. Id.
17. As stated in United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534 (1940):
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purposes of a statute
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the
purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.
When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has
looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even
the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this Court
has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words
may be on 'superficial examination.' The interpretation of the meaning of the
statutes is exclusively a judicial function. This duty requires one body of public servants, the judges, to construe the meaning of what another body, the
legislators, has said. Obviously there is danger that the courts' conclusion as to
legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the judges' own views or
by factors not considered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the
danger is the best assurance of escape from its threat but hardly justifies an
acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts
available information for reaching a correct conclusion.
Id. at 543-44.
18. 615 F.2d at 1186.
19. RzSTATEMENT (SzcoaN) or THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrE STATES
§ 171 (1965).
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ble to another nation under international law for conduct which is wrongful to a citizen of the latter state when he is also a citizen of the former
state. By analogy, the court held that ordinarily "only the American nationality of the dual citizen should be recognized under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)." The court stated:
This rule recognizes that in the usual case a foreign country cannot
complain about the treatment received by one of its citizens by a
country which also regards that person as a national. This principle
suggests that the risk of 'entanglements with other sovereigns that
might ensue from failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a
national level,' Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. at
500, is slight when an American citizen is also a citizen of another
country and therefore he ordinarily should only be 2regarded
as an
0
American citizen for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The court also recognized the exception to the general rule in the concept
of "effective or dominant nationality. 21 The court found that Sadat's voluntary nationalization in the United States, as well as his actions subsequent to his naturalization, precluded him from invoking 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2) based on such-an exception.
The court's decision leaves open the possibility of an American dual
national invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). By
recognizing dual citizenship, the concept of dominant nationality, and
recognizing that a person's citizenship is not exclusively determinable by
the laws of the forum state, the court fails to preclude U.S. citizens entirely from invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). For
example, if the plaintiff in Aguirre had not been a resident of the same
state as the defendant and was able to establish that her dominant nationality was Mexican (based on her parents' citizenship and intent to
return to Mexico), the Sadat court of appeals seems to indicate that it
would find jurisdiction to exist. The court also makes clear that the complete diversity requirement for corporations with regard to state citizenship is not always applicable by analogy to cases involving diversity of
national citizenship. As the court pointed out under the corporations
analogy, an American dual national would thus be able to assert his foreign nationality to avoid federal jurisdiction in an action by a non-national of the United States. As the court stated, "[a]rguably, cases such as
this are precisely those in which a federal forum should be afforded the
foreign litigant in the interest of preventing international friction.""2
Dirk T. Biermann

20. 615 F.2d at 1187.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1186.

The International Court of Justice-United
States v. Iran
On 24 May 1980, the International Court of Justice delivered its
judgment in United States v. Iran.' The Court unanimously decided that:
[T]he Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately
take all steps to redress the situation resulting from the events of 4
November 1979 and what followed from these events and to that end:
(a) must immediately terminate the unlawful detention of the
United States Charg6 d'affaires and other United States nationals
now held hostage in Iran, and must immediately release each and
every one and entrust them to the protecting Power;
(b) must ensure that all the said persons have the necessary means
of leaving the Iranian territory including means of transport;
(c) must immediately place in the hands of the protecting Power the
premises, property, archives and documents of the United States Em2
bassy and of its Consulates in Iran ....

The Court also held unanimously "that no member of the United States
diplomatic or consular Staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any
form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a witness." 8 Although the decision is important in many respects,4 the Court's discussion
of its jurisdiction to issue interim measures despite the concurrent forma-

tion of the United Nations Security Council's Peacekeeping Commission
may be most significant in determining the future role of the Court in the
resolution of political disputes.5

The United States referred the issues raised by the occupation of the
Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic staff to the United Nations
Security Council on 9 November 1979 and to the Secretary-General on 25
November 1979.1 Four days later, while the matter was still before the
Security Council, the United States submitted its application to the

1. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran, [1980] I.C.J.
reprinted in U.N. Doc. S/13989 (1980).
2. U.N. Doc. S/13989 39.
3. Id. at 1 95.4. On 15 December 1979, the Court ordered the release of all American
nationals detained in Iran and the relinquishment of the Embassy to the United States. It
has been suggested that such a decision by the Court clouded the real legal question:
whether the order to release the hostage Americans is an appropriate provisional measure
since if Iran obeyed the order, it would not be able to press its claim that the diplomatic
personnel must stand trial for espionage. See 21 HLv.INT'L L.J. 268, 274 (1980).
4. Stephen Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser in the State Department, has commented
that the decision may help to resuscitate the Court: "We hope this case could contribute to
a renaissance .... The court is in danger of atrophying." NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1979, at 83.
5. During the 35 years of its existence, the Court has only considered 45 disputes and
has issued 14 final judgments, plus 16 advisory opinions. Id.
6. U.N. Doc. S/13989 39.
-;
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Court along with its request for interim measures. 7 On 4 December, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 457 whereby it resolved to "remain
actively seized of the matter." Although the Secretary-General did not
announce the creation of a special Peacekeeping Commission until 7 February 1980, it was apparent in December when the Court issued its indication of provisional measuresO that the Security Council was endeavoring
to resolve the dispute. Regarding the potential of conflict between actions

by the Security Council and those of the International Court of Justice, a
unanimous Court rejected the notion of judicial abstention:
[I~t does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Council
that there was or could be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective functions by the Court and the Security
Council. Nor is there in this any cause for surprise. Whereas Article
12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any
recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect to that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court
by any provision of either the Charter or the Statute of the Court.
The reasons are clear. It is for the Court, the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in
issue between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal
questions by the Court may be an important and sometimes decisive
factor in prompting the peaceful settlement of the dispute.10

The Court decided by a majority that Iran had violated and continued to violate several bilateral treaties in force between the United States
and Iran"' as well as several principles of diplomacy created by long-established rules of general international law.12 Iran's conduct, it said, could
not be justified even were the alleged criminal activities of the United
States in Iran proven, 8 "because diplomatic law itself provides the neces-

7. Id. The Court granted the request by the United States for relief pendente lite on 15
December 1979. United States v. Iran, [1979] I.C.J. 7, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 931,
959-60 (1979).
8.U.N. Doc. S/13989 at 39.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. U.N. Doc. 8/13989 at 40. The Court cited Article 36 of the U.N. Charter and the
Aegean Sea ContinentalShelf Case, [1979] I.C.J. 12, for the proposition that neither the
mandate given by the Security Council for the formation of a commission by the SecretaryGeneral can be considered an obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. U.N. Doc.
S/13989 at 1 40.
11. Id. at 95. Of primary importance is the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
12. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, was intended to codify the principle of customary international law of the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents. See Commentary of 1958
Draft Article 27, [1958] 11 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 97. This principle is the oldest, most fundamental principle of diplomatic law. E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DELOmATc RELATIONS 135 (1976). See also SATOW's GUIDE TO DIPLOmATIc PRAcTIce 120 (5th ed. L. Gore-Booth 1979).
13. U.N. Doc. S/13989 at 1 37. A perfunctory challenge to jurisdiction was raised by
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sary means of defense against, and sanction for illicit activities by members of diplomatic or consular missions.""' Specifically, the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express sanctions for situations where
members of an embassy engage in espionage under the guise of diplomatic immunity: the receiving state may either declare such "diplomats"
to be persona non grata or break diplomatic relations with the sending
state."6
Consequences for the future

The International Court of Justice has suggested a construct for the
peaceful settlement of political disputes which is rooted in the belief that
the resolution of a legal issue sometimes hastens the resolution of a politi-

cal dispute. One might ask why, if this is true, the Court's decision had no
effect on the Government of Iran. Although the principle of diplomatic
and consular immunity is a fundamental precept of international law,1'

the Government of Iran has eschewed every indication that such concepts
are valid or applicable to a revolutionary regime. This viewpoint is aptly

expressed in two interviews given by the Ayatollahs Behesti and
Khomeini a few weeks after the initial hostage-taking. In the first,
Behesti-a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Council-attempted to
justify the action of 4 November by arguing that traditional, nonrevolutionary principles do not apply to revolutionary regimes.' 7 In the second,

Iran in a letter of 9 December 1979 which argued that the American appeal could not be
examined by the Court separately from what it described as the "overall problem" involving
"more than twenty-five years of continual interference by the United States in the internal
affairs of Iran." The Court answered this charge with an opinion which might indicate a
shift toward favoring intensified judicial activity, especially in time of strife:
[NIever has the view been put forward before that because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should
decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue between them. Nor
can any basis for such a view of the Court's function be found in the Charter or
the Statute of the Court; if the Court were, contrary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted
restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution of international
disputes.
Id.
14. Id. at T 83.
15. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
16. The tradition of Islam has made a substantial contribution to the evolution of this
concept. U.N. Doc. S/13989 at 1 86.
17. The Ayatollah Behesti was interviewed by the German newsmagazine Die Stern:
[Stern] If spies are discovered in a foreign embassy, it is a standard procedure
to expel them, but not to take them as hostages.
[Behesti] It is a standard procedure? If we were talking here about diplomatic
relations, I would say you are right. But we have a revolution and they have
laws of their own. Being revolutionaries we support the youth because this action is the only way to make the world familiar with their ideas, goals and
feelings of revenge. The world must understand that.
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Khomeini was asked:
[Question] [You are holding the hostages of the American Embassy
in Tehran ....

Would you release the hostages?

[Khomeini] Do international conventions provide for the sending of
spies into a country in the name of an ambassador or a charg6
d'affaires or not? . .. What our nation has done is to arrest a bunch
of spies who, according to the norms, should be investigated, tried and
treated in accordance with our own laws.' 8

Although no suggestion has been made by Iran that the Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights of 195519 between the
United States and Iran was not in force on 4 November 1979 when the
American Embassy was overrun or on 29 November when the United
States submitted its dispute to the Court, Iran reasons that any treaties
or conventions that were in force with the Pahlavi regime are not applicable to the new revolutionary government. This doctrine of convenience is
clearly at odds with even the basest understanding of the concept of re0
bus sic stantibus.2
Notwithstanding the celerity and decisiveness with
which it acted, and the fact that the Court can at times be effective, 2 this
decision is especially troubling because its ineffectiveness in a case involving a clear breach of a fundamental precept of international law might
well encourage a proliferation of Iran's doctrine of convenience.
Brian J. McCoy

[Stern] What does the Koran have to say of. this primitive way of revenge
thinking?
[Behestil It allows it but also says forgiving is better ....
Memorial for the Petitioner, United States v. Iran, [1980] I.C.J. _; reprinted in U.N. Doc.
8/13989 at 128-29.
18. Memorial for Petitioner, at 215, United States v. Iran, [19801 I.C.J.
; reprinted
in U.N. Doc. S/13989. In answer to the question posed by Khomeini:
The Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express provisions to meet
the case when members of an embassy staff, under the cover of diplomatic
privileges and immunities engage in such abuses of their functions as espionage ....
[Ilt is for the very purpose of providing a remedy for such possible
abuses of diplomatic functions that Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations stipulates:
1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain
its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any
member of the diplomatic staff is persona non grata or that any other
member of the staff is not acceptable. In any such case the sending
State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his function with the mission ....
19. Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
20. The majority of modern writers accept the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus which
invokes a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating a treaty. See I.
BRowNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 617 (3d. ed. 1979); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62, reprintedin 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 679 (1969); but
cf. J. BRwALY, THE LAw OF NATONS 335-39 (6th. ed. H. Waldock 1963).
21. See E. McWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAw-MAKING PROCaSS 17-97 (1979). McWhinney discusses what he terms the "judicial activ-

ism" of the Court.

The Moon Treaty
Ever since the launching of space vehicles became a practical reality,
the question of who would gain ownership of the moon and planets has
been a concern. Although only a dozen people have ever set foot on the
moon, and the last team of Apollo astronauts landed there in the winter
of 1972, the moon suddenly has become the object of a heated debate on
earth. The "Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies" (the Moon Treaty) is now open for signature.' The process of formulating a treaty on the moon began with a 1970
Argentinian proposal to the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) entitled
"Draft Agreement on the Principles Governing Activities in the Use of
the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies."' During
the following years, much time and effort was spent by lawyers and diplomats from many nations on its further elaboration. On December 5, 1979,
the General Assembly approved the Moon Treaty and asked the United
Nations Secretary-General to open the agreement for signature and
ratification.8
The Moon Treaty is an attempt to codify principles of international
law well in advance of the time when competition for wealth on the moon
becomes feasible. It invokes general principles of international law and
the United Nations Charter for guidance on space activities.' The agreement is based on the concept that the moon and its natural resources are
the common heritage of mankind and are not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty." Although it calls for the establishment of an international regulatory regime to create and oversee an equitable system for granting all nations equal rights to resources and
products developed from space exploration, 6 commercial lunar exploration is not yet feasible. Thus, the Treaty has been drafted only as a statement of general principles, and is only the first step in a two stage process. The details of an international regulatory regime will be the focus of
the second effort, which is not likely to be articulated until well after the
year 2000. As do the Law of the Sea Treaties, the Moon Treaty promises

1. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 5, 1979; text at annex to GA. Re. 34/68,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/68 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Moon Treaty].
2. Draft Agreement on the Principles Governing Activities in the Use of the Natural
Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr.
1 (1970).
3. Moon Treaty, note 1 supra.
4. Id. art. 2.
5. Id. art. 11, IN 1-4.
6. Id. art. 11, 5.
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to define the legal consequences of lunar exploration well before the technology is available. Inherent in this promise is the inevitable conflict between the freedom of scientific exploration and exploitation for the common benefit of mankind. In its attempt to assure that future exploration
of space will be for the benefit of all, the Moon Treaty may well inhibit
the future development of the space technology that is necessary for future exploitation. Despite this gloomy note, it is in the interest of the
United States to ratify the Treaty to assure its position in the negotiations regarding the coming international regulatory regime for the exploration and exploitation of space.
There are many benefits to be realized from the exploration and exploitation of the moon. Research is continuing regarding the development

of new materials in space and the future uses of raw materials that do not
originate on earth. For example, the moon is believed to contain high con-

centrations of titanium and aluminum which could be used as thermal
shielding and construction materials for huge earth-orbiting satellites to
capture solar energy. 7 This idea is attractive because of the low "escape
velocity" of the moon when compared with earth, as well as the advantages offered for materials fabrication in the low-gravity, high-vacuum
conditions of outer space.' But the moon is not only valuable for its mineral and other resources, for it may provide a platform for future scientific and military activities. These activities could be immeasurably profitable to whatever country held sovereignty. The freedom of scientific
investigation is expressly affirmed in the Treaty.' The collection of samples is free and the samples remain under the guard of the state which
has collected them. 10 States also may use their samples in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions." The vagueness of these freedoms is evidence of the reluctance of the drafters of the Treaty to formulate a specific answer concerning the precise meaning of nonappropriation
of the natural resources of these areas.
The Treaty also provides that the use of force on the moon is prohibited."' This provision must, however, be viewed in light of the fact that
the United Nations Charter allows the use of force in certain specific situations.1 3 Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that military bases, installations, and fortifications are prohibited, the use of military personnel
for scientific research or other peaceful purposes is allowed.14 Forbidden
weapons include only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de7. Tur,

Mar. 24, 1980, at 47; ScwmcE Naws, Mar. 1, 1980, at 135; CHEMICAL AND ENGIAug. 29, 1977, at 20-22; AvIAON WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 19,

NEEING NEWS,

1977, at 9.
8. TIME, Mar. 24, 1980, at 47.

9. Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6,
10. Id. art. 6, 1 2.
11. Id.
12. Id. art. 3, 1 2.
13. See, e.g., U.N. CHArE art. 51.
14. Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3,

1.

4.
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struction; conventional weapons are seemingly allowed. 18 However, it
must also be borne in mind that other provisions insist on cooperation
and assistance on the earth and the moon. 16 The Treaty grants states
freedom to pursue their activities in the exploration and use of the moon
by landing their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, and station installations anywhere on or below the surface of the moon, without
interference with the activities of other states on the moon.1 7 If one state
has doubts about the correct application of the Treaty by another state
party, consultation between states concerning the peaceful utilization of
the moon is contemplated.1" However, there is no provision for a compulsory judicial forum; it is left to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations to ensure that these consultations become effective.19 The state
which has launched persons, structures, or other installations on the
moon retains jurisdiction and control over them, and the extent of international responsibility is not defined.' 0
The likelihood is that these vague principles will inhibit the development of space technology. Space enthusiasts call the Moon Treaty a harbinger of doom for free enterprise and for America's future on the moon.
Part of this opposition stems from language that attempts to protect the
interests of countries that do not yet have the technology to share in the
exploitation of whatever extraterrestrial resources may turn out to be
available and worthwhile. The crux of the matter seems to be the phrase
in Article XI declaring that the moon and its resources are "the common
heritage of mankind." The conflict parallels the decade-long debate over
the seabed mining provisions in the Law of the Sea Treaties. Some elements in the industrialized nations are unwilling to share the riches of the
seabed with less developed countries. Thus, there is decreased financial
incentive and increased financial insecurity. Since similar problems could
arise in fledgling space industries, some are fighting ratification of the
Moon Treaty by the United States.
One of the Treaty's most visible and vocal foes is Leigh S. Ratiner, a
Washington, D.C. lawyer who represented companies interested in mining
manganese nodules from the ocean floor. He says the "common heritage"
phrase is a bad one "even though I helped originate it." The problem, he
says, is that "most of the world feels it means 'common property,' which
cannot be disposed of without common consent."' 1 Echoing Ratiner,
Houston space lawyer Arthur Dula says: "Resources that are owned by
everybody are developed by nobody. Free enterprise institutions simply
cannot make significant investments in space while they are under the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. art. 3, 3.
See id. arts. 2; 4, 1 2; 5; 13-15.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 15, 2.
Id. art. 15, 3.
Id. art. 12, 1 1.
SCINCE NaWs, Mar. 1, 1980, at 135.
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threat of suit over treaty terms or ex post facto appropriation of their
investments by a nebulous future international regime. '2 United Technologies Corporation, on February 14, 1980, became the first company to
denounce the Treaty when it placed large advertisements in the Washington Post and several New England newspapers. Under the headline,
"Stranglehold on the Moon," the company called for an effort to
head off this Third World drive to frustrate America's hard-won technological supremacy. The draft agreement would have the effect of
imposing an indefinite delay on commercial development of space at a
time when the United States is a world leader in space technology ....
[I]f the draft treaty stands up in Congress, American inventiveness and enterprise would be shut off from the industrialization of
space.13
Proponents of the Treaty argue that the ban on unilateral claims implied in the "common heritage" phrase is already covered by the 1967
Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which the United States has
signed. 4 Though the Moon Treaty states that no part of the moon can
become the exclusive preserve of any single country or organization, it
does not forbid mining or exploration there. It stipulates only that such
activities come under a still undefined "international regime," presumably to be worked out at some future conference only when exploitation is
about to become feasible. Thus, nothing in the Moon Treaty calls for a
moratorium while such an international regime is being set up. Treaty
proponents say the Moon Treaty would obligate the parties Only to work
toward defining the regime and getting it established, but not that they
succeed in setting one up. Without these rather minimal restrictions in
the Moon Treaty, the potential would exist for other far fetched schemes
that could be far more restrictive. Thus, a future regime that reasonably
assures that the exploration and exploitation of the moon will be able to
proceed subject to rational regulations is in the best interest of the
United States. Such a regime should be sought even if it means a further
deferral of the date exploitation would commence. The advantages of ratification of the Moon Treaty closely parallel those of the Law of the Sea
Treaty: (1) it would avoid the potential conflict of a wide-open race to
exploit the moon; (2) it would multilateralize the giving of aid, ensuring
that other developed and rapidly developing states contributed their fair
share along with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe; and (3) it would establish an international administration capable of
forming the self-supporting, independent nucleus of an international re-

22.

SCIENcE, Nov. 23, 1979, at 915; TIME, Mar. 24, 1980, at 47.
23. As reported in Bus. WEEK, Mar. 10, 1980, at 39; see also SCIENCE NEWS, Mar. 1,

1980, at 135.
24. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
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gime to protect the freedoms of the moon beyond national jurisdiction. 5
Finally, the failure to provide greater certainty and predictability in space
relations could lay the foundation for future space-related difficulties for
the United States. Efforts to achieve multilateral solutions for a number
of issues might be frustrated, with prejudice to the chances of achieving
needed multilateral agreements in such areas as the sea, Antarctica, energy, food, and the environment.
Nearly ten years has elapsed since Argentina put forward its draft
agreement on principles governing activities in the use of the natural resources of the moon. This draft was submitted to the United Nations at a
moment when Neil Armstrong's first footsteps on the moon led humanity
to believe that his memorable trip would shortly be followed by numerous
others, opening up the possibility of an early colonization of the moon.
But almost one decade after the introduction of the draft treaty, the exploration and exploitation of the moon has not advanced as was hoped, or
feared, at the end of the 1960's. Interest in space during the 1970's was
reoriented from theoretical achievements and activities towards those of a
more concrete and easily beneficial nature, such as earth-orbiting satellites. Thus, it is interesting that the moon should now be considered in
terms of the legal consequences of possible occupation by man, at a moment when technology has not permitted human beings to envisage its
practical utilization.
John H. Works, Jr.

25. See Franck, Kennedy & Trinko, An Equitable Regime for Seabed and Ocean Subsoil Resources, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 161 (1974).
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Edited by Alice H. Henkin. Copublished by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, New York, NY; Sijthoff & Noordhoff International
Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands; and Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, NY (1979). Pages xii, 203. $12.10 (clothbound).
During President Carter's term in office, human rights issues have
taken on a new dimension in international relations.' Increasingly, they
have become a weapon of United States foreign policy.' Among recent

events, the plight of refugees$ and the taking of diplomatic hostages in
the seizure of the United States Embassy in Teheran4 have emphasized
the necessity of treating human rights and their observance as a matter of
international concern. Before the Helsinki Final Act was due for reexamination in Belgrade, two Programs of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic
Studies-the Program on Justice, Society and the Individual, and the
Program in International Affairs-held a workshop on the Internationalization of Human Rights. The published result, Human Dignity, consists
of papers delivered at, developed during, or inspired by that workshop,
together with selected human rights documents.' In addition to the papers discussed below, valuable pieces were contributed by Elaine Pagels,
Professor of History and Religion at Barnard College, Columbia University, and by Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Senior Judge, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Human Dignity was edited
by Alice H. Henkin, Associate Director of the Program on Justice, Society

1. Derian, Review of Human Rights in Latin America, DEP'T STATE BULL., Oct. 1980, at

51.
2. Nanda, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy Under Carter: Continuity and
Change, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 517 (1979).
3. Warren, Refugees, A Global Issue, DEp'T STATE BULL., Sept. 1980, at 53.
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
5. For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
done at Helsinki, Aug. 1, 1975, see 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1293 (1975) or HUMAN DIGNrrY 135203 (A. Henkin ed. 1979).
6. Documents reproduced in HUMAN DIGNITY are the U.N. Charter (selected articles),
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
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and the Individual.
In a useful commentary on codification and implementation, Thomas
Buergenthal, Fulbright and Jaworski Professor of Law at the University
of Texas, makes the interesting comment that not all the rights set out in
the Universal Declaration 7 are "deemed to be equally basic or fundamental. ' In Professor Buergenthal's opinion,
an international consensus on core rights is to be found in the concept
of 'gross violations of human rights' and in the roster of rights subsumed under it. That is to say, agreement today exists that genocide,
apartheid, torture, mass killings and massive arbitrary deprivations of
liberty are gross violations. To the extent that this agreement exists, it
reflects an international consensus on the type of governmental activities that are impermissible.9
In other words, those matters which, at least on the basis of ideological
belief in 'motherhood,' are generally considered as forming the basis of
international criminal law. Professor Buergenthal goes on to say that
"[t]his consensus, incidentally, is not ideologically colored and can be applied to any form of government. That is probably why there is consensus
with regard to these rights."10 Unfortunately, this is a somewhat idealistic
view of the situation, for apart from the universal lip service these ideas
receive, it can hardly be said with truth that there is a reality of observance in practice. Professor Buergenthal concludes his essay with a call
for full United States support for human rights covenants and agreements, for without this he "doubt[s] that we shall be able to legitimate
our current international human rights policies and avoid charges that we
are trying to impose our values on the rest of the world. ' 1"
The elements of the United States human rights strategy are considered by Abraham Sirkin, formerly a member of the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff. To some extent Mr. Sirkin differs from Professor
Buergenthal's basic approach in that he says that one American view
holds "that all rights [in the Universal Declaration] are created equal and
that we must not, in principle, play favorites among them."" He still
feels, however, that there are "core" rights, like that of emigration or of
freedom of the press or of religion, so that "a United States human rights
policy would stand a better chance if its more widespread efforts were
devoted, initially at least, to reducing or eliminating the gross violations
of the 'core' rights of the individual person."'1 As to the suggestion that is
heard with ever increasing emphasis today, particularly in connection
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
8. HUMAN DIGNrIy, supra note 5, at 17.
9. Id. at 17-18.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id. at 28.
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with the hostage-taking crisis in Iran,
[ilmpatient as we may become with rulers who fail to heed our call to
freedom, we must recognize that we cannot control the consequences
of a successful 'destabilization.' As bad as things may currently be in a
particular country, the results of a change forced by outside pressure
might turn out to be even worse.'
On the other hand, Iran also teaches that care must be taken that noninterference with an autocratic regime does not shade into active support,
which itself stimulates active anti-Western hatred.
Dr. Harlan Cleveland, Director of the Aspen Institute's Program in
International Affairs, widens the concept of human rights to cover the
rights of states on behalf of their people in fields that were formerly considered as falling within the rubric of abus de droit. He points out how
easily domestic interests such as weather control may affect the interests
of other nations, and concludes that
[m]aybe the time has come for us to stop thinking of human rights
and human needs as 'internal affairs.' 'Human needs' are coming to be
regarded as a first charge on the world's resources. And 'human rights'
are becoming a first charge on the public conscience of people (if not
governments) everywhere.' 5
Aspen Institute Special Adviser Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., however,
points out in a piece entitled A Bedrock Consensus of Human Rights that
there are severe limits on what one government can do directly in support of human rights in another country. It is manifest, too, that, at
the most, human rights can be no more than one among a myriad of
considerations entering into policy determinations-that the weight
given to human rights will differ according to time and circumstances-and that the only available operating procedure is to keep a
weather eye out for targets of opportunity.0
Recent reactions to Idi Amin, the tragedy of the "boat people," the problem of apartheid, particularly if understood in a wider sense than just
what white southern Africa does to its blacks, and the response to recent
terrorist acts, culminating in the Teheran Embassy incident, all emphasize that these caveats are as valid on the multilateral as on the bilateral
level.
In Human Dignity's concluding paper, Robert McKay, Director of
the Aspen Program on Justice, Society and the Individual, asks what is
yet to come. He emphasizes the importance of education and the deeper
involvement of nongovernmental organizations, and suggests as the most
important and immediate issues on the world agenda those of the relationship of man to the natural and the man-made environments, the rela-

14. Id. at 29.
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id. at 54.
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tionships among rich and poor nations, and the role of human rights in
the North-South and East-West dialogues. 17 This program could keep
any number of colloquia, symposia, and workshops on human rights busy
for years. It could also keep diplomats, if they were serious, in a frame of
mind to deal with issues which, if solved, might make hatred and war a
little less likely.
L.C. Green*

17. Id. at 81.
* L.C. Green is University Professor at the University of Alberta.
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LC 78-73024; xiv, 191 p.; footnotes, tables, general index.
Mr. Barkenbus presents a study of the international political and legal issues involved in the mining of manganese nodules which exist in
great numbers on seabeds beyond national territories. Through discussions of the potential impact of nodule mining on the economy of the
United States and Of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea negotiations, the author develops his major thesis: unilateral nodule mining would be against the United States' best interests. With a
compromise yet to be reached on nodule mining by the nations of the
world, and the increasing prospects of unilateral action on the part of the
United States, the author concludes that an international solution to this
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Contributors from Austria, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and
the United States offer an international perspective dealing with issues of
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and EEC antimerger law, privacy legislation, the economic system of
Latin America, correspondence rights of prisoners, the legal status of illegitimate children, private transnational law, and comparative law as to
countries with different economic systems.
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(cloth); ISBN 0 292 78506 2; xi, 353 p.; footnotes, appendices, bibliography, index.
Mr. Eckes explores how natural resource considerations have influenced American foreign relations since World War I. He examines
America's dependence on foreign mineral supplies as well as the internal
struggle for control over America's resources, and analyzes the times of
plenty as well as the times of scarcity. Mr. Eckes recognizes the important role mineral supplies have played in shaping foreign as well as domestic policy in the United States and in other countries. The book limits
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its scope to nonagricultural and nonenergy-related materials with an emphasis on industrial raw materials because these resources have failed to
gain attention proportionate to their importance in shaping world policy.
Topics includes America's quest for mineral self-sufficiency, the role of
mineral resources in times of war-including the cold war-and the current scramble for control of resources.
EL-HAKIM, A.A., THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA; Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY 13210 (1979); $24.30
(cloth); ISBN 0 8156 2217 1, LC 79-17456; 293 p.; footnotes, bibliography,
tables, maps, general index, appendices. Foreword by R.Y. Jennings.
The author presents a comprehensive examination of the Middle
Eastern Arab States' policies on the law of the sea. He reveals that Arab
policies, which tend to follow those of other developing countries, are becoming increasingly important in a world thirsty for oil despite the fact
that the interest of the Arab States in the subject is relatively recent and
no exclusive Middle Eastern approach to the law of the sea has yet developed. The book covers many topics in varying degrees of depth, including
the territorial sea, continental shelf resources, the rights of passage
through the Straits of Hormuz and Tiran, the Arab States' participation
in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and regional issues.
ELIAN, G., THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES;
Sijthoff & Noordoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1979); available in U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $45.00 (cloth); ISBN 90 286 0049 3; xi, 238 p.; footnotes,
select bibliography, index of terms, organizations, personalities, events
and opinions. Translated from Romanian by Professor Andrei Bantas of
Bucharest University.
Mr. Elian presents a comprehensive survey of the principle of sovereignty as it applies to the world's dwindling supply of natural resources.
His discussion emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the emerging
Third World nations capture and retain control of their natural resources,
and traces the development of international law in this area since the
Second World War. Issues discussed also include maritime resources and
those in other regions of difficult access; United Nations debates on the
principle of economic sovereignty over natural resources; the influence of
interstate organizations on the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources; the growing development of international economic exchanges;
and the Romanian outlook on sovereignty over national resources within
the framework of a new international economic order.
FINCH, J., INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL THEORY

(3d ed.); Sweet and Max-

well Ltd., 11 New Fetter Lane, London (1979); distributed in U.S. and
Canada by The Carswell Company Ltd., Agincourt, Ontario; $35.00 in
cloth, also available in paper; ISBN 421 24820 3 (cloth), 421 24830 0 (paper); xii, 228 p.; preface, footnotes, further readings, index, index of
jurists.
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John Finch, of the Faculty of Law of the University of Leicester, has
revised the earlier edition of this book by expanding and reorganizing the
text and by adding references to further readings. The book's aim remains the same: to present a short guide to some of the most significant
aspects of the theory of jurisprudence. It describes the major features of
the development of juristic thought, giving due attention to positivism
and natural law, and to a number of the principal juristic thinkers.
Among these are Aristotle, Grotius, Hobbes, Blackstone, Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, Olivecrona, Hart, Fuller, Ross, Gray, Holmes and Llewellyn.
There are chapters on Soviet legal theory, on the central position of the
courts, and on law, force and authority. The latter includes a section on
international legal theory.
GRAHL-MADSEN,

A., TERRITORIAL AsyLuM; Almquist & Wiksell Inter-

national, Stockholm, Sweden, in collaboration with Oceana Publications,
Inc., New York, NY (1980); ISBN 91 22 0 390 8 (Almquist & Wiksell),
ISBN 0 379 20706 0 (Oceana); xvi, 231 p.; footnotes, appendices, annexes,
table of abbreviations, bibliography, index.
Professor Grahl-Madsen explains the present state of the law of asylum: the time-honored right of states to grant asylum to any person seeking it, the constitutional and statutory provisions in many countries giving the individual a more or less perfect right to be given refuge, and the
rudimentary provisions of international law prohibiting the extradition of
political offenders and the forcible return of refugees to countries where
they will not be safe from prosecution.
The plans for an Asylum Convention are discussed in detail, and the
results of the ill-fated United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum
are critically analyzed. In appendices the author relates the interesting
discussions in the Nansen Symposium, discusses the disturbing phenomenon of "refugees in orbit," and suggests a plan of international cooperation as a key to the solution of the current refugee problems which cannot
be solved regionally. The annexes contain international instruments dealing with refugees and asylum, and the many proposals for a convention or
protocol.
HENKIN,

L., How NATIONS BEHAVE; Columbia University Press, 562

West 113th Street, New York, NY 10025 (1979); distributed by Council
on Foreign Relations, Inc.; $6.50 (paper), $20.00 (cloth); ISBN 0 231
04756 8 (cloth), ISBN 0 231 04757 6 (paper), LC 79-1015; xv, 339 p.; footnotes, index, preface to first and second editions.
Professor Henkin, expanding on the foundation laid down in the first

edition of How

NATIONS BEHAVE,

presents an analysis of the contempo-

rary "system" of international law. The analysis centers on the role of a
system of law, emphasizing the interrelationships between legal systems
and contemporary political forces. In addition, the book provides an excellent critique of the current changes in international legal thinking and
approaches to the development of a legal system for a new world order.
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NY (1979); $17.50 (cloth); ISBN 0 379 20680 3, LC 79-26485; xi, 304 p.;
documents, tables, abbreviations, indices. Supplements ANNUAL REVIEW
OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS. Preface to first edition by A.W. Cordier.
Significant events in the history of the United Nations were selected
by the editors and tabulated by date in short entries of a few lines each.
The subject index allows the reader to trace developments in various
areas. Primarily a starting point for the researcher, the book also includes
the texts of important documents and numerous tables of memberships,
budgets, and other useful information.
LANDSBERG,
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Ballinger Pub-

lishing Co., Cambridge, MA (1979); $9.95 (paper); ISBN 0 88410 092 8
(cloth), ISBN 0 8447 2135 4 (paper), LC 79-5226; xviii, 628 p.; footnotes,
charts, tables, glossary, abbreviations, acronyms, appendix, index. Foreword by McGeorge Bundy.
ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS is the final report of the third
independent study group commissioned by the Ford Foundation to examine energy problems. The study group, composed of distinguished academicians and businesspeople, relies heavily on basic economic realities,
particularly the role of market forces, in considering both traditional and
nontraditional energy sources and in making a number of specific policy
recommendations. While the energy situation in the United States is the
main focus of this information-packed book, energy in an international
setting and the implications for the United States are also discussed.
LAQUEUR, W. & RUBIN, B., THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER; Meridian
Books, The New American Library, 1301 Avenue of the Americas, New
York, NY 10019 (1979); $6.75 (paper); ISBN 0 452 00511 6, LC 79-87938;
viii, 375 p.; footnotes, bibliography.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER, a reference work and a guide to further
study of human rights issues, provides a general overview of human rights
through a compilation of essays and original documents. Opening essays
discuss historical background and philosophical and legal implications.
This is followed by a documentary history of the development of the concept of human rights, touching on such topics as the treatment of aliens,
slavery, rights in times of armed conflict, and the rights of minorities.
The texts of a number of international agreements are included. The last
section, on modern conceptions of human rights, discusses struggles for
racial and sexual equality, national self-determination, equal justice
under law, environmental protection, and freedom of information. The
book includes a very detailed bibliography.
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Haven, CT 06520 (1980); $45.00 (cloth); ISBN 0 300 02344 8, LC 7918149; xxiv, 1016 p.; preface, footnotes, appendix, table of cases, name
index, subject index.
In HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, subtitled THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY, Professors McDougal, Lasswell and Chen recommend a conception of human rights in
terms of the shaping and sharing of values. They illustrate their approach
with a detailed examination of important problems concerning respect,
which they hold to be the core value of all human rights. The book offers
a broad outline of the contemporary global process of authoritative decision, and recommends intellectual procedures for relating fundamental
policies about human rights to particular instances of choice. The authors
assert that if the appropriate predispositions can be created in effective
elites, an international law of human dignity can become a realistic goal.
ROSENNE, S. (editor), DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE; Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, NY (1979); $47.50
(cloth); ISBN 0 379 20460 6, LC 73-91985; xii, 497 p.; revision of earlier
edition.
Updated to December 31, 1978, this work is a compilation of documents relating to the International Court of Justice, serving as a handy
reference for practitioners, diplomats, students, and politicians. Documents include the U.N. Charter, the Statute of the Court and Rules from
1946 through 1978, with French and English texts. Also included are
tables of membership, sections on access to the Court by non-members,
jurisdiction, diplomatic privileges and immunities of Court officials, and
judicial statutes.
SMITH, D.D., SPACE STATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY; Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, CO 80301, Frederick A.
Praeger, Publisher (1979); $22.50; ISBN 0 89158 654 7, LC 79-13106; xvi,
264 p.; photos, figures, plates, appendices, endnotes, index. Foreword by
S. Neil Hosenball.

Mr. Smith assesses the potential legal impact of space stations, including such applications as the gathering, processing, transmission, and
dissemination of information; the generation of energy; space colonization; and space manufacturing. Emphasis is placed on institutional concerns regarding ownership and operation. International treaties and conventions and their effects on space station development are analyzed, and
current international law and policy issues in the context of operational
space stations are reviewed. The author, an attorney, is editor of SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS.
STANLEY, C.M., MANAGING GLOBAL PROBLEMS; Stanley Foundation,
Muscatine, Iowa 52761 (1979); distributed in U.S. by University of Iowa
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index, bibliography, appendix of acronyms.
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global problems. The author suggests various approaches, procedures and
mechanisms that are capable of dealing with the global problems discussed. Emphasizing the interrelationships of critical global issues and
the importance of dealing with them in a comprehensive manner, the
book is directed both to international decisionmakers and to students of
decisionmaking processes.
SzA6, I., & PIrERI, Z. (editors), A SOCIALIST APPROACH TO COMPARATIE LAW; A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden, The Netherlands, or Akad6miai Kiad6,
Budapest, Hungary (1977); $24.25; ISBN 90 286 015 70 (Sijthoff), ISBN
963 05 1032 4 (Akad6miai Kiad6); 235 p; footnotes, tables, annex, graph.
Foreward by I. Szab6; translated by I. Mora; translation revised by G.
Pulay.
Seven Hungarian legal scholars present to Western readers the socialist methodology and theory of comparative law, illustrating the differences between socialist and non-socialist approaches. The spectrum of the
contributions is broad, covering topics in criminology, contracts, civil law,
theory, government, and private international law.
G., THE PERMANENT ALLIANCE: THE EUROPEAN-AMERICAN
1945-1984; Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers,
Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1977); available in U.S. from
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767;
$42.50 (cloth); ISBN 90 286 0466 9 (cloth); xi, 407 p.; appendices and
index. Written under a NATO fellowship.
WILLIAMS,
PARTNERSHIP,

A political and military survey of the post-World War II EuropeanAmerican alliance, this analysis by a British international political scientist traces the course of American involvement in Western Europe from
the beginnings of the Cold War, through 1976 and the introduction of
Brandt's Ostpolitik, and projects into the future. Mr. Williams sees the
coincidence of economic, political, and strategic interests between the
U.S. and Europe as making this alliance a natural one despite the inherent conflict between the ideas of Atlantic unity and European integration.
ZWEIGERT, K., & KROPHOLLER, J. (editors), SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW: VOL. I, PRIvATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW; Sijthoff &
Noorhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1977); available in U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century
Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $105.00 (cloth); ISBN 90 218 9131 X
(cloth); xxxii, 1056 p.; footnotes, chronological tables, consecutive English,
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The three-volume compendium attempts to compose a sourcebook
which is comprehensive of every text of uniform private international law
now in force, without regard to the method of creation of the law. This
first, general volume covers different areas of private and commercial law
but excludes regional and internal uniform law, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code and the unification laws of the Benelux countries; however, the Nordic countries' uniform laws are reproduced. Most public,
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procedural, and labor law topics are excluded. Two more specialized
volumes, on transportation law and on the law of copyright, competition,
and industrial property, are to follow.

